

Whole-of-Government and Whole-of-Society Approaches in Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: A Study on the Implementation of the RAN PE 2021–2025

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Abstract : *The emergence of violent extremism as a prominent non-traditional security threat has driven a fundamental shift in security governance, transitioning from state-centric, coercive approaches toward preventive and collaborative models. In Indonesia, this transformation is institutionalized through the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE) 2021–2025, which operationalizes Whole-of-Government (WoG) and Whole-of-Society (WoS) approaches. Employing a constructivist perspective, this study examines how global norms of Human Security and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) are diffused and localized into Indonesia's domestic security practices through state–civil society interactions. The study finds that while the*



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RAN PE marks a significant evolution from a predominantly law enforcement-oriented model toward a preventive, community-based governance architecture, implementation remains shaped by enduring state-centric security logics. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) act as key norm entrepreneurs, strengthening social cohesion, peace education, and community resilience while translating global norms into locally contextualized practices. Consequently, the RAN PE represents both a strategic policy shift and a structural negotiation between state and non-state actors over contemporary security governance. This paper contributes to the P/CVE literature by illustrating how the interplay between WoG and WoS frameworks mediates norm localization, underscoring the critical role of institutionalized state-civil society collaboration for sustainable, preventive security governance.

Keywords: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), Human Security, Norm Localization, Whole-of-Society (WoS), RAN PE (National Action Plan)

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War era, the concept of security in International Relations (IR) studies was predominantly defined by a traditional, state-centric security perspective. Within this framework, security was primarily conceptualized as the capacity of a state to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national stability against external military threats through defensive strategies and armed capabilities.¹ Security threats were largely understood through the prism of inter-state conflicts and geopolitical rivalries dictated by the bipolar structure of the international system. Consequently, security scholarship focused overwhelmingly on national defense and conventional military capabilities, leaving individual security and societal vulnerabilities largely unaddressed within the broader international security agenda.²

¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. ke-2 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 102.

² Azrul Azlan Abd Rahman, "The Concept of National Security in the Period of Cold War and Post-Cold War," *Journal of Law and Sustainable Development* 11, no. 5 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.55908/sdgs.v11i5.766>; Indah Amaritasari, "Keamanan Nasional dalam Konsep dan Standar Internasional," *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 1, no. 2 (2015): 155.

The end of the Cold War fundamentally transformed the landscape of global security threats. Although the risk of major inter-state wars declined, this shift did not automatically yield a more secure international environment. Instead, non-traditional security threats—characterized by their complex, cross-border, and multifaceted nature, such as terrorism, violent extremism, transnational organized crime, and social instability—came to dominate contemporary security dynamics.³ Unlike conventional military perils, these non-traditional threats target not only the state as a political entity but also directly undermine individual well-being and community resilience. This structural shift exposed the limitations of traditional state-centric frameworks in explaining contemporary, multidimensional security dynamics. Accordingly, it catalyzed an epistemological shift toward a broader conceptualization of security—one that transcends state protection to encompass the safeguarding of individuals from fear, violence, marginalization, and systemic social precarity.⁴

This evolving threat environment fostered the development of the *Human Security* paradigm, which repositions individuals as the referent object of security. Broadly introduced in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 *Human Development Report*, Human Security articulates two core dimensions: *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*.⁵ Departing from traditional state-centric frameworks, Human Security prioritizes protecting individuals and communities from an array of economic, social, political, and physical threats. This paradigm shift broadened security discourse from a rigid state-centric orientation toward a people-centered, multidimensional approach. In the realm of counter-terrorism and violent extremism, Human Security provides a theoretical and operational basis for preventive strategies rooted in community

³ Indah Amaritasari, “Keamanan Nasional dalam Konsep dan Standar Internasional,” *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 1, no. 2 (2015): 155.

⁴ Anak Agung Ayu Intan Parameswari dan Ni Wayan Rainy Priadarsini S., “Upaya Strategis Pemerintah Mengatasi Masuknya Teroris Melalui Pelabuhan Gilimanuk Bali,” *Jurnal Kajian Bali (Journal of Bali Studies)* 13, no. 2 (2023): 625, <https://doi.org/10.24843/jkb.2023.v13.i02.p12>.

⁵ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22.

resilience, social inclusion, and local protection, offering a vital alternative to purely coercive and repressive measures.⁶

The September 11 attacks in the United States marked a pivotal turning point in the evolution of global counter-terrorism governance. In the aftermath, state actors heavily reinforced state-centric, security-driven counter-terrorism apparatuses through military intervention, strict law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and heightened surveillance mechanisms. While these measures neutralized specific terrorist networks, a growing body of scholarship highlights that coercive, state-centric strategies fail to address the underlying socio-economic, political, and ideological drivers of violent extremism.⁷

Furthermore, an overreliance on repressive measures risks exacerbating marginalization, eroding public trust in state institutions, and inadvertently driving further radicalization. Recognizing these structural limitations, scholarly and policy discourses have increasingly advocated for preventive frameworks that emphasize community resilience, social inclusion, and multi-stakeholder collaboration.

This shift toward prevention catalyzed the conceptual formulation of Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), an approach that prioritizes non-coercive, community-based interventions. Unlike conventional counter-terrorism, which focuses primarily on reactive security enforcement, PVE treats social, economic, political, and cultural drivers as integral components of prevention strategies.⁸ As PVE governance has evolved, it has increasingly operationalized multi-actor collaboration through *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) and *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) frameworks—bringing together state institutions, Civil Society Organizations

⁶ Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001): 90, <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753191141>; Francesco Ragazzi, “Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation: Securitising Social Policy?” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 10, no. 2 (2017): 168, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1236875>.

⁷ Naureen Chowdhury Fink dan Ellie B. Hearne, *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2008), 12.; Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 479–94, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.491009>.

⁸ United Nations, “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.”

(CSOs), local communities, and non-state actors.⁹ Consequently, preventing violent extremism is no longer conceived solely as an exclusive mandate of the state, but as a collaborative, participatory, and preventive security governance architecture.¹⁰

In recent years, the evolving landscape of violent extremism in Indonesia has demonstrated increasingly complex and multidimensional threat patterns.¹¹ The rise of digital radicalization, online propaganda dissemination, and the growing involvement of women and children within extremist networks underscore that these threats can no longer be adequately addressed through traditional security lenses.

In response to these shifting dynamics, the Indonesian government transformed its counter-terrorism strategy from a predominantly repressive mechanism toward a more preventive and collaborative governance model. This strategic realignment was formally institutionalized through Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE) 2021–2025.

By operationalizing WoG and WoS frameworks, the RAN PE integrates inter-ministerial coordination with active participation from CSOs and non-state actors. Within this implementation architecture, CSOs serve not merely as project executors but as strategic partners of the state, enhancing community resilience through grass-roots prevention initiatives.

The implementation of the RAN PE represents a broader transformation in Indonesia's security practices—shifting from law enforcement-heavy counter-terrorism toward a more preventive, participatory security governance model. However, this evolution cannot be fully understood merely as an administrative policy shift or an institutional re-alignment. A constructivist perspective offers valuable analytical leverage by explaining how

⁹ UNDP, “Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity.”

¹⁰ OSCE, *Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism*.

¹¹ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), *The Crackdown on Islamist “Radicals” in Indonesia*, IPAC Report No. 71 (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2021); Jamhari dan Testriono, “The Roots of Indonesia’s Resilience Against Violent Extremism,” *Studia Islamika* 28, no. 3 (2021): 517–45, <https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v28i3.23956>.”

shared norms, ideas, and actor interactions actively shape and redefine security practices. In the context of the RAN PE, transnational Human Security and PVE norms are not passively imported; rather, they undergo a continuous process of domestic adaptation and localization tailored to Indonesia's socio-political context. Thus, CSO engagement in the RAN PE framework not only expands non-state participation in security governance but also directly facilitates the localization of global Human Security and PVE norms into domestic security practices.

Existing scholarship on counter-terrorism in Indonesia generally falls into three main analytical streams: first, studies focusing on state security apparatuses, legal enforcement, and state-led deradicalization programs; second, policy-oriented analyses assessing the institutional coordination and implementation of the RAN PE; and third, empirical studies highlighting CSO contributions to community-level prevention initiatives. While insightful, these three strands remain largely compartmentalized. Consequently, existing literature has yet to adequately explain how global Human Security and PVE norms are localized into domestic security governance through the dynamic interaction between state institutions and CSOs within the RAN PE architecture.

Addressing this conceptual and empirical gap, this article adopts a constructivist framework to analyze the implementation of the RAN PE as a process of global norm diffusion and localization within Indonesian security governance. In doing so, this study not only uncovers the structural transformation of counter-terrorism from a law enforcement-driven model toward preventive and collaborative governance, but also demonstrates how the interplay between WoG, WoS, and CSO networks contributes to the operational localization of Human Security and PVE norms. Specifically, it highlights the creation of resilient local social networks, inter-cultural dialogue, and social integration initiatives that mitigate vulnerabilities to radicalization. These empirical and theoretical insights seek to enrich broader academic debates on security governance and P/CVE implementation, particularly within the context of the Global South.

Research Gap

While existing literature has extensively examined law enforcement measures, radicalization pathways, and civil society roles in isolation, a distinct scholarly gap remains regarding how the structural interplay between WoG and WoS frameworks in the implementation of the RAN PE 2021–2025 serves as an **institutional mechanism for localizing global Human Security and PVE norms**. This study addresses this gap by offering a constructivist analysis of the collaborative dynamics between the BNPT and CSOs (such as the Wahid Foundation and WGWC) in transforming Indonesia's national security governance.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a qualitative approach through document analysis to investigate the implementation of Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE) 2021–2025 as a transformative practice of security governance in Indonesia. The unit of analysis is the implementation of the RAN PE, conceptualized as the institutionalization of *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) and *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) approaches in preventing violent extremism.¹² A constructivist perspective is utilized to analyze how global Human Security and PVE norms undergo processes of diffusion, adaptation, and localization within Indonesia's domestic security practices.

Data were gathered through a rigorous document analysis of relevant academic literature and policy documents pertaining to the implementation of the RAN PE in Indonesia. The data corpus comprises primary policy documents—including Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021, RAN PE implementation documents, operational guidelines for the RAN PE and Regional Action Plans (RAD PE), official reports from the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), and publications by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in P/CVE initiatives across Indonesia. The analysis is further supported by peer-reviewed journal articles, research reports, policy briefs, and

¹² Glenn A. Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 27–40, <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>.

international organization documents examining Human Security, PVE, constructivism, WoG, WoS, and norm localization. These documents were purposively selected as they represent the underlying policy framework, program implementation, and actor perspectives involved in the RAN PE, thereby enabling a detailed tracing of how Human Security and PVE norms are translated into policy, operationalized by diverse actors, and adapted within the Indonesian context.

Document analysis was conducted using thematic coding to identify core themes related to Human Security, PVE, WoG, WoS, CSOs, and the mechanics of norm diffusion and localization. The analytical focus was directed toward tracing how global Human Security and PVE norms were translated into national policy, adapted into institutional design, and implemented through collaborative interactions between the state and CSOs during the 2021–2025 period. From a constructivist viewpoint, the localization process is identified through the formal adoption of global norms into national regulations, shifts in actor roles, the strengthening of collaborative mechanisms, and the practical translation of these norms into domestic security routines. Consequently, documents are treated not merely as passive information sources, but as constitutive representations of evolving norms, ideas, and security practices embedded within Indonesia's socio-political context.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Research on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) within national security governance has undergone rapid theoretical and empirical evolution.¹³ To establish an analytical framework aligned with the Discussion section, this Literature Review synthesizes the scholarly domain into three core conceptual pillars: (1) the paradigm shift from state-centric security to human security, (2) constructivist perspectives and the mechanism of norm

¹³ Mohd Mizan Aslam, "The Critical Role of Civil Society Organizations (CSO) in Combating Terrorism," in *Civil Society Organizations Against Terrorism: Case Studies from Asia*, ed. Rohan Gunaratna dan Mohd Mizan Aslam (London: Routledge, 2021), 63–78, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003150145-3>.

localization, and (3) the institutionalization of Whole-of-Government (WoG) and Whole-of-Society (WoS) approaches.¹⁴

The Paradigm Shift from State-Centric Security to Human Security

In classical International Security Studies, the conceptualization of security was overwhelmingly dominated by realists' state-centric frameworks.¹⁵ This tradition posited territorial sovereignty and military capability as the principal bulwarks against interstate threats.¹⁶ However, post-Cold War security dynamics precipitated a fundamental redefinition of security threats toward increasingly complex, non-traditional risks, where non-state actors and extremist ideologies directly target domestic societal resilience and individual safety.¹⁷ Contemporary security governance consequently demands a strategic equilibrium between managing traditional and non-traditional threats.¹⁸

In response to the analytical limitations of traditional paradigms, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) introduced the concept of Human Security, effectively shifting the referent object of security from state sovereignty (*national security*) to human individuals (*people-centered*) via two primary pillars: *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*.¹⁹ A substantial body of literature demonstrates that overly repressive and hard counterterrorism approaches often fail to address underlying structural drivers—such as social marginalization, intolerance, and systemic injustice—and risk compounding radicalization while

¹⁴ Indah Amaritasari, "Upaya Lokalisasi Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme oleh BNPT," *Abdi Bhara* 3, no. 1 (2024): 20–27, <https://doi.org/10.31599/av1vdx31>.

¹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–39, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>

¹⁶ Carola Patricia Cucat Vélchez, "The Concept of National Security in the Period of Cold War and Post-Cold War," *Journal of Law and Sustainable Development* 11, no. 5 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.55908/sdgs.v11i5.766>

¹⁷ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. ke-2 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 102.

¹⁸ Arfan Mahmood, Muhammad Tahir, dan Maryam Arshad Tarar, "Security in the Transforming World: Balancing Traditional and Non-Traditional Threats," *Social Science Review Archives* 3, no. 3 (2025): 2646–51, <https://doi.org/10.70670/sra.v3i3.1589>

¹⁹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22.

eroding public trust in state authority.²⁰ Consequently, Human Security serves as an essential normative foundation for Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) strategies, prioritizing early prevention, social cohesion, and the empowerment of vulnerable communities.²¹

Constructivism, Diffusion, and the Localization of PVE Norms

The adoption of Human Security and PVE norms by sovereign states cannot be adequately explained through utilitarian, rational-choice calculations alone. Constructivist theory posits that the international structure is fundamentally constituted by ideas, identities, and intersubjective understandings.²² Ideational power plays a pivotal role in reinterpreting security concepts in International Relations, wherein global norms shape how states define threats and formulate socially legitimate policy responses.²³

Nevertheless, global norms are not passively absorbed into domestic structures. Drawing on Amitav Acharya's theory of *norm localization*, local actors function as *norm entrepreneurs* who actively adapt, adjust, and reinterpret international norms to align with local cultural values, religious traditions, and existing legal frameworks (*cognitive prior*).²⁴ In international and regional P/CVE studies, transnational counterterrorism arenas consistently involve complex

²⁰ R. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Francesco Ragazzi, "Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation: Securitising Social Policy?" *Critical Social Policy* 37, no. 2 (2017): 163–79, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018316683472>.

²¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity* (New York: UNDP, 2016).

²² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 110; Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–48, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100008133>

²³ Nawid Aria, "The Power of Ideas: A Constructivist Reinterpretation of Security in International Relations," *Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities* 2, no. 3 (2025): 18–36, <https://doi.org/10.62810/jssh.v2i3.120>

²⁴ Acharya, Amitav. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582024>.

processes of norm assemblage.²⁵ In the Indonesian context, state institutions such as the BNPT and national stakeholders localize extremist prevention norms by harmonizing them with local wisdom, the state ideology of *Pancasila*, and religious moderation.²⁶

Institutionalizing Whole-of-Government (WoG) and Whole-of-Society (WoS) Approaches

The evolution of contemporary security governance necessitates multi-stakeholder collaboration mechanisms (collaborative frameworks). The Whole-of-Government (WoG) approach fosters horizontal and vertical coordination across ministries and agencies to eliminate sectoral silos in addressing multidimensional security challenges.²⁷ Concurrently, the Whole-of-Society (WoS) framework expands participation beyond state apparatuses to include Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), religious institutions, academia, media, and the private sector.²⁸

Empirical studies on P/CVE practices in Indonesia highlight that CSO engagement is not merely auxiliary, but vital. Indonesia's operationalization of the WoS approach is reflected in CSOs' unique capacity to engage grassroots communities with greater operational flexibility and social legitimacy than formal security forces.²⁹ Islamic mass organizations and former violent extremist offenders (*ex-offenders*) play crucial roles in interactive dialogue, counter-narrative

²⁵ Baldaro, Edoardo, and Silvia D'Amato. 2024. "Transnational Counterterrorism Assemblages: The Case of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Mali." *Territory, Politics, Governance* 12 (4): 519–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2023.2268651>

²⁶ Indah Amaritasari, "Upaya Lokalisasi Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme oleh BNPT," *Abdi Bhara* 3, no. 1 (2024): 20–27, <https://doi.org/10.31599/av1vdx31>.

²⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism* (Vienna: OSCE, 2020).

²⁸ Cameron Sumpter dan Yuslikha K. Wardhani, *Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia's National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.37805/pn2022.2.sea>.

²⁹ Chaula Rininta Anindya, *An Indonesian Way of P/CVE and Interpreting the Whole-of-Society Approach: Lessons from Civil Society Organisations* (London: Routledge, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003518655-7>

disruption, and social reintegration.³⁰ Furthermore, Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (RAN PE) successfully institutionalized WoG and WoS synergies.³¹ Nevertheless, this integration remains marked by ongoing negotiations between state-centric security logic—focused on formal authority—and Human Security paradigms that emphasize human rights and civic inclusiveness.³²

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Paradigm Shift in Security Governance

The development of policies aimed at preventing violent extremism in Indonesia demonstrates a fundamental paradigm shift in security governance. Prior to the enactment of Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE), state responses to terrorism were heavily dominated by a state-centric approach that relied on law enforcement, security operations, and intelligence capabilities as primary instruments. While this coercive approach proved effective in degrading the operational capacity of terrorist networks, it remained ill-equipped to systematically address the multi-dimensional root causes of violent extremism—such as social exclusion, intolerance, inequality,

³⁰ Wachid Ridwan, “The Dynamics of Islamic Mass Organisations in Preventing Violent Extremism,” in *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia: Islam, Gender and Civil Society*, Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, dan Yenny Wahid, ed., (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4>. Muhammad Wildan, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: The Role of Former Terrorists and Civil Society Organisations,” in *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia: Islam, Gender and Civil Society*, ed. Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, dan Yenny Wahid (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 150–79.; <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4>

³¹ International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), *Menampak Dampak, Meneruskan Kebijakan: Laporan Penelitian Capaian dan Keberlanjutan Kebijakan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme 2020–2024* (RAN PE) (Jakarta: INFID, 2023).

³² Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes, *The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies: Undermining Human Rights, Instrumentalising Civil Society* (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2018), 30.

identity politics, and the rapid dissemination of extremist ideology across digital spaces.³³

This reorientation is clearly reflected in the substantive framework of the RAN PE, which expands counter-terrorism strategy beyond reactive security enforcement toward comprehensive prevention involving both state and non-state actors. The RAN PE integrates prevention, preparedness, protection, rehabilitation, and multi-stakeholder partnerships as core components of national security policy. Beyond strengthening inter-ministerial and regional institutional coordination through a *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) approach, the RAN PE explicitly opens structural avenues for participation by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), educational institutions, religious organizations, mass media, academia, and the private sector via a *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) mechanism.³⁴ Consequently, security is no longer conceptualized as the exclusive domain of state security apparatuses, but as a collective responsibility requiring cross-sectoral collaboration to foster community resilience.

This shift signifies the institutionalization of global PVE norms into Indonesia's national policy landscape. Aligning with the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the PVE approach emphasizes addressing conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism through education, community empowerment, social cohesion, protection of vulnerable groups, and enhanced participation of women and youth.³⁵ Nevertheless, the implementation of the RAN PE reveals that Indonesia did not passively adopt these transnational norms. Instead, PVE norms have been continuously negotiated and adapted into domestic multi-stakeholder governance contexts that had already been evolving within Indonesian administrative practices.³⁶

³³ Jones, ISIS in Indonesia; Mietzner and Muhtadi, "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation"; United Nations, "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism."

³⁴ Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, Laporan RAN PE 2023.

³⁵ United Nations, "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism."

³⁶ Wulandari, "Analysis of The Indonesian Government Initiative of The National Action Plan on Counter Violent Extremism That Lead to Terrorism"; Indah Amaritasari, "Upaya Lokalisasi Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme oleh BNPT," Abdi Bhara 3, no. 1 (2024): 22, <https://doi.org/10.31599/av1vdx31>.

From a constructivist perspective, this transformation demonstrates that security governance shifts are driven not only by evolving threat landscapes, but also by how state actors reframe threats and re-define appropriate strategic responses. International norms regarding Human Security and PVE provide a new normative foundation regarding the importance of preventive measures, yet their operational meaning and implementation are actively reshaped through interactions between international organizations, the state, and domestic non-state actors.³⁷ Put differently, the implementation of the RAN PE does not represent a direct, unmediated adoption of global norms, but rather a process of localization that yields a security governance framework tailored to Indonesia's political, institutional, and socio-cultural context.

Simultaneously, this transformation highlights an ongoing process of negotiation between state and non-state actors in policy implementation. On one hand, the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) retains its primary authority as the lead agency coordinating RAN PE implementation through inter-ministerial mechanisms. On the other hand, the practical efficacy of preventive measures relies heavily on CSOs, which possess social legitimacy, direct community access, and the operational capacity to translate PVE agendas into locally resonant programs.

For instance, BNPT formed the Task Force of Religious Leaders and Scholars (Ulama) to deliver educational outreach, public lectures, and national integration dialogues aimed at countering radical narratives that incite violence or religious intolerance. Thus, the implementation of the RAN PE illustrates that the paradigm shift in Indonesian security governance does not supplant state security imperatives; rather, it integrates them with Human Security principles through a more collaborative governance architecture. Analyzing this negotiative process provides the foundation for understanding how global PVE norms

³⁷ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change"; Newman, "Human Security and Constructivism"; Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58.

subsequently undergo diffusion and localization through the operationalization of the RAN PE.³⁸

However, although the RAN PE expands non-state participation through a Whole-of-Society approach, its policy implementation has not entirely discarded the state-centric character of Indonesia's security governance. Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 continues to designate BNPT as the central lead agency responsible for coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating the execution of the RAN PE, thereby framing CSO engagement within state-established institutional boundaries.³⁹

Furthermore, the 2023 and 2024 RAN PE Implementation Reports demonstrate that multi-stakeholder collaboration operates through structured mechanisms such as the Joint Secretariat, inter-agency coordination forums, the National Partnership Forum, and thematic working groups.⁴⁰ Therefore, the evolution of security governance within the RAN PE framework is most accurately understood as a continuous negotiation between state security logic and Human Security paradigms, rather than a total replacement of one paradigm by another.

Diffusion and Localization of PVE Norms

The implementation of the RAN PE demonstrates that the PVE framework in Indonesia is the result of an active interaction between international normative developments and domestic policy needs. Following the adoption of the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in 2015, global approaches to violent extremism shifted from predominantly repressive responses toward more preventive strategies. This paradigm emphasizes community empowerment, education, the enhancement of social cohesion, protection of vulnerable groups, and structured collaboration between government and civil society as core components of long-term prevention.⁴¹

³⁸ Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Sumpster and Wardhani, *Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia's National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism*.

³⁹ *Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021*.

⁴⁰ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

⁴¹ United Nations, "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism."

This strategic direction was subsequently reflected in Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021, which establishes prevention as a primary pillar of counter-violent extremism policy in Indonesia.⁴²

However, the operationalization of the RAN PE indicates that Indonesia did not adopt PVE norms in an unmediated or passive manner. Various provisions within the RAN PE reveal that global norms have been carefully adapted to fit Indonesia's administrative system, legal framework, and socio-cultural realities. Rather than relying solely on abstract global PVE agendas, the implemented approach actively integrates foundational national values—such as *Pancasila*, religious moderation (*moderasi beragama*), tolerance, and community resilience. Consequently, while international norms provided an essential baseline reference during policy design, the actual content and implementation mechanisms were decisively shaped by domestic imperatives.⁴³

Evidence of this norm localization is further driven by non-state actors. Within the RAN PE implementation framework, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) act not merely as project implementers, but as key translators of international norms into local contexts. For example, the Wahid Foundation (WF) developed grassroots programs that bridge PVE agendas with tolerance building, peace education, and local socio-economic empowerment. Similarly, AMAN Indonesia together with the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC) successfully advocated for the integration of gender perspectives and the protection of vulnerable groups into local prevention initiatives. The contributions of both organizations demonstrate that PVE practice in Indonesia has evolved through a highly contextualized approach rather than a simple replication of international templates.⁴⁴

From a constructivist lens, this empirical evidence illustrates that norm diffusion does not terminate upon formal policy adoption. Transnational norms undergo continuous negotiation, reinterpretation, and structural adaptation to

⁴² Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021.

⁴³ Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58; Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021.

⁴⁴ Dja'Far and Nisa, Wahid Foundation dan Advokasi Kebijakan Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan di Indonesia; Kholifah and Masudi, WGWC: Membumikan Gender Dalam Kerja Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan.

secure political and social legitimacy within the domestic arena. In Indonesia's case, while the state retains central authority through the BNPT as the coordinating lead agency, the practical efficacy of these policies relies heavily on the government's ability to foster genuine collaboration with CSOs and local actors. This dynamic demonstrates a textbook process of norm localization as conceptualized by Acharya —where domestic actors do not passively absorb external norms, but actively reconstruct them to align with local institutional structures, prevailing social values, and national security needs.⁴⁵

Implementation of the RAN PE as the Institutionalization of WoG and WoS Approaches

The implementation of the RAN PE illustrates that the process of PVE norm localization in Indonesia extends beyond the formulation of national policies to encompass the creation of formal institutional mechanisms that sustain its execution. Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 establishes the RAN PE as a national coordination framework involving ministries and state agencies, regional governments, CSOs, academia, mass media, and development partners in counter-violent extremism efforts. Through this structural blueprint, preventive approaches are systematically integrated into national security governance, ensuring that violent extremism is no longer treated solely as the domain of law enforcement and security institutions.⁴⁶

Within this governance arrangement, the BNPT retains its central position as the lead agency. Beyond drafting national policy, BNPT is tasked with coordinating the overall implementation of the RAN PE, facilitating inter-ministerial cooperation, conducting monitoring and evaluation, and compiling national implementation reports. This setup indicates that the *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) approach does not weaken state authority; rather, it reinforces the state's coordination capacity, enabling previously siloed prevention programs to be executed in a more integrated and coherent manner.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58; Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

⁴⁶ Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021.

⁴⁷ Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

The operationalization of WoG is clearly demonstrated through the active involvement of line ministries and state agencies in accordance with their respective mandates. The 2023 and 2024 RAN PE Implementation Reports highlight a significant strengthening of inter-agency coordination through joint action plans, unified reporting mechanisms, the establishment of the Joint Secretariat (*Sekretariat Bersama*), and institutional support for drafting Regional Action Plans on P/CVE (RAD PE). These institutional mechanisms demonstrate that PVE has evolved into a cross-sectoral policy agenda spanning education, social welfare, religious affairs, women empowerment, public communication, and local governance.⁴⁸

Simultaneously, the execution of the RAN PE formalizes the *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) paradigm. Implementation reports reveal that CSOs, faith-based organizations, higher education institutions, media outlets, local communities, and development partners actively engage in diverse initiatives—including peace education, community resilience programs, digital literacy, women and youth empowerment, and local government capacity building. This broad engagement expands the operational foundation of policy execution, grounding PVE governance not merely in state capacity, but also in the social legitimacy and community-level proximity of non-state actors.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the expansion of civil society participation has not dismantled the state-centric core of Indonesian security governance. The entire implementation process remains bound within the institutional parameters set by BNPT as the lead agency. While CSOs are provided structural space to contribute through strategic partnerships, policy priorities, coordination protocols, and reporting lines strictly adhere to the RAN PE institutional hierarchy. Consequently, state–civil society dynamics within this framework are

⁴⁸ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*.

⁴⁹ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

best understood as a negotiated partnership rather than a delegation or transfer of sovereign authority to non-state actors.⁵⁰

From a constructivist standpoint, this dynamic proves that norm localization alters not only substantive policy text but also the institutional logic of security governance. The state retains ultimate authority in directing policy implementation, while non-state actors are afforded functional space to contribute based on their comparative advantages and social proximity to communities. Thus, the implementation of the RAN PE represents a hybrid governance model that combines the state's central coordinative authority with societal participation as an integrated strategy for preventing violent extremism.⁵¹

From a critical perspective, however, constructivism may offer an overly optimistic account of norm localization in security policy. Although the state retains formal authority over RAN PE execution, such state dominance can potentially constrain meaningful civil society participation. In certain contexts, states may prioritize maintaining complete control over security agendas at the expense of grassroots contributions, thereby increasing vulnerabilities among marginalized communities. Therefore, evaluating the dynamic balance between state authority and genuine public participation remains essential for developing inclusive security policies.

WF and AMAN Indonesia as Norm Entrepreneurs

The implementation of the Whole-of-Society (WoS) paradigm within the RAN PE framework significantly expands the operational space for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in preventing violent extremism. However, the contribution of CSOs is not confined merely to executing grass-roots programs. As highlighted in the 2023 and 2024 RAN PE Implementation Reports, CSOs actively contribute to policy formulation, institutional capacity building, multi-stakeholder network expansion, and the dissemination of best practices at both national and sub-national levels.⁵² This demonstrates that CSOs serve as pivotal

⁵⁰ Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, Laporan RAN PE 2024.

⁵¹ Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58; Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

⁵² Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–
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agents translating the strategic objectives of the RAN PE into community-level security practices.

From a constructivist lens, this agency can be conceptualized through the framework of *norm entrepreneurs*. As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, norm entrepreneurs do not merely introduce new normative ideas; they actively cultivate social acceptance through sustained advocacy, persuasion, and institutional embeddedness.⁵³ In Indonesia, this dynamic does not occur via direct or unmediated adoption of international templates. Instead, PVE norms are continuously translated and adapted to align with prevailing domestic socio-cultural values and institutional architectures, illustrating Acharya's concept of norm localization.⁵⁴ This theoretical dynamic is clearly evidenced in the programmatic work developed by the Wahid Foundation (WF) and the AMAN Indonesia during the implementation of the RAN PE.

The Wahid Foundation (WF) has contributed significantly by formulating a prevention framework that links PVE objectives with tolerance building, peace education, and community resilience. Initiatives such as *Desa Damai* (Peace Villages) and *Sekolah Damai* (Peace Schools) bypass heavy-handed, repressive security logic, positioning local communities as primary actors in cultivating resilience against extremist ideologies. Beyond grass-roots programming, WF actively participates in institutional capacity building, multi-stakeholder dialogues, and policy feedback mechanisms within state-led coordination forums. This approach demonstrates how global PVE norms are operationalized into practices closely aligned with domestic societal needs, rather than serving as passive replications of international models.⁵⁵

75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582024>; also see Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

⁵³ Martha Finnemore dan Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789>.

⁵⁴ Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582024>.

⁵⁵ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

The AMAN Indonesia and the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC) displays a distinct pattern of norm localization. WGWC systematically integrates gender perspectives into PVE implementation, framing women not merely as passive victims requiring protection, but as active agents in strengthening family and community resilience against radicalization. Through targeted training, capacity enhancement, policy advocacy, and the development of women-led peace networks, the AMAN Indonesia and WGWC broadens the scope of counter-extremism governance beyond traditional state security concerns to encompass the protection of vulnerable groups, social empowerment of women and youth, and the reinforcement of social cohesion. This strategy illustrates how global PVE norms are re-articulated to address localized gender dynamics and social realities⁵⁶.

The collective work of both organizations highlights that norm localization depends not solely on state policy design, but on the capacity of local non-state actors to contextualize transnational norms for domestic audiences. While WF prioritizes tolerance education, peace-building, and community resilience, and the AMAN Indonesia advances a gender-responsive, empowerment-focused framework. Despite their distinct focus areas, both entities follow a shared structural pattern: translating global PVE norms into contextualized, inclusive, and socially accepted practices. Thus, CSOs operate not merely as secondary implementation partners for the state, but as key actors shaping the substantive meaning and practical execution of PVE in Indonesia.

This reality supports Acharya's (2004) argument that the successful diffusion of international norms is fundamentally driven by localized adaptation led by domestic actors. Under the RAN PE framework, the state provides the structural policy architecture and institutional coordination mechanisms via Whole-of-Government (WoG) channels, while CSOs like WF and AMAN Indonesia enrich policy execution through programmatic innovation, advocacy, and community empowerment within the Whole-of-Society (WoS) paradigm. Consequently, the implementation of the RAN PE demonstrates that the

⁵⁶ Dja'Far and Nisa, *Wahid Foundation dan Advokasi Kebijakan Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan di Indonesia*; Wahid Foundation, "Intoleransi Masih Tinggi, Wahid Foundation Gandeng Media Dan Kesbangpol Jateng Gerakkan Sekolah Damai"; Wahid Foundation, "RAN PE"; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.
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ongoing transformation of security governance in Indonesia is not merely a top-down product of state policy reform, but a negotiated outcome of state–CSO interactions in building a contextually grounded, preventive security architecture.⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that the implementation of the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE) 2021–2025 represents not only a strategic policy shift in Indonesian counter-terrorism, but also a broader structural transformation of security governance toward a collaborative model. This reorientation is operationalized through the *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) approach—which strengthens inter-ministerial and inter-agency coordination under the leadership of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT)—and the *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) framework, which structurally incorporates Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), academia, faith-based organizations, mass media, and local communities into P/CVE efforts. Consequently, the RAN PE architecture signifies that violent extremism prevention is no longer conceptualized purely as a law enforcement issue, but as a shared imperative that integrates security, social cohesion, and development dimensions.

Furthermore, this research illustrates that the operationalization of the RAN PE constitutes a process of active norm localization rather than a passive adoption of global policy templates. Transnational norms surrounding Human Security and PVE have been translated into the Indonesian context through

⁵⁷ Zuhri et al., *Civil Society and Gender Mainstreaming: Case Study of the Working Group on Women and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (WGWC) Program*; True and Eddyono, “Preventing Violent Extremism – What Has Gender Got to Do With It?”; True and Eddyono, *PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: GENDER PERSPECTIVES AND WOMEN’S ROLES*; Kholifah and Masudi, *WGWC: Membumikan Gender Dalam Kerja Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan*; Venny et al., *Perempuan Perdamaian: Adopsi Resolusi 1325 Di Indonesia*; Mustaspa and Affianty, “Agensi Perempuan Dalam Implementasi Resolusi PBB 1325 Tentang WPS Pada RAD Pencegahan Ekstremisme Di Banten (2021-2023)”; Kholifah and Masudi, *WGWC: Membumikan Gender Dalam Kerja Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

deliberate adaptation to national values, administrative structures, and localized community needs. Within this dynamic, the state maintains its central coordinative role via BNPT, while non-state actors—specifically organizations such as the Wahid Foundation (WF) and the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC)—operate as *norm entrepreneurs* who re-articulate global principles into locally resonant programming. These findings confirm that norm localization unfolds through continuous interaction and negotiation between state and non-state actors, rather than through unmediated top-down absorption of international standards.

Theoretically, this paper contributes to constructivist scholarship, particularly refining Amitav Acharya's (2004) framework on *norm localization*. The findings demonstrate that the ultimate trajectory of norm diffusion depends not merely on formal state policy adoption, but on the agency of domestic actors to interpret, negotiate, and operationalize those norms within specific domestic contexts. Accordingly, this study underscores that CSOs function not simply as peripheral project implementers, but as pivotal actors shaping the substantive meaning, legitimacy, and daily practices of security governance within the Global South.

From a policy standpoint, sustaining the momentum of the RAN PE beyond its initial 2025 mandate requires institutionalizing both WoG and WoS mechanisms. BNPT must continue to reinforce its coordinative capacity, refine monitoring and evaluation protocols, and ensure the deep integration of RAN PE targets into the national and sub-national budgeting and strategic planning cycles of line ministries and regional governments. Concurrently, CSO engagement should be fostered as an equal and sustainable partnership rather than a short-term sub-contracting arrangement. Strengthening institutional capacity, establishing systematic consultation channels, and providing robust support for community-driven innovations will be vital to ensuring that preventive security governance flourishes—without compromising the independence of civil society or reducing social actors to mere instruments of state security agendas.

Finally, this study acknowledges limitations inherent in its qualitative document-analysis methodology and its primary focus on national-level policy frameworks. Future research could expand upon these insights through

comparative empirical studies analyzing the localized implementation of Regional Action Plans (RAD PE) across diverse provinces, field-based ethnographic research investigating state–CSO partnership dynamics on the ground, or longitudinal assessments evaluating the forthcoming iteration of the RAN PE (2025–2029) to measure the long-term sustainability of norm localization and the practical efficacy of WoG and WoS approaches.

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