

Shadow Owners and Personalistic Power: Challenges in Tracing Corrupt Assets in the 2026 KPK Sting Operation Involving the Regent of Pekalongan

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Abstract : *Political corruption at the regional level has evolved from conventional bribery schemes to complex manipulation of corporate structures. This study analyzes the phenomenon of the Pekalongan Regent's Catch-and-Arrest Operation (OTT) to reveal how personalistic power facilitates the creation of shadow owners in regional strategic projects. Using a juridical-normative method with a case study and conceptual approach, this study dissects the abuse of formal authority through the practice of trading in influence. The research findings show: (1) Personalistic Power enables control of the procurement ecosystem through informal instructions that are impermeable to administrative traces; (2) Trading in Influence becomes an instrument for entrepreneurs to access projects, where the flow of benefits is channeled through family or staff nominees to break the chain of proof to public officials; (3) Obstacles to asset tracking arise due to the failure of digital systems to detect unusual financial profiles at the nominee layer. This study concludes that current beneficial ownership regulations are still a formality without legal teeth. Therefore, it is recommended that legal reconstruction be carried out through the independent criminalization of influence peddling in accordance with Article 18 of the UNCAC and the acceleration of the ratification of the Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture instrument to tear down the veil of corporate secrecy that conceals illegal wealth.*

Keywords : *Personalistic Power; Shadow Owners; Trading in Influence; Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture*

Abstrak : *Korupsi politik di tingkat daerah telah berevolusi dari skema suap konvensional menjadi manipulasi struktur korporasi yang kompleks. Penelitian ini menganalisis fenomena Operasi Tangkap Tanggangan (OTT) Bupati Pekalongan untuk mengungkap bagaimana kekuasaan personalistik memfasilitasi terciptanya pemilik bayangan dalam proyek strategis daerah. Menggunakan metode yuridis-normatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus dan konseptual, penelitian ini membedah penyalahgunaan otoritas formal melalui praktik perdagangan pengaruh. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan: (1) Personalistic Power*



memungkinkan kontrol ekosistem pengadaan melalui instruksi informal yang kedap jejak administratif; (2) Trading in Influence menjadi instrumen bagi pengusaha untuk mengakses proyek, di mana aliran manfaat dialirkan melalui nominee keluarga atau staf guna memutus rantai pembuktian ke pejabat publik; (3) Hambatan pelacakan aset muncul akibat kegagalan sistem digital dalam mendeteksi profil finansial yang tidak wajar pada lapisan nominee. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa regulasi Beneficial Ownership saat ini masih bersifat formalitas tanpa taring yuridis. Oleh karena itu, direkomendasikan rekonstruksi hukum melalui kriminalisasi mandiri perdagangan pengaruh sesuai Pasal 18 UNCAC dan percepatan pengesahan instrumen perampasan aset tanpa pemidanaan (Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture) untuk merobek tirai kerahasiaan korporasi yang menyembunyikan kekayaan ilegal.

Kata kunci : Kekuasaan Personalistik; Pemilik Bayangan; Perdagangan Pengaruh; Penyitaan Aset Tanpa Dasar Keyakinan

Introduction

Amidst the global tide of transparency, corrupt practices are no longer conducted through conventional means, such as the direct exchange of cash in secluded spaces. Instead, corruption has evolved into a sophisticated white-collar crime that leverages complex corporate structures¹. A primary instrument in this evolution is the use of Shadow Owners, in which the actual perpetrators—the Beneficial Owners—conceal themselves behind proxies or legal entities to sever the asset-tracing trail pursued by law enforcement².

In Indonesia, this phenomenon is exacerbated by the entrenched style of Personalistic Power at the regional level. Post-decentralisation, regional heads often emerge as central figures wielding absolute control over the bureaucracy and economic resources within their jurisdictions³. Power concentrated in an individual—rather than a system—creates an environment ripe for unquestioning loyalty. Within this ecosystem, a regional head's instructions are often perceived as "commands" that must be executed by subordinates and private partners alike, often bypassing formal administrative safeguards⁴.

Such personalistic power serves as the primary capital for Trading in Influence. In accordance with international standards⁵, public officials do not always accept direct bribes to exercise their authority. Frequently, they merely exert their "influence" or standing to direct strategic projects toward specific parties. In exchange, the project benefits flow to a network of Shadow

¹ David Chaikin and J C Sharman, *Corruption and Money Laundering: A Symbiotic Relationship* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

² Michael Johnston, *Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

³ Vedi Hadiz, Vedi R Hadiz, and Richard Robison, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (London: Routledge, 2004).

⁴ Moch Dani Pratama Huzaini, "Tentang Nominee Agreement Sebagai Modus Dalam TPPU," *Hukum Online.Com*, September 23, 2022.

⁵ United Nations, *United Nations Convention Against Corruption* (United of State America, 2004), https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.

Owners—comprising family members, aides, or shell companies—who legally omit the official's name while remaining factually under their control.

This phenomenon gains significant relevance in the Sting Operation (OTT) involving the Regent of Pekalongan. This case serves as both an anomaly and a recurring pattern in the Corruption Eradication Commission's (KPK) efforts. Despite the issuance of legal instruments such as Presidential Regulation No. 13 of 2018 on Beneficial Ownership, empirical evidence shows that tracing corrupt assets still faces a formidable wall in the face of personalistic loyalty networks and sophisticated ownership manipulation.

The novelty of this study lies in its integration of Personalistic Power and Shadow Ownership within the Indonesian legal framework. While existing literature often emphasises administrative failures, this research provides a fresh perspective by exposing Trading in Influence as a critical gap (a 'black hole') that shields illicit actors and obstructs global transparency initiatives at the local level.

Methods

The study adopts a Juridical-Normative research method to examine norms, principles, and the legal framework surrounding corruption cases, focusing on the investigation of Personalistic Power and Shadow Owners. A Case Approach is employed by analysing the Corruption Eradication Commission's (KPK) Sting Operation (OTT) involving the Regent of Pekalongan, which highlights the dynamics of corruption. Additionally, a Conceptual Approach is used to evaluate legal doctrines such as Trading in Influence and Beneficial Ownership through scholarly views and legal principles.

The research utilises secondary data, including primary Legal materials such as the Anti-Corruption Law (UU Tipikor), the Money Laundering Law (UU TPPU), and Presidential Regulation No. 13 of 2018 on Beneficial Ownership, as well as legal documents related to the Pekalongan Regent case. Secondary Legal Materials include textbooks, scientific journals, and research from anti-corruption organisations, while Tertiary Legal Materials include legal dictionaries and media reports. Data were collected through Documentary Studies (Library Research), including the inventory and systematisation of relevant documents and literature. Qualitative data analysis was conducted using a Deductive Method, beginning with a Grand Theory of power and transparency, which was applied to the Pekalongan Regent case for comprehensive conclusions on tracing corrupt proceeds.

Result And Discussion

The Anatomy of Personalistic Power and Trading in Influence in the Pekalongan Regent's Sting Operation

The manifestation of corruption at the regional level is often inseparable from the dominance of Personalistic Power inherent in the regional head. In the context of the Pekalongan Regent's sting operation (OTT), power is no longer viewed as an administrative mandate but as a personal authority capable of

mobilising bureaucratic structures outside formal channels. This aligns with the concept of neo-patrimonialism, in which public officials use legal-rational authority for personal gain through informal loyalty networks⁶.

The practice of Trading in Influence serves as the primary bridge in this scheme. As a holder of personalistic power, the Regent does not need to be directly involved in the technicalities of auctions or procurement administration. The influence possessed is sufficient to provide "directives" or "blessings" to procurement committees or department heads. Referring to Article 18 of the UNCAC⁷, such actions constitute the abuse of real or perceived influence to obtain an undue advantage—actions that are often difficult to prosecute under the conventional bribery articles of the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Law (UU Tipikor).

In this case, such influence is "sold" to private entities or contractors. The compensation is frequently disguised through sophisticated schemes to ensure it does not touch the official directly. Herein lies the legal anomaly in Indonesia: although the act of selling influence is palpably real and serves as the engine of corruption, law enforcement often continues to rely on conventional bribery articles because the offence of Trading in Influence has not yet been explicitly and independently adopted into national positive law⁸.

A consequence of strong personalistic loyalty is the emergence of the Shadow Owners phenomenon. To secure assets derived from influence trading, third parties with close personal ties—such as family members, aides, or trusted confidants—are used as formal owners (nominees) of the assets or companies that win the projects. The use of these nominees aims to conceal the identity of the actual Beneficial Owner, who is a public official⁹.

In the Pekalongan sting operation, we can observe a pattern where:

1. Assets are not registered in the Regent's name; however, managerial control and economic benefits remain entirely under his command.
2. Shell companies or nominees are used to channel project funding flows so that, in a legal-formal sense, the Regent appears "clean" and free from conflicts of interest.
3. The relationship between the Regent (Patron) and the entrepreneur or confidant (Client) creates a "watertight" ecosystem resistant to external oversight.

Personalistic power ensures that these "shadow owners" remain loyal by providing political and economic protection. This is precisely why asset tracing becomes exceptionally challenging; investigators are not merely facing stacks of legal documents but a "wall of personal loyalty" built on skewed power relations¹⁰.

⁶ Hadiz, Hadiz, and Robison, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*.

⁷ United Nations, *United Nations Convention Against Corruption*.

⁸ Rimawan Pradiptyo, *Korupsi Dan Celah Hukum Dalam Sistem Pengadaan Barang Dan Jasa Pemerintah* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2016).

⁹ Kristiawanto, *Beneficial Ownership: Reorientasi Kebijakan Hukum Dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi*.

¹⁰ Chaikin and Sharman, *Corruption and Money Laundering: A Symbiotic Relationship*.

The Asset Tracing Labyrinth: Juridical and Technical Barriers in Piercing the Veil of Beneficial Ownership

Asset tracing in cases involving personalistic power, such as the Pekalongan Regent's sting operation (OTT), is not merely an administrative challenge; it is an endeavour to navigate a legal labyrinth deliberately constructed to obscure the origins of wealth.

Furthermore, in corruption cases involving personalistic power, ownership structures are frequently manipulated through "Mother Company" or Family-Based Holding schemes. For instance, a pattern emerged in which PT RNB was legally owned or controlled by a "Mother" figure (a core family member of the official), yet substantially served as an instrument to collect project fees from private contractors. This scheme creates a double layer of protection: first, corporately through the entity of PT RNB; and second, sociologically through high-loyalty family bonds (*Omerta*). From a legal perspective, this represents a clear abuse of the Separate Legal Entity principle to conceal the actual Ultimate Beneficial Owner—the public official¹¹.

The use of family members as owners of PT RNB complicates asset tracing because investigators often struggle to establish a Causal Nexus. The accused can easily argue that PT RNB's capital originated from private family wealth, independent of the Regent's office. Without an Illicit Enrichment instrument, the state finds it difficult to prove that the surge in wealth within PT RNB resulted from Trading in Influence, unless an identical cash flow (follow-the-money) can be matched to the disbursement timing of regional projects¹².

A major obstacle is the use of legal entities as "shields." In many regional corruption cases, illicit proceeds are injected into companies that are legally distinct from the Regent's person. Investigators must be able to prove that such companies are merely the alter ego of the official. However, piercing the corporate veil requires complex evidentiary manoeuvres, particularly if the Shadow Owners testify that the capital originated from their personal funds¹³. This creates a significant hurdle for law enforcement in proving that the actual control and economic benefits remain in the public official's hands.

In regional sting operations, it is common to find assets registered under the names of those in the official's innermost circle, such as drivers, aides, or honorary staff. Technically, tracing becomes difficult when these assets are transferred multiple times in short succession to parties with no apparent financial link (layering). Juridically, Indonesian regulations still possess loopholes regarding the prosecution of service providers or individuals whose names are borrowed (nominees). If they claim ignorance of the funds' origins, the assets are often "stalled" during the seizure process due to claims by third parties acting in good faith¹⁴.

Despite Presidential Regulation No. 13 of 2018, its effectiveness is hindered by data synchronisation issues. The integration between the General Legal Administration (AHU) system at the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and

¹¹ Kristiawanto, *Beneficial Ownership: Reorientasi Kebijakan Hukum Dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi*.

¹² Nur Rohim Yunus, *Keadilan Hukum Dalam Perampasan Aset Korupsi* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2017).

¹³ Fuady, *Doktrin-Doktrin Modern Dalam Hukum Perdata*.

¹⁴ Yunus, *Keadilan Hukum Dalam Perampasan Aset Korupsi*.

the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK) is not yet fully automated or transparent to field investigators¹⁵. In fast-paced sting operations, investigators race against time to prevent Shadow Owners from transferring assets. Personalistic Power allows the official to issue rapid instructions to underground networks to "cleanse" data or assets the moment an investigation is detected.

Finally, tracing corrupt proceeds in Indonesia remains heavily reliant on the prosecutor's ability to prove the predicate offence. Without the full implementation of the Illicit Enrichment concept, investigators struggle to seize the assets of Shadow Owners, even when their financial profiles—such as an aide possessing billions of rupiah—are incongruous¹⁶. As long as prosecutors cannot directly link the asset to a specific bribe flow within the OTT, the asset often escapes forfeiture under conventional criminal evidentiary standards.

The phenomenon of the profile gap—the discrepancy between asset value and legitimate income—within a public official's inner circle is a recurring typology in Indonesian corruption. By comparison, in the cases of Rohadi (a court clerk) or Fuad Amin (former Regent of Bangkalan), billions of rupiah in assets were registered under the names of drivers or aides who lacked the economic capacity to own them. This pattern confirms that Personalistic Power creates patron-client relationships that utilise nominees as legal shields. Without Non-Conviction Based (NCB) Asset Forfeiture instruments, seizing assets held by these nominees remains difficult, as the legal system remains fixated on formal ownership rather than factual material control.

Regulatory Evaluation and Legal Reconstruction: Closing Transparency Loopholes Behind the Veil of Power

The effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in cases like the Pekalongan Regent's sting operation (OTT) depends heavily on the extent to which legal instruments can pursue hidden assets. However, an evaluation of current regulations reveals a disparity between the perpetrators' sophisticated modus operandi and the limited reach of existing rules.

The implementation of Beneficial Ownership (BO) principles through Presidential Regulation No. 13 of 2018 was a progressive step. Nevertheless, when faced with personalistic power, this regulation encounters serious obstacles. First, the Self-Declaration mechanism allows corporations to report only formal names rather than the actual regional power-holder as the true controller. Second, the Lack of Sanctions—administrative penalties for dishonest corporations remain weak, failing to deter Shadow Owners¹⁷.

A significant weakness in our legal system is the failure to explicitly adopt Article 18 of the UNCAC regarding Trading in Influence into the Anti-Corruption Law. In the Pekalongan Regent case, "selling influence" is often the primary entry point. Without this specific offence, prosecutors are forced to use bribery or gratuity articles that require evidence of direct fund flows

¹⁵ Kristiawanto, *Beneficial Ownership: Reorientasi Kebijakan Hukum Dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi*.

¹⁶ Hadi Prasetyo, *Korupsi Korporasi Dan Beneficial Ownership* (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2021).

¹⁷ Kristiawanto, *Beneficial Ownership: Reorientasi Kebijakan Hukum Dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi*.

(follow the money), whereas in Shadow Owner schemes these flows are deliberately severed through nominees.

As a strategic solution, Indonesia requires the accelerated enactment of the Asset Forfeiture Bill. The Non-Conviction Based (NCB) Asset Forfeiture mechanism allows the state to seize assets suspected of being proceeds of crime without waiting for a criminal conviction (in personam). It suffices to prove that the assets held by Shadow Owners (e.g., aides or relatives) are disproportionate to their legitimate income, known as Illicit Enrichment¹⁸.

Applying NCB Asset Forfeiture in regional personalistic corruption requires a strong Material Nexus. Unlike In Personam systems that target the perpetrator's guilt, the NCB mechanism focuses on the status of the asset (In Rem). The challenge in the Pekalongan case is proving the Causal Nexus between the regent's personalistic power and the acquisition of assets formally held by Shadow Owners. By shifting the burden of proof to the asset holder to demonstrate the legal origin of their wealth, the veil of Beneficial Ownership protected by Personalistic Power can be dismantled for state asset recovery.

Radical Transparency through Cross-Sectoral Data Integration

To counter personalistic power, real-time synchronisation among wealth reports (LHKPN), legal administration systems (AHU), banking data (PPATK), and procurement systems (LKPP) is essential. This legal reconstruction involves implementing an AI-based Red-Flag Detection system:

1. LHKPN vs Banking (PPATK): Detecting suspicious spikes in the accounts of aides or staff that do not match their salary profiles.
2. AHU System vs Procurement (LKPP): Automatically cross-checking the Beneficial Owners of tender winners against staff or family databases to flag Conflicts of Interest.
3. Tax Data vs Asset Monitoring: Identifying "Shadow Owners" who report luxury assets in tax filings despite low income, triggering immediate clarification through the reverse burden of proof.

Digital Mapping and Technical Implementation. The digitisation of nominee asset mapping can be realised through a Monitoring Integration Dashboard (MID) or a real-time Early Warning System, utilising:

1. BO Risk Score: Automatically blocking tenders if a "red flag" connection is found between the company owner and the regional head.
2. Financial Profiling Algorithms: Using radar charts to visualise the gap between official income and assets registered at the National Land Agency (BPN).

¹⁸ United Nations, *United Nations Convention Against Corruption*.

3. Network Link Analysis: Digital spider-web diagrams connecting "Nodes" (Regent, Aides, Shell Companies, and Properties) to expose circular flows of regional funds.
4. Geospatial Tracking (GIS): Detecting "Insider Trading" where financially incapable nominees suddenly purchase land around new infrastructure projects.

The aforementioned legal reconstruction encompasses three main pillars:

1. Legality of Digital Evidence (Digital Nexus): The law must recognise the results of Network Link Analysis as valid circumstantial evidence (alat bukti petunjuk) to establish a nexus between an official's personalistic power and nominee assets. This reconstruction shifts the evidentiary standard from a rigid "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to a "balance of probabilities" standard in civil or administrative domains for the seizure of suspicious assets.
2. Formalisation of In Rem Mechanisms (Non-Criminal Asset Forfeiture): Digital mapping technology will remain ineffective if the law continues to mandate a criminal conviction against the perpetrator (In Personam). Legal reconstruction is achieved by adopting Non-Conviction Based (NCB) Asset Forfeiture mechanisms. Under this scheme, digital mapping results showing a "gap profile" in Shadow Owners would suffice as the basis for the state to forfeit assets, in accordance with international standards outlined in Article 54 of the UNCAC¹⁹.
3. Shifting the Burden of Proof: Through radical transparency, legal reconstruction is directed toward the full implementation of the reversal of the burden of proof for assets flagged by digital systems. When the system detects a nominee holding assets inconsistent with their profile, the legal burden to prove the legitimate origin of the wealth shifts to the asset holder, rather than to the prosecutor²⁰.

Consequently, this legal reconstruction is not merely a procedural refinement but an effort to de-personalise power. Through a real-time integrated system, the informal "commands" of regional heads will directly collide with a digital "wall of transparency," thereby severing the economic incentives of Shadow Ownership practices²¹.

A fundamental question arises: if digital transparency systems (such as e-Katalog and SIRUP) already exist, why did Shadow Ownership practices in the Pekalongan Regent case remain undetected? This research identifies that this failure stems from four primary factors:

1. The Digital Facade Phenomenon: Current digital procurement systems often function merely as an administrative "shell." Procedurally, nominee companies fulfil all digital requirements, yet the system fails to detect the Beneficial Owner behind the scenes. This occurs because

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Yunus, *Keadilan Hukum Dalam Perampasan Aset Korupsi*.

²¹ Pradiptyo, *Korupsi Dan Celah Hukum Dalam Sistem Pengadaan Barang Dan Jasa Pemerintah*.

data verification remains manual and is not integrated with banking databases in real-time²².

2. Algorithmic Limitations in Detecting Trading in Influence: E-procurement systems are designed to detect procedural errors (e.g., incomplete documentation) but are not equipped to detect informal "decrees" or influence exerted outside the system. Personalistic power operates in "dark spaces" (verbal communication), while digital systems only record the final output that appears legally valid²³.
3. The Issue of Data Silos: Although LHKPN, the AHU system, and procurement data are available digitally, each institution operates in an isolated "silo." Without automated integration, the procurement system will not trigger a red flag even if a tender winner is the regent's aide, because personnel data does not "communicate" automatically with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights' corporate ownership data²⁴.

Weaknesses in the Reversal of the Burden of Proof for Nominee Assets: In the current legal system, even when digital systems indicate anomalies (e.g., a driver possessing billions in assets), law enforcement cannot immediately seize those assets without first proving the predicate offence. This is why digital systems appear "toothless": they can detect irregularities, but the law provides no authority to execute findings without a protracted criminal process²⁵.

Conclusion

This research concludes that the phenomenon of Shadow Owners in regional head corruption is a pathological manifestation of Personalistic Power that exploits loopholes in corporate transparency regulations. The case of the Pekalongan Regent's sting operation (OTT) demonstrates that asset-tracing instruments will continue to run into a wall of impunity as long as Trading in Influence is not independently criminalised under national positive law.

The utilisation of personalistic loyalty networks—ranging from personal aides to "Mother Company" structures (such as PT RNB)—has created a dual-layered shield that severs the Causal Nexus between authority and illicit wealth. The failure of current digital systems (the Digital Facade) illustrates that transparency without juridical "teeth" merely shifts the locus of corruption into darker, informal spaces.

As an antithesis, a radical legal reconstruction is required through the enactment of the Asset Forfeiture Bill, which features Non-Conviction Based (NCB) Asset Forfeiture mechanisms. This transformation must be driven by cross-sectoral data integration that shifts the law enforcement paradigm from reactive-conventional to preventive-proactive. Only by piercing the abused principle of Separate Legal Entity and adopting the concept of Illicit

²² Kristiawanto, *Beneficial Ownership: Reorientasi Kebijakan Hukum Dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi*.

²³ Pradiptyo, *Korupsi Dan Celah Hukum Dalam Sistem Pengadaan Barang Dan Jasa Pemerintah*.

²⁴ Chaikin and Sharman, *Corruption and Money Laundering: A Symbiotic Relationship*.

²⁵ Joseph J Senturia, *Political Corruption*. In *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan Pub, 1930).

Enrichment can the state effectively dismantle the economic incentives of corrupt power and achieve optimal public asset recovery.

Recommendation

Based on the findings and analysis, this research proposes several strategic measures to strengthen asset tracing and corruption eradication at the regional level. Primarily, it is imperative for the Legislature (DPR-RI) and the Government to urgently revise the Anti-Corruption Law to adopt Article 18 of the UNCAC fully. This step is crucial to ensure that trading in influence by regional heads can be prosecuted independently, bypassing the evidentiary hurdles of conventional bribery, which are often obscured by nominee schemes. Furthermore, the enactment of the Asset Forfeiture Bill must be accelerated, with a rigorous emphasis on the Non-Conviction Based (NCB) Asset Forfeiture mechanism. Such an instrument is vital for forfeiting illicit enrichment held by Shadow Owners, as demonstrated in cases like the PT RNB scheme, where the primary perpetrators often evade immediate criminal conviction.

In tandem with legislative reform, the Judiciary and law enforcement agencies—including the KPK, the Attorney General’s Office, and the National Police—must shift their approach toward the "Piercing the Corporate Veil" doctrine. Prosecutors and judges should be encouraged to apply this principle in corruption cases involving family-owned enterprises, prioritising material ownership and economic benefit over formal legal documentation. This should be complemented by optimising evidentiary instruments to compel nominees, such as aides or relatives, to justify wealth profiles inconsistent with their documented income. Finally, at the administrative level, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, LKPP, and PPATK must develop a real-time integrated digital platform that connects Beneficial Ownership databases, wealth reports (LHKPN), and procurement systems. By implementing AI-based Red-Flag Detection and transitioning from self-declaration to rigorous factual verification for corporations in strategic tenders, the state can more effectively map and dismantle the networks of influence that facilitate regional corruption.

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