

Indonesian Police Reform: Balancing Independence and Accountability

Edi Saputra Hasibuan

Universitas Bhayangkara Jakarta Raya

Email: edi.hasibuan@dsn.ubharajaya.ac.id

Article Information:

Received:	Revised:	Accepted:	Published:
April 20, 2026	June 20, 2026	July 23, 2026	July 31, 2026

This article was originally written in Indonesian. The English version was generated using machine translation and subsequently revised and refined by a professional language editor. In the event of any discrepancy, the original Indonesian text shall prevail.

Abstract : *The placement of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) within the constitutional structure—directly under the President or under a ministry—remains a contested issue in Indonesia’s security-sector reform amid a persistent deficit in public trust and human rights protection. This article analyses the direction of police reform and weighs the constitutional consequences of both placement options. Employing a juridical-normative method with statutory, conceptual, case, and comparative approaches, this study examines primary and secondary legal materials, including Constitutional Court Decision No. 19/PUU-XXIII/2025. The study finds that the dichotomy of ‘under the President versus under a ministry’ is a false binary: the quality of democratic policing depends not on the structural locus but on the design of institutional safeguards: namely, guaranteed*



Copyright © (2026) Edi Saputra Hasibuan. Jurnal Keamanan Nasional. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial 4.0 International License.

operational independence of investigation, legally empowered external oversight, and transparency. Comparative evidence from the United Kingdom, Japan, and France shows that police placed under a ministry can remain professional and democratic when such safeguards exist. The article recommends retaining Polri under the President while reconstructing the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) from an advisory body into an oversight body with binding ethical-investigative authority through amendment of Law No. 2 of 2002.

Keywords : *police reform; accountability; independence; democratic civilian control; democratic policing*

INTRODUCTION

Police reform is one of the most important agendas in the post-1998 reform democratization. The separation of the National Police from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) began through Presidential Instruction No. 2 of 1999, confirmed by MPR Decrees No. VI/MPR/2000 and VII/MPR/2000, and instituted through Law No. 2 of 2002 concerning the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia. Through this series, Polri is expected to evolve into a professional, neutral, and service-oriented civilian institution.¹ However, more than two decades later, the polemic regarding the position and direction of the National Police reform is still relevant to debate.²

As a state apparatus, the National Police is tasked with maintaining security and order, enforcing the law, and also providing protection and public service. In practice, the reality in the field is often inversely proportional to these normative expectations, thereby eroding public trust, which serves as the bedrock of institutional legitimacy.³

¹ Susatyo Purnomo Condro, "Perubahan Paradigma Pemolisian di Era Pandemi Covid-19," *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* Vol. 8, no. 1 (2022): p20, <https://doi.org/10.31599/7zxrtw15>

² Munif Ashri, "Dampak Akses ICCPR Terhadap Pencegahan Praktik Pembunuhan di Luar Hukum dalam Perspektif Indonesia," *Veritas et Justitia* 11, no. 1 (2025): 50–81.

³ Isna Putri Yustina, "Tinjauan Yuridis Kode Etik Kepolisian Republik Indonesia dalam Penegakan Hukum di Indonesia" (Dissertation, Universitas Islam Sultan Agung Semarang, 2024)

The results of the Indikator Politik Indonesia survey show that public trust in the National Police is at a high level but has been consistently eroded, namely 80% (2021), 77.3% (2022), 76.4% (2023), and 75.3% in early 2024. This erosion is volatile and susceptible to events, and is exacerbated by divergences between survey agencies: the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) in early 2025 placed the National Police as the law enforcement agency with the lowest trust compared to the Attorney General's Office and the KPK.⁴

Table 1.
Level of Public Trust in the National Police according to Indikator Politik Indonesia (2021–2024)

Year (Wave)	Highly Trusted (%)	Moderately Trusted (%)	Total (%)
2021 (Nov)	16	64	80,0
2022 (May)	11,8	65,5	77,3
2023 (Jun)	10,8	65,6	76,4
2024 (Jan)	12,0	63,0	75,3

Source: Indikator Politik Indonesia, *national survey 2021–2024 (processed by the author). Total = the sum of “highly trusted” and “moderately trusted” responses”.*

At least four factors explain the pressure on public trust: abuse of authority and violence by officials, illegal levies that are structural in nature, involvement of individuals in criminal acts, and major scandals such as the obstruction of justice case in the case of Brigadier J in 2022.⁵

⁴Data on the trend of the Indikator Politik Indonesia 2021–2025 as compiled from the release of the institution's survey; compare the Lembaga Survei Indonesia, *Survei Tingkat Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Lembaga Penegak Hukum* (Jakarta: LSI, Februari 2025).

⁵Kompas, “Kasus Obstruction of Justice Pembunuhan Brigadir J Mengguncang Reformasi Polri,” edisi Agustus 2022.

The 2023 Kompolnas report places complaints of maladministration and abuse of authority ranked as the second highest category, emphasizing that problems are systemic, not just individual.⁶

The problem has become increasingly salient/highly topical due to the rolling out of the draft revision of Law Number 2 of 2002 (Police Bill) since 2024 which has been criticized as having the potential to expand authority without strengthening accountability safeguards, while on the other hand the Constitutional Court Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025 emphasizes that the position of the National Police remains under the President and cannot be reduced to a ministerial level.⁷

Departing from this context, this article answers two research questions. *First*, what is the direction of the reform of the National Police in responding to the crisis of public trust related to the abuse of authority and human rights violations? *Second*, what are the constitutional consequences of placing the National Police under the President compared to under a ministry, as well as the ideal supervisory design for both options?"

This article contributes theoretically by shifting the focus of the debate from the structural locus ("under whom") to the design of institutional safeguards ("with what safeguards"), using the framework of democratic policing and democratic civilian control. Empirically, this article integrates the latest survey data, legislative developments (Police Bill), jurisprudence (Constitutional Court Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025), and police institutional practices in a number of democratic countries as the basis for the recommendation of *the ius constituendum*.

⁶Kompolnas, *Laporan Tahunan Pengaduan Masyarakat terhadap Polri* (Jakarta: Kompolnas, 2023).

⁷The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia (Mahkamah Konstitusi), Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025, regarding the position of the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia as a state tool under the President.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Recent Literature

The study of the reform of the National Police in the last five years is divided into several focuses. In the empirical-diagnostic realm, Hasani, Halili, and Yosarie mapped 130 institutional problems through a survey of 167 experts and found a gap in accountability in Law Number 2 of 2002 (61.7% of expert assessments were unfavorable), accompanied by a comparison of France and the Netherlands.⁸ Adhikara, Putranto, and Gurion examine the search for legitimacy in contemporary policing,⁹ while Hatmawan examines public compliance in the midst of the tense police-community relationship.¹⁰

In the normative-institutional realm, Amostian, Yusriyadi, and Silviana highlight the weak authority of the National Police Commission as a point vulnerable to accountability,¹¹ while the previous author evaluated the Presisi program as a trust-building strategy.¹²

The international literature enriches the perspective of supervision. Hope points out that civilian oversight is the main approach to "policing the police" in a democratic society, complete with its typologies and challenges;¹³ Rosenthal

⁸Ismail Hasani, Halili, and Ikhsan Yosarie, "Police Transformation within Constitutional Democracy Design: Evidence from Indonesia," *Jurnal Civics: Media Kajian Kewarganegaraan* 23, no. 1 (2026): 331–346.

⁹R. Adhikara, P. Y. Putranto, dan A. B. Gurion, "In Pursuit for Legitimacy: An Overview of Contemporary Policing in Indonesia," *Eduvest: Journal of Universal Studies* 4, no. 2 (2024): 687–702.

¹⁰Ilham Dwi Hatmawan, "Public Compliance towards Indonesian National Police (POLRI) Authority in the Midst of a Strained Public–Police Relationship," *Jurnal Kriminologi Indonesia* 1, no. 1 (2025): Article 6.

¹¹Amostian, Yusriyadi, and Ana Silviana, "Reformasi Polri Melalui Penguatan Fungsi dan Kewenangan Komisi Kepolisian Nasional dalam Melakukan Pengawasan Eksternal terhadap Polri," *Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia* 5, no. 3 (2023): 510–522.

¹²Edi Saputra Hasibuan, "Reformasi Polri: Menilik Keberhasilan Program Presisi Polri," *Krtha Bhayangkara* 17, no. 3 (2023): 515–524.

¹³Kempe Ronald Hope Sr., "Civilian Oversight for Democratic Policing and Its Challenges: Overcoming Obstacles for Improved Police Accountability and Better Security in Africa and Beyond," *Journal of Applied Security Research* 16, no. 4 (2021): 422–447.

maps the perspectives of the directors of civilian oversight agencies,¹⁴ and Adams experimentally examines the police leadership's support for democratic oversight regimes.¹⁵

Gap Analysis

The existing literature generally stops at the diagnosis of dysfunction, performance evaluation, or strengthening of one supervisory institution. Relatively no study has specifically examined the structural dichotomy of the placement of the National Police—under the President or ministries—by clashing it with the theory of democratic policing and democratic civilian control as well as on the design of the police supervisory body in the comparative jurisdiction, especially in the context of the 2024 National Police Bill and the Constitutional Court Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025. This is the void that this article aims to fill.

Main Theory

First, democratic policing (David H. Bayley): democratic policing is subject to democratically elected laws and authorities, prioritizing citizen safety, transparency, and respect for human rights; its democratic quality is not measured by who it is structurally accountable, but by its accountability to the law and the public.¹⁶

Second, democratic civilian control (Samuel P. Huntington): *objective civilian control* maximizes professionalism by maintaining the professional autonomy of the

¹⁴Robert A. Rosenthal, “Perspectives of Directors of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement Agencies,” *Policing: An International Journal* 41, no. 4 (2018): 435–447.

¹⁵Brian Adams et al., “Police Reform from the Top Down: Experimental Evidence on Police Executive Support for Civilian Oversight,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22620>.

¹⁶David H. Bayley, *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 2001), 13–14.

apparatus from political intervention, as opposed to *subjective civilian control* which subordinates the apparatus to political factions.¹⁷

Third, accountability (Guillermo O'Donnell): horizontal accountability—oversight by another state's agency that has the authority to question and sanction—is key; weak horizontal accountability occurs when supervisors do not have coercive powers.¹⁸ Fourth, *the state of law* as a normative frame that demands the neutrality of the apparatus, the rule of law, and equality before the law.¹⁹

Conceptual Framework


As illustrated in Figure 1, this research framework progresses systematically from problem identification to policy recommendations. It begins with the crisis of public trust and human rights protection, which gives rise to a structural dichotomy regarding police governance. This dilemma is then critically examined through three analytical lenses, shifting the conceptual focus toward institutional safeguard design. Ultimately, this logical progression yields concrete recommendations for structural restructuring (*see the figure at next page, [ed]*).

¹⁷Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80–85.

¹⁸Guillermo O'Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 3 (1998): 112–126.

¹⁹Jimly Asshiddiqie, *Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2022), 189.

Figure 1. Research Conceptual Framework



Source: Author's construction (2026).

RESEARCH METHODS

This research is a juridical-normative (doctrinal) law research that places norms, principles, and doctrines as the object of study. This type was chosen because the focus of the analysis is the constitutional position of the National Police and the harmonization of its arrangements, not field behavior testing; Therefore, the research does not use primary data (interviews/questionnaires), but rather a study of documents on legal materials and secondary data.²⁰

²⁰Ariman Sitompul, *Metode Penelitian Hukum Normatif: Strategi Praktis Penulisan Skripsi, Tesis, dan Disertasi* (Medan: t.p., 2022), 30–40.

Four integrated approaches are used: the statute *approach* to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the MPR Decree No. VI and VII/MPR/2000, and Law No. 2 of 2002; the *conceptual approach* to democratic policing, democratic civilian control, and accountability; the *case approach* on the Constitutional Court's Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025 and legal events that triggered a crisis of trust (Ferdy Sambo case, the Kanjuruhan tragedy); and a *comparative approach* to the institutional model of policing in the United Kingdom, Japan, and France.

Primary legal materials include the above regulations and rulings; Secondary legal materials include the Komnas HAM Report (2023), Kompolnas report, survey data on Political Indicators, LSI, and Kompas R&D (2021–2025), books, and articles from reputable journals; tertiary material in the form of a legal dictionary. The collection technique is carried out through literature study. Analysis is prescriptive-qualitative, interpreting and connecting norms with theories to produce arguments *ius constituendum*.

The validity of legal materials is maintained in two ways: verification of primary sources in official repositories (regulatory databases, Directory of Supreme Court and Constitutional Court Decisions, and official reports of state institutions), and triangulation of secondary data between sources—in particular comparing cross-agency survey figures to avoid unverified claims.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Key Findings: Crisis of Trust, Accountability, and Human Rights

Measured by democratic policing standards, the transformation of the National Police has not been fully realized. The biggest problem is accountability: normatively there is internal (Propam) and external (Kompolnas, DPR) supervision, but its effectiveness is weak because Kompolnas only serves as an advisory body without binding investigative authority, while the President's control is political and does not reach violations of operational ethics.²¹ The

²¹Satjipto Rahardjo, *Polisi dan Masyarakat dalam Negara Demokrasi*, (Bandung: Alumni, 2022), 156.

accountability deficit, thus, stems from the absence of coercive authority on the supervisor, not from the absence of its institution.

The structural vulnerability of internal oversight was starkly demonstrated in the Ferdy Sambo case, where the abuse of authority within the Internal Affairs Division (Propam) led to systematic obstruction of justice. Concurrently, institutional failures such as the Kanjuruhan stadium tragedy further exposed the critical deficit in operational accountability and human rights protection, directly triggering the sharp decline in public trust.

The weakness of independence worsened the situation; in various political moments, the National Police was often perceived as not neutral, even though in a state of law the apparatus must be free from political intervention.²² The stigma of law enforcement being 'sharp downwards, blunt upwards' exposes the stark contradiction between the ideal of equality before the law and actual discriminatory practices.²³

In the human rights dimension, the 2023 Komnas HAM Report recorded the police as the party with the most complaints (around 37% of complaints), and this trend persists—in 2024 Komnas HAM again recorded the police as the institution with the most complaints.²⁴

Theoretical Analysis

With the framework of William N. Dunn's policy evaluation—effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, leveling, responsiveness, and precision—the National Police Grand Strategy 2005–2025 (Trust Building, Partnership

²²Muladi, *Demokrasi, HAM, dan Reformasi Kepolisian*, (Jakarta: Prenadamedia, 2023), 211.

²³Todung Mulya Lubis, *Hukum dan Politik di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2022), 94.

²⁴Komnas HAM RI, *Laporan Tahunan 2023: Situasi Hak Asasi Manusia di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Komnas HAM RI, 2023), 48; compare Komnas HAM 2024 complaint data which puts the police at the top. Saurin P. Siagian, "Sinergitas Komnas HAM RI dengan Propam Polri dalam Mitigasi Pelanggaran HAM," *Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*, 27 Mei 2025, https://dataham.komnasham.go.id/home/detail_komham/d82c8d1619ad8176d66553453cfb2e55f0

Building, Strive for Excellence) can be assessed.²⁵ The final stage that should have resulted in superiority and trust has not been fully effective: trust has been consistently eroded to 75.3% in early 2024 and highly volatile to events—from the 2022 shock to the sharp decline after the August 2025 riots—signaling a low responsiveness to accountability demands.²⁶

Discussion: Structural Design in the Perspective of Democratic Civic Control and Comparison

The placement of the National Police directly under the President gives high independence but poses accountability problems because supervision is not equal to its authority;²⁷ Conversely, placing the police under a ministry strengthens accountability through the minister's political accountability to Parliament, but opens up the risk of politicization.²⁸

Table 2.

Comparison of the Constitutional Consequences of Police Placement

Aspects	Under President	Under the Ministry
Independence	Higher; the potential for greater neutrality.	More vulnerable to the political interests of the ministry.

Source: processed by the author (2026).

²⁵William N. Dunn, *Public Policy Analysis: An Integrated Approach*, 5th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2012), 254–256.

²⁶Edi Saputra Hasibuan and Kurniawan Tri Wibowo, *Politik Hukum Kepolisian: Pembentukan Peraturan Kepolisian* (Yogyakarta: Jejak Pustaka, 2025), 113.

²⁷Bivitri Susanti, *Reformasi Sektor Keamanan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Epistema Institute, 2023), 81.

²⁸Todung Mulya Lubis, *Hukum dan Politik di Indonesia*, 99.

The claim that the placement of the police force under the ministry inherently weakens the institution is comparatively untenable. In the UK, the police are within the purview of the *Home Office*, but the operational independence of the chief of police is guaranteed by the doctrine of *operational independence*, with local accountability through the *Police and Crime Commissioners*.²⁹ In Japan, the *National Police Agency* is overseen by the *National Public Safety Commission* which maintains neutrality from partisan political control; in France, the *Police Nationale* is under the Ministry of the Interior but investigations are subject to the supervision of judicial authorities.³⁰

Some established democracies even place the police under ministries but balance them with oversight bodies with full investigative authority, such as the *Independent Police Conduct Authority* (New Zealand/Australia) and the *Civilian Review and Complaints Commission* (Canada). This kind of civilian supervision, as emphasized in the literature, is the main approach to maintaining accountability—an aspect that is precisely absent from the National Police Commission.³¹

Analyzed with Huntington's theory, the two options pursue the same goal through different paths; therefore the dichotomy of "under the President or the ministry" is a false opposition—the determining variable is not the structural box, but the quality of its safety design. These findings are in line with a recent study that places the accountability gap in Law No. 2 of 2002 as the root of the problem.³²

²⁹David H. Bayley, *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 60–64.

³⁰Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Guidebook on Democratic Policing* (Vienna: OSCE, 2008), 18–20.

³¹Kempe Ronald Hope Sr., "Civilian Oversight for Democratic Policing," 422–447; please see too Robert A. Rosenthal, "Perspectives of Directors of Civilian Oversight," 435–447.

³²Hasani, Halili, dan Yosarie, "Police Transformation within Constitutional Democracy Design," 331–346.

Juridically, this choice obtained constitutional affirmation. The Constitutional Court's Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025 states that the position of the National Police cannot be reduced to a ministerial level and remains under the President as the holder of government power, in line with Article 30 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000.³³

Implications: National Security and Policy

For national security, maintaining the National Police under the President maintains a clear line of command and reduces political fragmentation between ministries, but it is only valid if it is accompanied by strengthening horizontal accountability. For policy, the key implication is the need to reconstruct the design of external oversight – not simply move the structural locus – in order for the crisis of trust to be substantially addressed.

CONCLUSION

First, The direction of the National Police's reform in responding to the crisis of trust cannot be solved through structural changes alone. The accountability deficit stems from the lack of coercive authority on supervisors, weak independence from political intervention, inconsistencies in law enforcement, and lack of guaranteed human rights protection—four prerequisites for democratic policing.

Second, the dichotomy of placement "under the President or ministries" is a misguided opposition; The structural locus is not a determinant of the democratic quality of the police, but rather the design of its security. In the context of Indonesia, and strengthened by the Constitutional Court Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025, the most relevant option is to maintain the National Police under the President accompanied by strengthening horizontal accountability with legal force.

³³Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 19/PUU-XXIII/2025.

Policy implications: it is recommended to amend Law No. 2 of 2002 to reconstruct the National Police Commission from a advisory body to a supervisory institution with the authority to conduct binding ethical investigations, accompanied by periodic reporting to the public, as well as optimizing the role of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia over *the undue delay* in handling cases. Future research agendas include a study of the independence of the National Police's budget and the readiness of the bureaucratic culture if external supervision is tightened, as well as a more in-depth comparative study on the legal basis of police supervisory bodies in various jurisdictions.

Research Limitations

This research has a number of limitations. *First*, in terms of data, the research is juridical-normative and only examines legal materials and secondary data, without primary field data (interviews or questionnaires), so it does not measure stakeholder perceptions directly.

Second, in terms of approach, legal comparisons are carried out at the level of institutional design and have not explored all the positive legal bases of each jurisdiction in depth.

Third, public trust rates vary between survey institutions with different methodologies, so the interpretation of trends needs to be cautious. This limitation also opens up opportunities for further research that is empirical and comparative-juridical in more detail.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Asshiddiqie, Jimly. *Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia*. Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2022.

Bayley, David H. *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 2001.

- Bayley, David H. *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990.
- Dunn, William N. *Public Policy Analysis: An Integrated Approach*. 5th ed. Boston: Pearson, 2012.
- Goldsmith, Andrew, dan Colleen Lewis (ed.). *Civilian Oversight of Policing: Governance, Democracy and Human Rights*. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000.
- Hasibuan, Edi Saputra. *Hukum Kepolisian*. Jakarta: Erlangga, 2024.
- Hasibuan, Edi Saputra, dan Kurniawan Tri Wibowo. *Politik Hukum Kepolisian: Pembentukan Peraturan Kepolisian*. Yogyakarta: Jejak Pustaka, 2025.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Lubis, Todung Mulya. *Hukum dan Politik di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Kompas, 2022.
- Muladi. *Demokrasi, HAM, dan Reformasi Kepolisian*. Jakarta: Prenadamedia, 2023.
- Rahardjo, Satjipto. *Polisi dan Masyarakat dalam Negara Demokrasi*. Bandung: Alumni, 2022.
- Susanti, Bivitri. *Reformasi Sektor Keamanan di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Epistema Institute, 2023.

Journal

- Adams, Brian, et al. "Police Reform from the Top Down: Experimental Evidence on Police Executive Support for Civilian Oversight." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* (2025). <https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22620>.
- Adhikara, R., P. Y. Putranto, dan A. B. Gurion. "In Pursuit for Legitimacy: An Overview of Contemporary Policing in Indonesia." *Eduvest: Journal of Universal Studies* 4, no. 2 (2024): 687–702.
- Amostian, Yusriyadi, dan Ana Silviana. "Reformasi Polri Melalui Penguatan Fungsi dan Kewenangan Komisi Kepolisian Nasional dalam Melakukan Pengawasan Eksternal terhadap Polri." *Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia* 5, no. 3 (2023): 510–522.

- Ashri, Munif. "Dampak Akses ICCPR Terhadap Pencegahan Praktik Pembunuhan di Luar Hukum dalam Perspektif Indonesia." *Veritas et Justitia* 11, no. 1 (2025): 50–81.
- Condro, Susatyo Purnomo. "Perubahan Paradigma Pemolisian di Era Pandemi Covid-19." *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 8, no. 1 (2022): p20. <https://doi.org/10.31599/7zxrtw15>.
- Hasani, Ismail, Halili, dan Ikhsan Yosarie. "Police Transformation within Constitutional Democracy Design: Evidence from Indonesia." *Jurnal Civics: Media Kajian Kewarganegaraan* 23, no. 1 (2026): 331–346.
- Hasibuan, Edi Saputra. "Reformasi Polri: Menilik Keberhasilan Program Presisi Polri." *Krtha Bhayangkara* 17, no. 3 (2023): 515–524.
- Hatmawan, Ilham Dwi. "Public Compliance towards Indonesian National Police (POLRI) Authority in the Midst of a Strained Public–Police Relationship." *Jurnal Kriminologi Indonesia* 1, no. 1 (2025): Artikel 6.
- Hope Sr., Kempe Ronald. "Civilian Oversight for Democratic Policing and Its Challenges: Overcoming Obstacles for Improved Police Accountability and Better Security in Africa and Beyond." *Journal of Applied Security Research* 16, no. 4 (2021): 422–447.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies." *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 3 (1998): 112–126.
- Rosenthal, Robert A. "Perspectives of Directors of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement Agencies." *Policing: An International Journal* 41, no. 4 (2018): 435–447.
- Yustina, Isna Putri. "Tinjauan Yuridis Kode Etik Kepolisian Republik Indonesia dalam Penegakan Hukum di Indonesia." Disertasi, Universitas Islam Sultan Agung Semarang, 2024.

Laws and Regulations and Decisions

Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945.

Ketetapan MPR Nomor VI/MPR/2000 tentang Pemisahan Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia.

Ketetapan MPR Nomor VII/MPR/2000 tentang Peran Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Peran Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia.

Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia.

Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia. Putusan Nomor 19/PUU-XXIII/2025.

Other Resources

Indikator Politik Indonesia. Survei Nasional: Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Lembaga Negara, 2021–2025. Jakarta: Indikator Politik Indonesia.

Komnas HAM RI. Laporan Tahunan 2023: Situasi Hak Asasi Manusia di Indonesia. Jakarta: Komnas HAM RI, 2023.

Kompas. “Kasus Obstruction of Justice Pembunuhan Brigadir J Mengguncang Reformasi Polri.” Edisi Agustus 2022.

Kompolnas. Laporan Tahunan Pengaduan Masyarakat terhadap Polri. Jakarta: Kompolnas, 2023.

Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan (Litbang) Kompas. Survei Persepsi Publik dan Evaluasi Kinerja Kepolisian. Jakarta: Litbang Kompas, November 2025.

Lembaga Survei Indonesia. Survei Tingkat Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Lembaga Penegak Hukum. Jakarta: LSI, Februari 2025.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Guidebook on Democratic Policing. Vienna: OSCE, 2008.

Siagian, Saurlin P. "Sinergitas Komnas HAM RI dengan Propam Polri dalam Mitigasi Pelanggaran HAM." Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia. 27 Mei 2025.

https://dataham.komnasham.go.id/home/detail_komham/d82c8d1619ad8176d66553453cfb2e55f0.

