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- Police Science in the European Police College Perspective
- Transactional Securitization in the Venezuelan Crisis: A Political and Security Law Analysis of the Arrest of Nicolás Maduro
- Multi-Stakeholder Governance for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage
- Whole-of-Government and Whole-of-Society Approaches in Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: A Study on the Implementation of the RAN PE 2021–2025
- Indonesian Police Reform: Balancing Independence and Accountability



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Police Science in the European Police College Perspective

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Abstract : *Police science has evolved alongside the increasing complexity of policing functions in modern society. In Europe, its development gained significant momentum through the initiatives of the European Police College (CEPOL), which promotes an integrated scientific approach to policing. This article aims to analyze the concept of police science from the CEPOL perspective based on the report Perspectives of Police Science in Europe. The study employs a qualitative library research method through the analysis of official CEPOL documents. The findings indicate that to enhance police professionalism, police science is understood as an interdisciplinary applied discipline integrating law, criminology, sociology, psychology, and management. CEPOL emphasizes the interconnection between research, education, and operational practice, as well as the importance of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as the fundamental principles guiding policing in addressing contemporary security challenges. In the context of current global issues, such as*



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transnational crime, terrorism, irregular migration, cybercrime, and hybrid threats, a knowledge-based police science approach has become increasingly relevant for strengthening the adaptive capacity of police institutions. For Indonesia, the CEPOL perspective provides a valuable conceptual framework for the development of police science capable of responding to evolving national security challenges, including the management of transnational crime, digital transformation in policing, and the strengthening of democratic and accountable security governance.

Keywords : *Police science, CEPOL, policing, police education, rule of law*

INTRODUCTION

The development of modern society has increased the complexity of policing functions within the state. The police are no longer viewed solely as law enforcement institutions that carry out repressive functions, but as public organizations that have broad responsibilities in maintaining security, order, human rights protection, and social conflict management in a democratic society.¹ This changing role requires a scientific approach capable of systematically explaining how the police work, how security policies are formulated, and how policing practices can be improved through knowledge-based research and education. It is in this context that police science develops as a field of study that seeks to integrate theory and practice in the implementation of police functions.

In the academic literature, policing studies initially developed across several disciplines. Legal studies examine policing in relation to law enforcement and state authority, criminology examines crime and responses to crime, sociology examines the relationship between police and society, while administrative and management highlight police organization as a bureaucratic institution. This fragmentation has resulted in the absence of a single discipline dedicated specifically to policing. Therefore, there is a need to develop a field of

¹ David H. Bayley, *Police for The Future*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 125-126

science that specifically studies the police comprehensively, both as an institution and as a social process.²

The need for a scientific approach to policing has intensified alongside growing demands for professionalism, accountability, and transparency in the implementation of security functions. In a democratic society, the police are not only required to be effective in enforcing the law, but also must be able to work in accordance with the principles of the rule of law, respecting human rights, and be accountable for their actions to the public.³ This condition requires a strong scientific basis as a foundation for education, training, and policy-making in the police field. Therefore, the development of police science cannot be separated from efforts to modernize the police institution itself.⁴

In the international context, especially in Europe, the need for the development of police science is increasingly urgent as cross-border cooperation in the field of security increases. EU integration entails the consequence of increased mobility of people, goods and services, which at the same time opens up opportunities for the development of transnational crimes, such as human trafficking, terrorism, cybercrime, and organised crime. These challenges cannot be faced by one country individually, but require close cooperation among member countries. Such cooperation requires not only operational coordination, but also a common understanding of police functions, professional standards, and scientific approaches in handling security issues.⁵

To address this need, the Council of the European Union established the European Police College (CEPOL) as an institution tasked with enhancing education and training cooperation for high-level police officers in member states. CEPOL's mandate is not only limited to training, but also includes the development of a European approach to key issues in crime eradication, crime prevention, and the maintenance of public order and security, especially those that have a cross-border dimension.⁶ In carrying out this mandate, CEPOL

² European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," (2007), 10

³ Hermawan Sulisty & Tito Karnavian, *Democratic Policing*, (Jakarta: Pencil 324, 2018).

⁴ European Police College (CEPOL), 9

⁵ European Police College (CEPOL), 3-4

⁶ European Police College (CEPOL), 5

realizes that a clear conceptual basis is needed for police science to be developed in a directional manner.

The main problem faced in the development of a European approach to policing is the lack of understanding of the definition and scope of police science.⁷ Studies on policing have been widely conducted by experts from various disciplines, but the results of these studies have not been integrated into a scientific framework that can be used together. Moreover, each country has different police traditions, both in the legal system, organizational structure, and institutional culture, making it difficult to formulate a concept of police science that applies in general. This raises fundamental questions about how it is possible to develop a European approach to policing if there is no common understanding of policing itself.

To answer this problem, CEPOL formed a working group consisting of academics and police practitioners from various European countries with different disciplinary backgrounds. This group is tasked with examining the possibility of developing police science as a scientific discipline that can be the basis for police education and research in Europe. In the study, it was agreed that police science must be understood as an interdisciplinary field that studies police as an institution as well as policing as a social process. Thus, police science is not only concerned with law and law enforcement, but also includes social, political, psychological, and organizational aspects that affect police practice.⁸

An interdisciplinary approach to police science is in line with the development of police studies in international literature. Greene argues that the study of modern policing cannot be understood through a single discipline alone, because policing practices are complex social phenomena and are influenced by a variety of factors, including public policy, organizational culture, power structures, and the relationship between police and society. Therefore, the development of police science requires an integration between academic

⁷ European Police College (CEPOL), 20

⁸ Sebastian Roché, "Police Science: Science of The Police or Science for The Police? — Conceptual Clarification and Taxonomy for Comparing Police Systems," (2017)

research, practical experience, and public policy, so that the knowledge generated can be used to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of the police.⁹

Greene also emphasizes that the development of police studies in the late 20th century shows a shift from a normative approach to a research-based empirical approach. If in the past the study of the police focused more on the rule of law and organizational structure, then in modern development the attention has shifted to how the police actually work in practice, how policies are implemented, and how the community responds to police actions.¹⁰ This shift has led to the birth of the concept of knowledge-based policing, which is policing based on scientific evidence and research results, not just on tradition or experience.

It is in this context that CEPOL places the development of police science as an important part of efforts to build a modern police force in Europe. Police science is seen as a bridge between theory and practice, between research and policy, and between education and operations. With a strong scientific foundation, it is hoped that the police can increase professionalism, strengthen accountability, and adapt to changes in the increasingly complex security environment.

Furthermore, the European approach to police science emphasizes that police functions must be carried out within the framework of a state of law and a democratic society. The police must act according to the law, respecting human rights, and be under effective supervision. Therefore, police education must include an understanding of democratic values, professional ethics, and social responsibility. Police science not only aims to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement, but also ensures that police power is used lawfully and proportionately.¹¹

The development of the concept of police science in Europe also shows that policing cannot be separated from the social and political context in which

⁹ Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," *Policing*, Volume 8, Number 4, (2014), 379–392

¹⁰ Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," 381

¹¹ Sebastian Roché, "Police Science: Science of The Police or Science for The Police? — Conceptual Clarification and Taxonomy for Comparing Police Systems," (2017)

it operates. The police are not only law enforcers, but also part of the system of government and society. Therefore, the study of policing should include an analysis of the relationship between the state, society, and power. This approach is in line with the view in the modern police studies literature that places the police as a social institution influenced by political, economic, and cultural dynamics.¹²

This article aims to analyze police science from the perspective of CEPOL by examining the concept of police science developed in the *report Perspectives of Police Science in Europe* and related conceptual documents, and comparing it with the development of police studies in the international academic literature. The use of CEPOL report data is based on the author's reading of the CEPOL framework of thought which offers a police science approach within the framework of *knowledge-based policing* that integrates research, education, and operational practices while upholding democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. This perspective is relevant as a reference in the development of police science and the institutional transformation of the police in Indonesia to be more professional, adaptive, and responsive to global security dynamics. On that basis, this article is expected to provide a more systematic understanding of the scope, character, and purpose of police science, as well as its relevance to the development of police education and research, especially in the context of countries that are strengthening the professionalism and accountability of police institutions.

RESEARCH METHODS

This research uses a qualitative method with a library research approach. The main source of research is CEPOL's official report entitled *Perspectives of Police Science in Europe* compiled by the *Project Group on a European Approach to Police Science*. This document was chosen because it is the main reference in the development of the concept of police science in Europe. The analysis was carried out with content analysis techniques to identify the main concepts related to the definition of police science, the relationship between police research and

¹² Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," 380

practice, and the role of education and training in the development of police professionalism. This approach allows researchers to systematically understand CEPOL's perspective on police science as a scientific discipline. In addition, this study uses a conceptual approach to interpret the ideas contained in the CEPOL report, especially related to interdisciplinarity, integration of theory and practice, as well as democratic values and the rule of law in the implementation of police functions.

REVIEW OF POLICE SCIENCE LITERATURE

The study of police science has developed rapidly, especially since the end of Second World War.¹³ This development reached its peak in line with the socio-political transformation in Europe that demanded police professionalism,¹⁴ involving various disciplines, ranging from law, criminology, sociology, to public administration. In contrast to branches of science that have clear object limits, police science has developed interdisciplinary since its inception because it is related to the state's function in maintaining order, security, and law enforcement. Therefore, in the academic literature, the term police science is often used with different meanings, depending on the scientific tradition and the context of the country that developed it.

Historically, the term police science can be traced back to the 18th century in Europe, especially in France and Germany, when the concept of *Polizeiwissenschaft* was used to refer to the science of government in relation to societal governance.¹⁵ At that time, the term "police" did not only mean law enforcement officials, but also included all state functions in maintaining public welfare, order, and security.¹⁶ Therefore, police science in the early days was part

¹³ David H. Bayley, *Police for the Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

¹⁴ Robert Reiner, *The politics of the police* (4th ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 2-5.

¹⁵ Giuseppe Campesi, *A Genealogy of Public Security: The Theory and History of Modern Police Powers*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 23-24

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); see also Thomas Feltes, "Polizeiwissenschaft in Deutschland," *Polizei & Wissenschaft*, no. 4 (2007): 2–21.

of the science of state administration that focused on how the government effectively regulates people's lives.¹⁷

In contrast, the Anglo-American tradition (especially developed in the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia) uses the terms *Police Studies* or *Policing Studies* more than *Police Science*. The main focus is not to build an independent police discipline, but to analyze various aspects of policing through the perspectives of criminology, sociology, criminal law, and public policy. Anglo-American studies are generally oriented towards practical issues such as the effectiveness of patrols, criminal investigations, the use of police discretion, police-society relations, accountability, and crime control strategies.¹⁸ In fact, the 2007 CEPOL report stated that the European approach to police science is considered more ambitious than the Anglo-Saxon tradition because it seeks to establish its own conceptual framework and scientific identity for the police, while the Anglo-American tradition places police studies as part of a broader family of social sciences and criminology.

Despite the differences between the European traditions brought by CEPOL and the Anglo-American traditions, in subsequent developments, especially after the advent of modern states and a more structured legal system, the definition of policing has been narrowed. The police are understood as a specialized institution tasked with enforcing the law and maintaining order, so the study of the police begins to be separated from government science in general.¹⁹ However, the study of the police did not develop as a stand-alone discipline, but spread across various fields of science. Legal studies examine the authority of the police, criminology examines crime and its prevention, sociology studies the relationship between the police and society, while organizational and management studies the structure and performance of police institutions.²⁰

¹⁷ Giuseppe Campesi, *A Genealogy of Public Security*, 45-47.

¹⁸ See further review of Peter K. Manning, "The Study of Policing," *Police Quarterly*, (2005), 8(1), 23-43.

¹⁹ Giuseppe Campesi, *A Genealogy of Public Security*, 47-48

²⁰ Egon Bittner, *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society*. Rockville, MD: National Institute of Mental Health, 1970.

In modern literature, the development of police studies is increasingly influenced by the increasing demands for professionalism and accountability of police institutions. Greene states that in the second half of the 20th century, police studies began to develop as a separate field of research that was no longer limited to normative studies, but also included empirical research on how police work in practice. These developments are driven by the need to understand the effectiveness of police policies, the relationship between police and society, and the social impact of police actions.²¹

According to Greene, one of the main features of modern police studies is the shift from a legalistic approach to a social and organizational approach. If previously the research focused more on the legal rules that govern police authority, then in modern developments attention has shifted to how police organizations function, how decisions are made, and how policies are implemented in the field. This approach places the police as a social institution that is influenced by cultural, political, and economic factors, so it cannot be understood only through a legal perspective.²²

These developments have led to the emergence of the idea of *knowledge-based policing*, which is policing based on scientific research and empirical evidence.²³ In this approach, police policies, decisions, and practices should be supported by evidence and critically analyzed, not arbitrarily or without consideration.²⁴ This concept then became one of the bases for the development of police science as an applied discipline that aims to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of the police in a democratic society.

²¹ Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 8(4), 379–392. <https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pau034>

²² Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," 382.

²³ Yobhel Levic de Fretes, Muhammad Krisna Bayunarendro, Hillary Cornelia, "Evidence-Based Policing as a Foundational Policing Model for the INP," *Jurnal Ilmu Kepolisian*, Vol. 18, No. 2, (2024), 177-190.

²⁴ Colin Rogers, Ian Pepper, Louise Skilling, "Evidence-based policing for crime prevention in England and Wales: perception and use by new police recruits," *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, Vol. 24, No.4, (2022), 328–341. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41300-022-00158-w>

In the European context, efforts to systematically formulate police science gained momentum through the European Police College (CEPOL) initiative. CEPOL views that the development of security cooperation in the European Union requires a common understanding of the functions of the police, professional standards, and scientific approaches in dealing with security issues. Therefore, CEPOL formed a working group to study the possibility of developing *police science* as a scientific field that can be the basis for police education, training, and research at the European level.²⁵

One of the important findings of the CEPOL study is that police science cannot be narrowly defined as the study of police organization, but must encompass the entire policing process.²⁶ Policing is understood as all activities that aim to maintain order and security, both carried out by the police and by other institutions in society. Thus, the object of study of police science is not limited to police institutions, but also includes security policies, relations with the community, as well as supervision and accountability mechanisms.²⁷

This approach shows that police science is interdisciplinary. CEPOL emphasized that the development of police science requires contributions from various fields of science, including law, criminology, sociology, psychology, political, and management²⁸ No single discipline is able to fully explain the phenomenon of policing, so the integration of various perspectives is needed to understand and improve policing practices.

In addition to being interdisciplinary, police science is also understood as an applied science. The main goal of police science is not only to produce theories, but also to provide a scientific basis for police policy and practice. Therefore, the relationship between research, education, and operational practice is crucial. CEPOL emphasizes that police education should be based on

²⁵ European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 3-5

²⁶ European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 23.

²⁷ Sebastian Roché, "Police Science: Science of The Police or Science for The Police? — Conceptual Clarification and Taxonomy for Comparing Police Systems," (2017), 45

²⁸ European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 28.

research results, and research should be directed to answer practical needs in the implementation of police functions.²⁹

In the international literature, this approach is in line with the development of the concept of *professional policing*, which is the police that work based on scientific standards, professional ethics, and the principle of accountability. Modern policing is no longer seen as a purely technical job, but as a profession that requires higher education, specialized training, and strong analytical skills. Therefore, the development of police knowledge is an important part of efforts to increase the professionalism and legitimacy of the police in a democratic society.³⁰

In addition, the literature on police science also emphasizes the importance of democratic values and human rights. In a state of law, police power must be limited by law and supervised by the community. Therefore, the study of policing not only addresses the effectiveness of law enforcement, but also the legitimacy of the use of power. CEPOL affirms that the European approach to policing must be based on the principles of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and public accountability.

Based on the development of the literature, it can be concluded that police science is a field of study that continues to develop and does not fully have fixed limits. However, there are several main characteristics that can be identified, namely interdisciplinary, practice-oriented, research-based, and based on democratic values and the rule of law. These characteristics are the basis for the development of police science in the perspective of CEPOL, which seeks to build an integrated scientific approach to policing at the European level.

The Concept of Police Science in the Perspective of CEPOL

Efforts to formulate the concept of police science systematically at the European level have gained important momentum through the European Police College (CEPOL) initiative. The Council of the European Union established the institution with the aim of enhancing education and training cooperation for member state police officers, as well as developing a shared approach to

²⁹ European Police College (CEPOL), 20-23

³⁰ European Police College (CEPOL), 10-20

increasingly complex and cross-border security challenges. In carrying out this mandate, CEPOL realizes that operational cooperation cannot run optimally without a common conceptual understanding of the functions of the police, professional standards, and the scientific basis of policing. Therefore, the development of police science is seen as a strategic need in supporting police professionalism at the European level.³¹

One of the main problems identified in the CEPOL study is the absence of a single generally acceptable definition of police science. In fact, in Europe itself, it is still a debate about the use of the term "Police Sciences" or "Police Studies".³² Various studies on policing have been conducted by experts from different disciplines, but the results of these studies have not been integrated into a conceptual framework that can be used together. In addition, the differences in legal traditions, government systems, and police structures in European countries make it difficult to establish a uniform understanding of what police science is. This condition prompted CEPOL to form a working group tasked with conceptual clarification of police science.³³

The working group consists of academics and police practitioners from various member countries with diverse scientific backgrounds, such as law, criminology, sociology, psychology, and political science. The main goal of this group is to formulate the conceptual fundamentals of police science, including its definition, scope, methods, and development objectives.³⁴ In the process of the study, it was agreed that police science cannot be understood narrowly as a study of police organizations, but must include the entire process of *policing* in society. In this context, CEPOL defines police science as follows:³⁵

"Police Science is the scientific study of the police as an institution and of policing as a process. As an applied discipline it combines methods and subjects of other

³¹ European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 3-5.

³² European Police College (CEPOL), 23

³³ European Police College (CEPOL), 14

³⁴ European Police College (CEPOL), 14

³⁵ European Police College (CEPOL), 23

neighbouring disciplines within the field of policing. It includes all of what the police do and all aspects from outside that have an impact on policing and public order..."

In CEPOL's perspective, the term *policing* has a broader meaning than police. Police are understood as formal institutions that have the authority of the state to enforce the law and maintain order. At the same time, *policing* encompasses all activities aimed at maintaining security and order, both carried out by the police and by other institutions, including government agencies, private organizations, and the community. Thus, the object of study of police science is not limited to police organizations, but also includes security policies, supervision mechanisms, related with the community, and various forms of cooperation in maintaining social order.

This approach shows that police science in the perspective of CEPOL is interdisciplinary. There is no single discipline that is able to fully explain the phenomenon of the police, so the integration of various perspectives is needed. Legal science is needed to understand the basis of authority and the limits of the use of power, criminology to explain crime and its prevention, sociology to analyze the relationship between the police and society, psychology to understand the behavior of individuals in organizations, and management science and public administration to improve the effectiveness of police organizations. The integration of these various disciplines is the main characteristic of police science as a field of study oriented to problem solving.³⁶

In addition to being interdisciplinary, CEPOL emphasized that police science is an *applied science*, as written in the final document of CEPOL, as follows:³⁷

"As an applied discipline it combines methods and subjects of other neighbouring disciplines within the field of policing..."

³⁶ Hans-Gerd Jaschke and Klaus Neidhardt, "A Modern Police Science as an Integrated Academic Discipline: A Contribution to the Debate on its Fundamentals," *Policing and Society*, Volume. 17, No. 4, (2007), 303-320

³⁷ European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 23

The main goal of police science is not only to produce theories, but also to provide a scientific basis for police practice. Therefore, the relationship between research, education, and operational practice is crucial. Research should generate knowledge that is relevant to the needs of the police, education should transfer that knowledge to police members, and operational practice should use that knowledge in the performance of daily tasks. The interconnectedness between these three elements is seen as the main requirement for the development of a professional modern police.³⁸

The CEPOL report also emphasized that the development of police science cannot be separated from the context of a democratic society.³⁹ The police is an institution that has the authority to use force, so its use must be limited by law and closely supervised. Therefore, police science must pay attention not only to the effectiveness of law enforcement, but also to the legitimacy of the use of power. This is reflected in the training program organized by CEPOL which specifically contains material on respect for human rights (*fundamental rights*), rule of law, and public accountability as a normative foundation that must be part of the study of police science.⁴⁰ This is also stated in the final report of CEPOL as follows:

“CEPOL shall contribute by means of police training and by insights of police science and research to the European integration process which is firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law...”

This approach reflects the difference between the concept of policing in a democratic country and the concept of policing in an authoritarian system. In a democratic country, the police are not only tasked with maintaining order, but

³⁸ European Police College (CEPOL), 140,

³⁹ Hans-Gerd Jaschke menyatakan “It also offers the knowledge for democratic societies that are needed to monitor police practice and to take part in the process of policing.” in “Police Science – A European Approach,” https://www.cepoleuropa.eu/api/assets/website/Research_Science/sps_aea.pdf

⁴⁰ See Annual Report CEPOL 2024, “2024 In Brief: stay ahead of crime,” European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training.

also must protect the rights of citizens and be accountable to the community. Therefore, police education in Europe emphasizes the importance of democratic values, professional ethics, and critical analysis skills. CEPOL considers that the development of police science is one way to ensure that the police work based on knowledge and legal principles, not solely based on power.

The concept of police science from CEPOL's perspective is also closely related to the need for international cooperation. Globalization and European integration have led to an increase in transnational crimes, such as terrorism, human trafficking, cybercrime, and organized crime.⁴¹ These challenges cannot be faced by one country individually, so close cooperation is needed between the police forces of member countries. This cooperation requires the same professional standards, the same methods, and the same understanding of the functions of the police. Therefore, the development of police science is seen as a means to build a common language in the field of security.⁴²

In this context, CEPOL emphasizes that police education and training should be based on scientific research. Modern police must perform their duties to understand the development of society, technology, and increasingly complex forms of crime. Therefore, police education is not enough to be just technical, but must include theoretical knowledge that allows police members to think analytically and critically. Police science serves as an academic foundation that supports the development of the police education curriculum in Europe.

CEPOL's approach to police science also shows that the boundaries between academics and practitioners are increasingly blurred. Research on policing is not only carried out by universities, but also by police educational institutions and police institutions themselves. Instead, police practices are an

⁴¹ European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, *European Strategic training needs assessment 2018-2021*, (EU law enforcement priorities. Budapest: CEPOL, 2018).

⁴² This is reflected in CEPOL's mandate in the field of research and science as laid down in Article 5 of the Council Decision of 20 September 2005, stating, "The aim of CEPOL shall be to help train the senior police officers of the Member States by optimising cooperation between CEPOL's various components. It shall support and develop a European approach to the main problems facing Member States in the fight against crime, crime prevention, and the maintenance of law and order and public security, in particular the cross-border dimensions of those problems," in European Police College (CEPOL), *Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report* (Bramshill: European Police College, 2007), 6.

important source for scientific research. This mutual relationship between theory and practice is seen as the main characteristic of police science as an applied science that develops in a professional environment.⁴³

Based on this description, it can be concluded that the concept of police science in the perspective of CEPOL has several main characteristics, namely interdisciplinary, practice-oriented, research-based, and based on democratic values and the rule of law. Police science is understood as a field of study that examines the police as an institution and policing as a social process, with the aim of increasing the professionalism, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the police in modern society. This approach forms the basis for the development of police education, research, and cooperation at the European level, and provides an important conceptual framework for the development of police science in various countries.

The Interdisciplinary Character of Police Science

One of the main characteristics of police science in modern literature is its interdisciplinary nature.⁴⁴ In contrast to disciplines that have a clear object of study and relatively standard methods, police science develops from a practical need to understand and improve the function of the police in society. This is based on the duties of the police which include legal, social, political, and organizational aspects, so the study of the police cannot be limited to one field of knowledge only. From the perspective of CEPOL, this interdisciplinary nature is a fundamental feature that distinguishes police science from other academic disciplines.⁴⁵

⁴³ European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 24.

⁴⁴ Hans-Gerd Jaschke and Klaus Neidhardt, "A Modern Police Science as an Integrated Academic Discipline: A Contribution to the Debate on its Fundamentals," *Policing and Society*, Volume. 17, No. 4, (2007), 303-320

⁴⁵ "A police science which follows an interdisciplinary and European approach will form a strong link between theory and practice, doctrine/teachings/ training and research," in European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 12

In the CEPOL report, it is emphasized that the police as an institution is at the meeting point between the state and society. The police are an institution vested with the authority to use state power, but at the same time must work in a society that has diverse values, norms, and interests. Therefore, to understand the function of the police in its entirety, an approach that combines the perspectives of law, criminology, sociology, psychology, political science, and organizational science is needed. No single discipline is able to explain the entire dimension of policing, so the integration of various fields of science is an unavoidable necessity.

From a legal perspective, the police are understood as institutions that have the authority to enforce the law and maintain public order. Legal studies focus on the basis of police authority, limits on the use of force, law enforcement procedures, and mechanisms for monitoring police actions. In the state of law, all police actions must have a clear legal basis, so that legal science becomes one of the main foundations in the development of police science. However, a legal approach alone is not enough to understand how policing works in practice, as many operational decisions are influenced by social and organizational factors.

Criminology makes an important contribution in explaining the relationship between policing and crime. This science studies the causes of crime, crime patterns, and various crime prevention and control strategies. In the context of police science, criminology helps to understand how police policies affect crime rates, as well as how policing methods can be designed more effectively. The research-based approach in criminology is also the basis for the development of the concept of *evidence-based policing*, which is evidence-based policing and empirical research.⁴⁶

Sociology provides a different perspective by placing the police as a social institution that interacts with society. In the sociological approach, attention is not only to the authority of the police, but also to how society views the police, how legitimacy is built, and how conflicts between the police and society can occur. Studies of the sociology of policing show that the effectiveness of policing is determined not only by the force of the law, but also

⁴⁶ Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," 380

by the level of public trust. Therefore, the relationship between the police and the community is one of the main focuses in the study of modern police science.⁴⁷

Additionally to law, criminology, sociology and psychology also has an important role in police science. The police are an organization that works in often stressful situations, so understanding the behavior of individuals and groups is very important. Psychology helps explain how police members make decisions in emergency situations, how stress affects performance, as well as how leadership in police organizations can improve work effectiveness. In CEPOL's perspective, the psychological aspect is not only related to the individual police, but also to the interaction between the police and the community.⁴⁸

Organizational and management science is also an important part of police science. The police force is a large organization that has a hierarchical structure, command system, and complex operational procedures. Therefore, the study of organization, leadership, human resource management, and change management has become highly relevant. Many police reforms in various countries show that the main problem is not only in the rule of law, but in how the organization is run. Management science helps explain how policies can be effectively implemented in the organizational structure of the police.

Moreover, political science provides a framework for understanding the relationship between the police and the state. The police are part of the government system that is often influenced by political decisions. The study of political science helps explain how power is used, how security policies are formulated, and how policing is supervised in a democratic system. In a democratic country, the police must be accountable to the legitimately elected government, but at the same time must remain politically neutral. The tension

⁴⁷ Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," 381

⁴⁸ Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," 381-382

between professional independence and political control always becomes urgent in the study of police science.⁴⁹

The interdisciplinary nature of police science is also seen in the development of the concept of professional policing. Modern policing is no longer seen as a purely technical job, but as a profession that requires higher education and analytical skills. Greene states that police professionalism has to do with the increasing role of research, education, and ethical standards in policing practice. Modern police are expected to not only be able to carry out orders, but also be able to understand the reasons behind the policies implemented.⁵⁰

In CEPOL's perspective, the interdisciplinary nature of police science has direct implications for police education. The educational curriculum should not only contain technical training, but should cover a wide range of areas of knowledge relevant to police duties. Police education in Europe is designed to combine theory and practice, so that police members have analytical abilities as well as operational skills. This approach is seen as an essential requirement for facing the increasingly complex modern security challenges.⁵¹

The interdisciplinary character also shows that police science is dynamic and constantly evolving. Changes in society, technology, and forms of crime have led to a need for new knowledge in the field of policing. Therefore, police science cannot be static, but must always be open to the development of other sciences. The integration of various disciplines allows police science to adapt to changing security environments, while improving the quality of policing policies and practices.

Based on this description, it can be concluded that the interdisciplinary nature is the main characteristic of police science in a modern perspective as well as in the CEPOL's approach. Police science cannot be understood as a branch of one particular discipline, but as a field of study that integrates various sciences

⁴⁹ European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 159-161

⁵⁰ Jack R. Greene, "The Upside and Downside of the 'Police Science' Epistemic Community," 386

⁵¹ European Police College (CEPOL), "Perspectives of Police Science in Europe: Final Report," 16

to understand and improve police duties in society. This interdisciplinary approach is the basis for the development of police science as an applied discipline that aims to improve the professionalism, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the police in a democratic country.

CONCLUSION

Police science is a field of study that is developing along with the increasing complexity of police duties in modern society. Changing security environments, increasing demands for professionalism, and the need for accountability in democratic countries encourage the need for a scientific approach that can explain and improve policing practices systematically. In the development of academic literature, police science does not emerge as a single discipline that stands alone, but rather as an interdisciplinary field that integrates various sciences, such as law, criminology, sociology, psychology, organizational science, and political science. The interdisciplinary character reflects that the police is an institution that is at the meeting between the state, the law, and society, so it cannot be understood from just one scientific perspective.

In the European context, efforts to formulate police science more systematically gained momentum through the initiative of the European Police College (CEPOL). The institution serves not only as a center for police education and training, but also as a forum for the development of a scientific approach to policing. Through the Perspectives of Police Science in Europe report and other conceptual documents, CEPOL seeks to build a common understanding of the definition, scope, and objectives of police science as a basis for security cooperation among EU member states. The study shows that police science should be understood not only as a study of police institutions, but also as a study of the policing process in a broad sense, including security policy, relations with the community, and mechanisms of supervision over the use of power.

One of the key findings from CEPOL's perspective is that police science is a practice-oriented applied science. The main goal of police science development is not solely to produce theories, but to provide a scientific basis for policy-making, education, and the implementation of police duties.

Therefore, the relationship between research, education, and operational practice is an inseparable element. Research produces knowledge, education transfers that knowledge to members of the police, and operational practice uses this knowledge in the implementation of daily tasks. The integration of these three elements is seen as the main requirement for the realization of a modern professional police.

Furthermore to being interdisciplinary and applied, the concept of police science from the perspective of CEPOL is also based on democratic values and the rule of law. The police are an institution vested with the authority to use state power, so their use must be limited by law and effectively supervised. Therefore, the study of police science not only discusses the effectiveness of law enforcement, but also the legitimacy of the use of power, respect for human rights, and accountability to the community. This approach confirms that the police in a democratic country are not only tasked with maintaining order, but also protecting citizens' rights and maintaining public trust.

The interdisciplinary nature of police science also has important implications for the education and development of police professionalism. Modern policing requires members who not only have technical skills, but also analytical abilities and a theoretical understanding of society, the law, and the organization. Therefore, police education should be designed as research-based academic education, not just technical training. This approach is in line with the concept of *knowledge-based policing*, which is policing based on scientific knowledge and empirical evidence.

From the overall discussion, it can be concluded that police science from the perspective of CEPOL has several main characteristics, namely interdisciplinary, practice-oriented, research-based, and based on the values of democracy and the rule of law. Police science is understood as a field of study that studies the police as an institution and policing as a social process, to increase the professionalism, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the police in facing modern security challenges. This approach provides an important conceptual framework for the development of police science in various countries, particularly in an effort to strengthen the academic basis for professional, accountable, and democratic policing practices.

Thus, the development of police science is not only an academic need, but also a practical need in building a police institution that is able to answer increasingly complex security challenges. CEPOL's perspective shows that modern policing must be based on knowledge, research, and democratic values, so that the functions of the police can be carried out effectively while remaining within the framework of law and public trust.

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Transactional Securitization in the Venezuelan Crisis: A Political and Security Law Analysis of the Arrest of Nicolás Maduro

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Abstract : *This article examines the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by the United States in January 2026 through the perspectives of security law and securitization theory. Although the operation was officially justified on the basis of narco-terrorism charges, the use of military force within the territory of a sovereign state raises significant questions concerning the principles of state sovereignty and international law. Employing a normative legal approach combined with the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, this study analyzes how Venezuela's strategic oil resources were discursively reconstructed as an existential threat to U.S. national security through the interaction of speech acts, audience acceptance, and political legitimization, thereby enabling the adoption of extraordinary measures. The findings indicate that the United States acted as the principal securitizing actor, portraying the Maduro regime as a national security threat while simultaneously advancing strategic interests related to energy security and access to Venezuela's oil resources. Building upon these findings, this article introduces the concept of*



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transactional securitization, which explains how security discourse may function not only to legitimize exceptional security measures but also to facilitate strategic economic objectives. This conceptual development extends the explanatory scope of classical securitization theory by demonstrating that successful securitization may be followed by the political and economic reconfiguration of strategically valuable natural resources. From the perspective of international law, the Maduro case raises important questions concerning the principles of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) and good faith in the exercise of state authority, while illustrating the increasingly blurred boundary between national security and geopolitical economic competition.

Keywords : *transactional securitization; securitization; security law; Venezuela; state sovereignty*

INTRODUCTION

In early January 2026, international geopolitics was shaken by a limited U.S. military operation in Caracas that culminated in the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The operation reportedly involved a coordinated assault by U.S. special forces, who subsequently transferred Maduro to the United States to face trial before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The U.S. government presented the operation as a legitimate transnational law enforcement measure targeting organized crime, particularly allegations of narco-terrorism and international drug trafficking networks allegedly involving senior members of the Venezuelan government.¹

From a legal standpoint, the operation was grounded in indictments issued by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2020, which accused Maduro of participating in a narco-terrorism conspiracy involving transnational criminal organizations, including alleged cooperation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC—Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). The indictments alleged that Maduro and his associates sought to "flood" the United States with cocaine as part of a coordinated transnational criminal

¹ Lauren Floyd, "Maduro Indictment Unsealed after U.S. Capture in Venezuela," *Axios*, January 3, 2026, <https://www.axios.com/2026/01/03/indictment-trump-maduro-capture-venezuela> (accessed January 6, 2026.)

enterprise.² On this basis, Washington argued that Maduro's arrest constituted a legitimate exercise of transnational criminal law enforcement, notwithstanding the fact that the operation was conducted extraterritorially without the consent of the territorial state.

Official statistics released by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) underscore the magnitude of the narcotics threat confronting the United States. During Fiscal Year 2024, CBP officers seized more than 27,000 pounds (approximately 12.2 metric tons) of fentanyl, together with tens of thousands of pounds of methamphetamine and cocaine, as well as significant quantities of heroin, most of which entered through the U.S.–Mexico border.³ These seizures indicate that the United States continues to serve as a primary destination for transnational narcotics trafficking, particularly given that confiscated drugs represent only a fraction of the total volume attempting to enter the country. According to U.S. law enforcement agencies, most fentanyl circulating in the domestic market originates from transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico and is smuggled through official ports of entry. Consequently, strengthening border security has become one of the principal policy instruments employed by the United States to combat illicit drug trafficking.

Despite these official justifications, Maduro's arrest has generated intense legal and political controversy. From the perspectives of both security law and public international law, the operation raises fundamental questions regarding the limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the principle of state sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations explicitly prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of sovereign states except under narrowly defined circumstances. Consequently, numerous legal scholars and international observers have argued that the operation extended well beyond the boundaries of ordinary criminal law enforcement and

² U.S. Department of Justice, “Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Criminal Charges,” press release, March 26, 2020 (updated February 5, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/nicol-s-maduro-moros-and-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials-charged-narco-terrorism>

³ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Frontline Against Fentanyl,” accessed August 7, 2026, <https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/frontline-against-fentanyl>

instead resembled a form of unilateral military intervention aimed at regime change, with criminal prosecution serving primarily as its legal justification. Viewed from this perspective, the operation establishes a significant precedent in contemporary international relations by further blurring the distinction between transnational law enforcement and coercive intervention against a sovereign state.

The events of January 2026 did not emerge in isolation but rather represented the culmination of a long-standing geopolitical rivalry between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the United States. Since the presidency of Hugo Chávez and continuing under Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's socialist-oriented government has pursued an extensive program of energy nationalization, particularly in the oil sector, which had previously been dominated by Western multinational corporations. Beyond asserting economic sovereignty, these policies directly challenged long-standing U.S. strategic and commercial interests in Latin America.⁴

Against this backdrop, Venezuela has become both a pivotal actor in the global energy market and a persistent source of bilateral tension with the United States. The nationalization of strategic energy assets and the restrictions imposed on foreign oil companies fundamentally conflicted with Washington's liberal economic vision and its broader geopolitical objectives in the region. Consequently, the dispute between the two countries extends well beyond contemporary legal or diplomatic disagreements. Rather, it reflects a protracted contest shaped by competing ideological orientations, economic interests, and geopolitical influence that has evolved over more than two decades.

Within this broader geopolitical context, the energy sector—and oil in particular—constitutes a central dimension of the bilateral confrontation. According to international energy assessments, Venezuela possesses more than 303 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves, making it the country with the largest proven oil reserves in the world, surpassing even Saudi Arabia.⁵ This extraordinary resource endowment has elevated Venezuela's geopolitical

⁴ Azza Bimantara, "AS vs Venezuela, Akademisi UMM: Konflik Geopolitik Kepentingan Ekonomi dan Energi," Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, January 19, 2026,

⁵ Worldometer, "Minyak Venezuela," <https://www.worldometers.info/id/minyak/minyak-venezuela/>, diakses February 7, 2026.

significance by positioning the country as a strategically important actor in the global energy system.

The overwhelming majority of these reserves are concentrated in the Orinoco Oil Belt, one of the world's largest deposits of extra-heavy crude oil.⁶ Although the extraction and processing of extra-heavy crude require advanced technology and substantial financial investment, these technical constraints have done little to diminish its long-term strategic value. On the contrary, the Orinoco reserves remain highly attractive to major international energy companies seeking to secure future energy supplies.⁷

Accordingly, Venezuela's vast oil wealth should be understood not merely as the foundation of its domestic economy but also as a strategic geopolitical asset capable of shaping regional and global power relations. Access to—and control over—these resources constitutes an important explanatory variable for understanding the sustained involvement of major powers, particularly the United States, in Venezuela's political and security affairs. Rather than representing a purely economic commodity, Venezuelan oil has increasingly become intertwined with questions of strategic competition, regional influence, and national security.

The strategic implications of Venezuela's vast energy reserves extend well beyond strengthening the country's position within the global energy market. They also generate a complex structural paradox. On the one hand, continued global dependence on fossil fuels elevates Venezuela to a position of considerable geopolitical importance. On the other hand, the country's extraordinary resource wealth exemplifies the resource curse, whereby abundant natural resources do not necessarily translate into political stability or sustained economic prosperity. Instead, strategic natural resources frequently become sources of external competition, domestic instability, and geopolitical contestation.⁸

This structural contradiction has profoundly shaped U.S.–Venezuela relations. Bilateral tensions intensified following the Venezuelan government's

⁶ Bernard Mommer, "The Value of Extra-Heavy Crude Oil from the Orinoco Belt," *Middle East Economic Survey*, 47, no. 11 (March 15, 2004).

⁷ Bernard Mommer, "The Value of Extra-Heavy Crude Oil from the Orinoco Belt," *Middle East Economic Survey*, 47, no. 11 (March 15, 2004).

decision to nationalize the assets of major multinational energy corporations, including ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, after the companies rejected the country's revised ownership framework.⁸ Although formally justified as an exercise of economic sovereignty, the nationalization policy was widely interpreted in Washington as a direct challenge to U.S. economic influence and the liberal international economic order in Latin America.

Historically, Venezuela occupied a privileged position within the U.S. energy supply chain as one of the principal suppliers of heavy crude oil to refineries along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Geographic proximity, combined with the technical compatibility of Venezuelan heavy crude with existing refinery infrastructure, created a relationship of substantial energy interdependence between the both countries.¹⁰ This mutually beneficial relationship, however, gradually deteriorated as Caracas adopted an increasingly confrontational foreign policy emphasizing resource nationalism, state control over strategic industries, and resistance to U.S. political influence.

In response, the United States imposed successive rounds of economic sanctions targeting Venezuela's energy sector, particularly *Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA)*, the country's state-owned oil company and principal source of national revenue.⁹ Beyond restricting Venezuela's access to international export markets, these sanctions severely constrained PDVSA's ability to obtain foreign investment, advanced extraction technology, and international financing.¹⁰ Nevertheless, despite the resulting decline in oil production, Venezuela's enormous proven reserves continued to occupy a central place in global energy calculations. In an international environment increasingly characterized by supply uncertainty arising from geopolitical conflicts in Eurasia and the Middle East, securing access to alternative energy sources has become an increasingly important strategic priority for major powers—including the United States itself.

⁸ Fathur Octaviano Iskandar, "Keterlibatan Amerika Serikat dalam Krisis Venezuela pada Masa Nicolas Maduro," *e-Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2021), 445

⁹ Faradilla Firdaus, "Strategi Perlawanan Venezuela dalam Menghadapi Tekanan Amerika Serikat," *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional Universitas Airlangga*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2019), 88.

¹⁰ Faradilla Firdaus, "Strategi Perlawanan Venezuela dalam Menghadapi Tekanan Amerika Serikat," *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional Universitas Airlangga*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2019), 88

Against this geopolitical and economic backdrop, bilateral tensions reached an unprecedented level in early 2026 when U.S.-supported authorities arrested President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. Officially, the operation was justified as a transnational criminal law enforcement action targeting narco-terrorism and international drug trafficking networks allegedly threatening U.S. national security. Yet the operation immediately generated widespread legal and political controversy because it appeared to extend beyond accepted principles of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and raised serious questions regarding respect for state sovereignty under the Charter of the United Nations.

From the perspective of international security law, the arrest of a sitting head of state within the sovereign territory of his own country constitutes an extraordinary and highly exceptional measure. Such an operation inevitably raises questions regarding whether the criminal allegations alone sufficiently explain the decision to employ military force and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Instead, the case suggests the possibility that criminal prosecution functioned as a legal and political instrument serving broader strategic objectives. It is precisely at this point that securitization theory offers a particularly useful analytical framework.

According to the Copenhagen School, security is not an objective condition inherent in particular threats but rather a socially constructed status produced through successful speech acts.¹¹ Political actors transform ordinary political issues into matters of existential security by framing them as extraordinary threats requiring exceptional responses. Within this framework, the United States systematically portrayed the Maduro government as an exceptional danger to both U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. By constructing Maduro as the leader of a transnational narco-terrorist network, Washington effectively shifted the primary focus of the dispute from geopolitical and economic competition to the realm of national security, thereby creating discursive legitimacy for extraordinary measures that would otherwise have been politically and legally difficult to justify.

¹¹ Barry Buzan, et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), dikutip dalam Budiman, I., "Teori Sekuritisasi dalam Studi Keamanan Nasional," *Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013).

Accordingly, Maduro's arrest should not be understood merely as an episode of transnational criminal law enforcement. Rather, it represents a broader process of securitization in which economic interests—particularly those associated with long-term energy security—were reframed as existential national security concerns. Through this process, extraordinary measures, including military intervention and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, could be presented as both necessary and legitimate responses to an alleged security threat.

This economic motivation under the guise of security was explicitly confirmed by President Donald Trump shortly after the operation, when he connected the military action directly to the future of Venezuela's energy resources, stating:

"We're going to have our very large United States oil companies... go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country... The future will be determined by the ability to protect commerce and territory and resources that are core to national security. These are core to our national security."

Trump's overt focus on commercial restoration and resource control demonstrates that once the primary political obstacle—the Maduro regime—was removed under a security justification, the oil issue was immediately returned to the economic realm to serve the securitizing actor's interests. Consequently, this interpretation provides the analytical foundation for examining the Maduro case not simply as a matter of criminal justice, but as a vivid illustration of energy securitization in contemporary international politics.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs normative legal research using both a conceptual approach and a case approach. The conceptual approach is applied to examine the theory of securitization developed by the Copenhagen School, particularly the works of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. This framework provides the analytical basis for explaining how an economic issue—specifically access to strategic energy resources—can be transformed into an issue of national security

through the processes of speech acts, audience acceptance, and the legitimization of extraordinary measures.

The case approach focuses on the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by the United States in January 2026. Rather than treating the incident solely as an issue of transnational criminal law enforcement, this study analyzes it within the broader framework of public international law, security law, and the principle of state sovereignty. This approach enables the legal and political dimensions of the operation to be examined simultaneously through the analytical lens of securitization theory.

The study relies on both primary and secondary legal materials. Primary sources include the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Resolution 1803 (XVII)), official documents issued by the U.S. government, and public statements concerning the arrest operation. Secondary sources consist of scholarly books, peer-reviewed journal articles, and academic publications addressing securitization theory, international security law, energy politics, and U.S.–Venezuela relations.

The collected materials are analyzed qualitatively through legal interpretation and conceptual analysis. Relevant legal norms are examined alongside the principal concepts of securitization theory in order to identify patterns demonstrating how security narratives were employed to legitimize extraordinary measures. On this basis, the study evaluates whether the Maduro case reflects an emerging pattern of transactional securitization, in which national security discourse functions not only as a mechanism for addressing security threats but also as a means of advancing broader geopolitical and economic interests.

Accordingly, this study not only applies securitization theory as an analytical framework but also develops the concept of transactional securitization to explain how national security discourse may be strategically employed to advance geopolitical and economic objectives. Based on this problem, this paper examines how the U.S. securitization process transformed an economic issue (oil) into a national security threat through the narco-terrorism narrative against Nicolás Maduro.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SECURITIZATION THEORY

Understanding the arrest of Nicolás Maduro from the perspective of international security law requires an analytical framework capable of moving beyond the formal legal justifications advanced by the United States. While the operation was officially presented as an exercise in transnational criminal law enforcement targeting narco-terrorism, such an explanation alone is insufficient to account for the broader geopolitical and economic context surrounding the case. The apparent discrepancy between the criminal allegations and the strategic importance of Venezuela's energy resources suggests that the operation should also be examined as a process of securitization.

The theory of securitization, developed by the Copenhagen School and principally advanced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, provides an appropriate conceptual framework for explaining how issues that would ordinarily remain within the sphere of politics or economics are transformed into matters of national security.¹² Rather than treating security as an objective condition, securitization theory conceptualizes security as a socially constructed process through which political actors frame particular issues as existential threats requiring exceptional responses. In this sense, securitization refers to the discursive and political process through which an issue is elevated from the realm of normal politics to that of emergency politics, thereby legitimizing actions that would otherwise be regarded as extraordinary or legally contentious.

Within this framework, law is understood not merely as a system of fixed legal norms but also as a political instrument through which security narratives acquire institutional legitimacy. Once an issue has been successfully securitized, legal authority may be invoked to justify measures that extend beyond the ordinary limits of political and legal practice. In the case of the U.S. intervention against Venezuela, the discourse of national security arguably enabled Washington to invoke domestic criminal law while simultaneously circumventing principles of state sovereignty that are ordinarily protected under international law.

According to the Copenhagen School, a successful securitization process requires the interaction of five constitutive elements: (1) the securitizing actor,

¹² Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, & Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998)

(2) the referent object, (3) the speech act, (4) audience acceptance, and (5) extraordinary measures.¹³ These elements operate as an integrated analytical framework rather than as independent variables. A securitizing actor first identifies a referent object that is portrayed as facing an existential threat. Through a persuasive speech act, the actor seeks to convince the relevant audience that the threat is sufficiently urgent to justify actions beyond the scope of ordinary political procedures. If the audience accepts this construction, extraordinary measures become politically and legally legitimate.

This theoretical framework forms the basis of the present analysis. Rather than interpreting Maduro's arrest solely as an episode of transnational criminal law enforcement, this study examines how each element of securitization operated to transform Venezuela's energy sector from an economic issue into a matter of U.S. national security. The following sections analyze how these five elements interacted to construct a security narrative that ultimately legitimized extraordinary measures against the Maduro government while simultaneously advancing broader geopolitical and economic interests associated with Venezuela's oil resources.

The first constitutive element is the securitizing actor, namely the political authority that identifies and articulates an existential threat. In the present case, the U.S. government—particularly the Department of Justice and President Donald Trump—served as the principal securitizing actors. Through their legal and political authority, these institutions publicly framed Nicolás Maduro and his government as threats to U.S. national security, thereby seeking to legitimize the use of coercive measures extending beyond ordinary domestic jurisdiction.¹⁴

The second element is the referent object, referring to the entity claimed to face an existential threat and therefore requiring protection. Officially, the

¹³ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, dan Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 40. Also see Imam Budiman, "Teori Sekuritisasi dalam Studi Keamanan Nasional," *Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional Universitas Budi Luhur*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013), hal. 12. (Membahas mengenai integrasi elemen-elemen sekuritisasi dalam kebijakan luar negeri).

¹⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, dan Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 40.

United States portrayed the American public, regional democratic stability, and national security as the principal referent objects endangered by transnational narcotics trafficking. However, from the perspective of political economy, this article argues that a deeper referent object underlay the official security discourse: sustained access to Venezuela's strategic oil reserves. In this interpretation, restrictions on international access to Venezuelan oil resulting from Maduro's resource-nationalist policies were implicitly framed as threats to Western energy security and long-term economic interests.¹⁹

The third element is the speech act, the discursive mechanism through which an issue is transformed into an existential security threat. President Donald Trump's statement of 3 January 2026 constitutes a particularly significant speech act. By portraying Maduro as an "illegitimate dictator" and accusing his government of perpetrating "the greatest theft of American property" through the nationalization of oil infrastructure, Trump effectively shifted the debate from one concerning economic policy and international law to one centred on national security. Through this discursive construction, the Maduro government was deprived of political legitimacy, while extraordinary measures—including military intervention and extraterritorial law enforcement—were presented as justified and necessary responses.¹⁵

The fourth element is audience acceptance. According to securitization theory, a speech act produces political consequences only when it is accepted by a relevant audience. In the United States, this audience included Congress, domestic public opinion, federal law enforcement institutions, and strategic international partners. The deliberate use of the label narco-terrorism, carrying particularly strong political resonance in American security discourse, facilitated public acceptance of the government's threat narrative. Such acceptance generated the political legitimacy necessary to justify extraordinary measures that would otherwise have been difficult to reconcile with established principles of international law, particularly the sovereign equality of states.¹⁶

¹⁵ Donald Trump, "TRANSCRIPT: President Trump Discusses the Capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, 1.03.26," Senate Democratic Leadership, Newsroom, January 3, 2026, <https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/trump-transcripts/transcript-president-trump-discusses-the-capture-of-nicolas-maduro-in-venezuela-10326>.

¹⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, dan Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 25. See too Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of

The final element is extraordinary measures, namely actions undertaken outside the procedures of ordinary politics and law. The arrest of Nicolás Maduro through a unilateral military operation in Caracas constitutes the clearest manifestation of this element. Under normal circumstances, disputes involving sovereign states would be addressed through diplomacy, extradition agreements, or adjudication before international judicial institutions. In this case, however, securitization enabled the United States to justify bypassing the customary immunity of a sitting head of state (immunity *ratione personae*) while asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction through unilateral military action. From the perspective of international law, coercive cross-border measures undertaken without authorization from the United Nations Security Council or the consent of the territorial state raise serious questions regarding compliance with the principles of state sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force.¹⁷

The Dynamics of the Securitization Process

Beyond these five constitutive elements, the Copenhagen School further argues that successful securitization involves a broader political dynamic through which an issue is transformed into an existential security concern. This process is characterized by three interrelated components: the construction of an existential threat, the justification of emergency action, and the suspension or transcendence of ordinary political and legal rules (breaking free of rules).¹⁸

These three components explain how security discourse enables political authorities to move issues beyond the realm of normal politics. Once an issue has been successfully framed as an existential threat, exceptional responses that would otherwise be regarded as legally or politically unacceptable become increasingly viewed as necessary and legitimate. In the Maduro case, the narco-terrorism narrative performed precisely this function. It reframed what had long

Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–201.

¹⁷ Iain Cameron, "International Criminal Jurisdiction, Protective Principle," dalam *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, latest update October 2021, *Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law*.

¹⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, dan Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 26.

been a geopolitical and economic dispute over Venezuela's strategic energy resources as an urgent national security threat, thereby legitimizing unilateral military action and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the broader discourse of protecting U.S. national security.

The Securitization Process in the Maduro Case

Securitization should not be understood as a single event but rather as a gradual political process through which ordinary political issues are transformed into matters of existential security. This transformation enables governments to justify measures that would otherwise remain politically or legally unacceptable. Rather than emerging spontaneously, securitization is achieved through a sequence of discursive, institutional, and political developments that progressively redefine both the nature of the threat and the range of permissible state responses.

The Maduro case illustrates this dynamic particularly well. Although the immediate justification for U.S. intervention centred on allegations of narco-terrorism, the broader geopolitical context suggests a more complex process in which concerns relating to Venezuela's strategic energy resources became increasingly intertwined with national security discourse. From this perspective, the arrest of Maduro can be understood not as an isolated law-enforcement operation but as the culmination of a broader process through which an economic dispute was progressively reframed as an existential security threat.

Stage One: Pre-Securitization Phase - Politicization of the Energy Dispute (2015-2024)

The first stage corresponds to what the Copenhagen School describes as politicization, during which an issue remains within the sphere of ordinary politics and is addressed through conventional policy instruments. During this period, disagreements between the United States and Venezuela primarily revolved around resource nationalism, the nationalization of foreign energy assets, economic sanctions, and international arbitration involving ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. Oil

continued to be treated principally as an economic commodity and an instrument of foreign policy rather than as a matter of national security.¹⁹

This situation gradually changed following the limited effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions. Beginning in 2017, Washington imposed increasingly comprehensive financial and energy sanctions against Petr6leos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) in an effort to weaken the Maduro government politically. While these measures significantly reduced Venezuela's oil production and export capacity, they failed to produce the anticipated regime change. Consequently, the persistence of Venezuela's enormous oil reserves—estimated at approximately 303 billion barrels—combined with growing uncertainty in global energy markets, encouraged a gradual reinterpretation of Venezuelan oil as a strategic security concern rather than merely an economic resource.²⁰

Within the logic of securitization, this transition marked the movement of the issue from normal politics towards security politics, creating the political conditions under which more exceptional policy options could subsequently be considered.²¹ Throughout this process, national security concerns have been closely intertwined with strategic economic interests associated with long-term access to Venezuela's energy resources. This article therefore conceptualizes this phenomenon as transactional securitization, namely a form of securitization in which security discourse functions primarily as an instrument for advancing broader geopolitical and economic objectives while maintaining the appearance of legitimate national security policy.

¹⁹ Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 515.

²⁰ Mucahithan Avcioglu, "Global energy giants gunning for Venezuela's resources," Anadolu Ajansı, (7 Januari 2026), <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/explainer-global-energy-giants-gunning-for-venezuela-s-resources/3792648?>

²¹ The Straits Times, "How Venezuelan oil factored into the US capture of Maduro," (4 Januari 2026), <https://www.straitstimes.com/business/companies-markets/how-venezuelan-oil-factored-into-the-us-seizure-of-maduro?>

Stage Two: Strategic Speech Act and the Construction of the Narco-Terrorism Narrative (2025)

The second stage represents the decisive discursive shift through which Venezuela's energy dispute was transformed into a matter of U.S. national security. Rather than relying solely on economic sanctions or diplomatic pressure, the United States increasingly employed political and legal discourse to redefine the Maduro government as an existential security threat. Within the framework of securitization theory, this process constitutes a speech act—the performative act through which political authorities construct a particular issue as requiring exceptional security responses. In this case, the strategic significance of Venezuela's oil resources gradually disappeared from public discourse and was replaced by a dominant narrative centred on narco-terrorism, transnational organized crime, and the protection of American society.

The securitizing move was reinforced through a series of official legal and political statements issued by the U.S. government. Most notably, the Department of Justice announced an indictment alleging that President Nicolás Maduro had led an international narcotics trafficking organization responsible for facilitating the large-scale distribution of cocaine into the United States. The indictment further alleged systematic collaboration between senior Venezuelan state officials, transnational criminal organizations, and armed non-state actors, portraying the Venezuelan government not merely as politically authoritarian but as an integral component of an international criminal enterprise. By framing the allegations in these terms, the United States shifted the debate beyond questions of governance or economic policy and instead constructed the Maduro administration as an existential threat to U.S. national security.²²

From the perspective of securitization theory, the significance of these legal accusations lies not solely in their judicial content but also in their political function. The indictment operated as a powerful discursive

²² Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. (1998)

instrument through which the U.S. government sought to redefine the meaning of Venezuela within American security discourse. Rather than emphasizing the geopolitical implications of Venezuela's resource nationalism or its vast oil reserves, official narratives increasingly portrayed the country's energy sector as a financial foundation for narco-terrorism. Consequently, intervention in Venezuela's oil industry could be framed not as an attempt to secure strategic economic interests but as a necessary measure to disrupt transnational criminal financing and protect domestic security.

This transformation illustrates the central logic of securitization. An issue originally rooted in political economy was progressively reconstructed as an existential security threat through coordinated legal, political, and institutional discourse. Once accepted within the framework of national security, actions that would otherwise have appeared incompatible with ordinary principles of international law—including military intervention and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction—became increasingly capable of being justified as legitimate responses to an exceptional threat.

From the perspective advanced in this article, this stage also marks the beginning of what is conceptualized as transactional securitization. The security narrative did not emerge in isolation from material interests; rather, it functioned as a strategic mechanism through which broader geopolitical and economic objectives could be pursued under the normative legitimacy of counter-narcotics and national security policy. Accordingly, the speech act served not only to construct an existential threat but also to create the political conditions under which control over strategically valuable energy resources could subsequently be pursued through extraordinary measures.

Stage Three: Escalation and Extraordinary Measures (2026)

The securitization process reached its culmination in January 2026 when the United States launched a limited military operation in Caracas that resulted in the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his subsequent transfer to the United States to face charges

relating to international narcotics trafficking. Conducted on 3 January 2026, the operation involved direct military action against a sitting head of state within the territory of a sovereign state—an exceptionally rare occurrence in contemporary international relations. From the perspective of securitization theory, this operation represented the transition from security discourse to extraordinary measures, whereby actions that would ordinarily be regarded as legally and politically impermissible became justified under the language of national security.²³

The operation also demonstrated that the preceding securitization process had achieved its intended political effect. The sustained construction of Maduro as the leader of a narco-terrorist regime, together with the repeated portrayal of Venezuela as a transnational security threat, generated sufficient audience acceptance among domestic political institutions and segments of the international community to legitimize an unprecedented exercise of extraterritorial coercive power. In the logic of the Copenhagen School, extraordinary measures become politically feasible only after a securitizing narrative has been successfully accepted by the relevant audience. The Maduro case therefore illustrates the practical culmination of the securitization process through the implementation of military force beyond the ordinary limits of international legal practice.

From the standpoint of international law, however, the operation remains highly controversial. The unilateral use of military force within the territory of another sovereign state, undertaken without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council or the consent of the territorial government, raises serious legal questions concerning the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and the immunity of incumbent heads of state (immunity *ratione personae*).²⁴

²³ Regina Garcia Cano dan Konstantin Toropin, "US strikes Venezuela, says Nicolás Maduro has been captured," *Military Times*, 3 Januari 2026, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/01/03/us-strikes-venezuela-says-nicolas-maduro-has-been-captured/>.

²⁴ Ali Harb, Abduction of Venezuela's Maduro illegal despite US charges, experts say, *Al Jazeera*, 8 January 2026. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/8/abduction-of-venezuelas-maduro-illegal-despite-us-charges-experts-say>

Consequently, while securitization may generate domestic political legitimacy, it does not necessarily eliminate the legal controversies associated with extraordinary measures under international law.

The most significant development, however, occurred immediately after the operation had been declared successful. In his official statement, President Donald Trump announced that major American oil companies would enter Venezuela, invest billions of dollars in restoring the country's damaged oil infrastructure, and resume commercial production.²⁵ More importantly, Trump explicitly linked the protection of commerce, territory, and natural resources to the core of U.S. national security.²⁶ This statement fundamentally altered the analytical significance of the case. Rather than remaining exclusively within the domain of security, the discourse shifted back toward economic objectives immediately after the principal political obstacle—the Maduro government—had been removed.

This post-operation transition represents the principal theoretical contribution of the present study. Whereas classical securitization theory primarily explains how security discourse legitimizes extraordinary measures, the Maduro case demonstrates an additional and previously underexplored stage in which successful securitization facilitates the reconfiguration of control over strategic economic resources. Security discourse thus functions not as an end in itself but as an instrument through which broader geopolitical and economic objectives become attainable.

Accordingly, this article conceptualizes this phenomenon as transactional securitization. Unlike classical securitization, where extraordinary measures constitute the endpoint of the securitization process, transactional securitization continues beyond the security operation itself. Once exceptional measures have successfully removed political or legal obstacles, the security narrative gradually recedes and

²⁵ Donald Trump, Transcript: President Trump Discusses the Capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, 3 January 2026.

²⁶ Trump, Transcript: Capture of Nicolás Maduro

strategic economic interests re-emerge as the dominant policy objective. In the Maduro case, the transition from narco-terrorism to the reconstruction and commercial exploitation of Venezuela's oil industry illustrates how national security discourse can operate as a temporary mechanism for facilitating the reorganization of access to strategically valuable resources. Security, therefore, becomes not merely a response to existential threats but also a political instrument through which states pursue long-term geopolitical and economic advantage.

Transactional Securitization: A Theoretical Anomaly in U.S. Security Policy

The Maduro case reveals an important theoretical limitation in the classical formulation of securitization developed by the Copenhagen School. Conventional securitization theory explains how political actors transform ordinary political issues into existential security threats through the successful construction and acceptance of security narratives. However, the theory pays considerably less attention to what occurs after extraordinary measures have been implemented, particularly when the security discourse subsequently gives way to explicitly articulated economic objectives. The events surrounding the arrest of Nicolás Maduro therefore present a significant theoretical anomaly that cannot be fully explained within the existing framework of securitization theory.

This article conceptualizes this anomaly as transactional securitization. The concept refers to a form of securitization in which national security discourse functions not merely to obtain political legitimacy for extraordinary measures but also to facilitate the pursuit of identifiable material and economic objectives. Rather than concealing strategic economic interests behind security rhetoric, the securitizing actor openly links the deployment of national security instruments to anticipated commercial gains. In this model, security becomes a transactional mechanism through which political authority is converted into economic advantage.²⁷

The public statements made by President Donald Trump following Maduro's arrest provide a particularly revealing illustration of this phenomenon.

²⁷ Rita Abrahamsen & Michael C. Williams, *Security Beyond the State*

Instead of limiting official discourse to the success of counter-narcotics operations, Trump explicitly announced that major American oil companies would enter Venezuela, invest in restoring its oil infrastructure, and generate substantial economic returns. By further describing commerce, territory, and natural resources as being "core to our national security," the administration effectively dissolved the conventional distinction between security policy and economic policy.²⁸ The security operation was therefore presented not merely as an instrument for neutralizing an existential threat but also as a means of restructuring access to strategically valuable energy resources.

From the perspective of international law, this development raises important normative questions concerning the principle of good faith in the exercise of sovereign authority. The doctrine of good faith requires that the exercise of governmental powers correspond to their formally declared legal purposes. Where extraordinary security measures are subsequently accompanied by explicit statements linking those measures to commercial exploitation of natural resources, questions inevitably arise as to whether the original security justification genuinely reflected the principal objective of state action. In legal doctrine, such circumstances may invite discussion regarding *détournement de pouvoir*, namely the misuse of public authority for purposes other than those for which that authority was lawfully conferred.²⁹

Within this analytical framework, the indictment of Nicolás Maduro on charges of narco-terrorism can be interpreted not only as a criminal law instrument but also as part of a broader process through which legal discourse facilitated strategic geopolitical and economic objectives. This interpretation does not, in itself, negate the possibility that legitimate security concerns existed. Rather, it suggests that security and economic interests became mutually reinforcing within a single policy framework, enabling legal justification, military intervention, and economic reconfiguration to operate as interconnected dimensions of the same securitization process.

Accordingly, transactional securitization extends the explanatory scope of classical securitization theory by introducing an additional analytical stage

²⁸ Donald Trump, Transcript: President Trump Discusses the Capture of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela

²⁹ Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights
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beyond extraordinary measures. Whereas the Copenhagen School generally concludes its analysis once exceptional actions have been legitimized, transactional securitization examines the subsequent transformation of security success into material economic benefit. The Maduro case demonstrates that, under certain geopolitical conditions, securitization may function not only as a mechanism for protecting national security but also as an instrument for reorganizing political and economic control over strategically valuable resources. In this sense, security discourse becomes simultaneously a source of legal legitimacy, geopolitical leverage, and economic transaction.

From Norm-Based to Interest-Based Securitization: Reconfiguring the Logic of Security

The Maduro case further illustrates a broader transformation in the logic of contemporary securitization. Historically, U.S. security interventions have generally been accompanied by normative justifications emphasizing democracy promotion, humanitarian protection, counter-terrorism, or the enforcement of international law. Even where geopolitical or economic interests were widely suspected, official discourse typically maintained a distinction between the declared security objective and any potential material benefits arising from intervention. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, was publicly justified primarily through the narratives of weapons of mass destruction and democratization, while debates concerning strategic energy interests remained largely implicit.

The Venezuela operation presents a markedly different pattern. Rather than maintaining a clear separation between security discourse and economic objectives, the Trump administration explicitly connected the success of the security operation with the future commercial exploitation of Venezuela's oil sector. This article argues that such openness represents a significant departure from what may be described as norm-based securitization, in which extraordinary measures are primarily legitimized through reference to universally recognized security norms, toward interest-based securitization, where security narratives are openly intertwined with identifiable geopolitical and economic interests.

Within this emerging framework, the primary function of security discourse extends beyond the protection of the conventional referent object—namely, the security of the American public against transnational narcotics trafficking. Instead, the securitization process simultaneously serves to facilitate strategic access to economically valuable natural resources. Consequently, the relevant audience is no longer confined to domestic political institutions or public opinion but also encompasses international investors, multinational energy corporations, and other economic stakeholders whose interests may benefit from the political reconfiguration made possible through successful securitization.

From the perspective of international law, this transformation raises important questions concerning the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) as recognized in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII).³⁰ The principle affirms the sovereign right of states to determine the ownership, management, and exploitation of their natural resources free from external coercion. Where security operations are followed by explicit governmental statements advocating the restructuring of another state's resource sector for commercial purposes, legitimate questions arise regarding the relationship between security policy and the international legal protection of economic sovereignty.

The Maduro case therefore demonstrates how security discourse may become intertwined with broader processes of geopolitical and economic restructuring. By redefining a long-standing dispute over resource governance as an urgent national security threat associated with narco-terrorism, the United States created political conditions under which exceptional legal and military measures became increasingly acceptable. Once those extraordinary measures had been implemented, the policy focus shifted toward the reorganization of Venezuela's strategic energy sector. This sequence illustrates the central logic of transactional securitization, whereby security narratives function not merely to address perceived threats but also to facilitate the political and economic reconfiguration of strategically significant resources.³¹

³⁰ UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII)

³¹ Michael C. Williams, Words, Images, *Enemies: Securitization and International Politics*

Sidratahta Mukhtar, Laurencius Simanjuntak, Aly Ashghor

Accordingly, this article argues that the Maduro case reflects an evolution from norm-based securitization, in which legitimacy derives primarily from adherence to broadly accepted security norms, toward interest-based securitization, in which national security discourse openly operates alongside strategic economic objectives. While these two forms of securitization are not mutually exclusive, the explicit convergence of security policy and commercial interests observed in this case represents an important conceptual development that extends the explanatory scope of classical securitization theory.

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that the arrest of Nicolás Maduro by the United States in January 2026 cannot be understood solely as an exercise of transnational criminal law enforcement. Rather, the case is more convincingly interpreted as a process of energy securitization, in which Venezuela's strategic oil resources were discursively reconstructed as an existential threat to U.S. national security through the narrative of narco-terrorism. By transforming an issue rooted in political economy into a security concern, the United States was able to legitimize extraordinary measures—including unilateral military intervention, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the practical disregard of the customary immunity traditionally accorded to an incumbent head of state.

More importantly, the Maduro case reveals an important limitation in the explanatory scope of the Copenhagen School's classical securitization theory. While the existing framework effectively explains how security discourse legitimizes extraordinary measures, it pays comparatively little attention to the subsequent political and economic consequences of successful securitization. This article therefore introduces the concept of transactional securitization to explain situations in which security discourse functions not merely to obtain legitimacy for exceptional security actions but also to facilitate the pursuit of strategic economic objectives. In the present case, the explicit linkage made by President Donald Trump between the military operation and the future commercial exploitation of Venezuela's oil industry illustrates how security narratives may evolve into mechanisms for the political and economic reconfiguration of strategically valuable resources.

From the perspective of international law, this development raises broader questions concerning the relationship between national security, state sovereignty, and the governance of natural resources. The convergence of security policy and openly articulated commercial interests has the potential to challenge established principles such as Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR), sovereign equality, and the requirement of good faith in the exercise of public authority. Although the Maduro case represents a single case study, it suggests that contemporary security practices may increasingly blur the traditional distinction between national security and geopolitical economic competition.

Limitations and Future Research

This study is limited to a normative legal analysis supported by securitization theory and focuses primarily on the legal and political discourse surrounding the events of early 2026. It does not examine the longer-term political, economic, or institutional consequences of the operation for Venezuela, Latin American regional security, or the broader international legal order. Future research should therefore investigate the empirical impact of this case on international legal practice, state behaviour, and patterns of extraterritorial intervention. Comparative studies examining similar disputes involving strategically valuable natural resources may also provide an opportunity to test the broader applicability of the concept of transactional securitization beyond the Venezuelan case.

Policy Implications

The findings of this study suggest the need for a stronger international legal framework governing the exercise of extraterritorial security jurisdiction. International institutions, particularly the United Nations, should consider developing more robust oversight mechanisms to ensure that national security justifications remain consistent with the principles of state sovereignty and the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the same time, greater clarification of international legal standards concerning the protection of strategic natural resources may help reduce the risk that security narratives are employed to

legitimize unilateral intervention for predominantly geopolitical or economic purposes.

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Multi-Stakeholder Governance for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage

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Abstract : *The safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) has evolved beyond cultural preservation into a complex public governance challenge requiring coordinated action among governments, local communities, civil society organizations, academia, the private sector, and law enforcement agencies. Although the UNESCO 2003 Convention advocates community-centred safeguarding, existing studies largely conceptualize collaboration as an implementation mechanism rather than as an institutional governance architecture. This study addresses this gap by developing a Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model (CMSGM) that institutionalizes collaborative governance for the sustainable safeguarding of ICH in Indonesia. A qualitative case study was employed using the Kebaya Goes to UNESCO initiative as the empirical context. Data were collected through five Focus*



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Group Discussions, semi-structured interviews with 145 purposively and snowball-selected informants, participant observation, and documentary analysis. Data were analyzed using the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña, supported by triangulation and trustworthiness procedures. The findings reveal that effective ICH safeguarding depends on institutionalized collaboration rather than regulatory intervention alone. Community participation remains constrained by government-led decision-making, highlighting the need to reposition communities as co-producers of public value. The study further demonstrates that adaptive governance emerges through the integration of Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, Polycentric Governance, and Collaborative Policing, with the Indonesian National Police serving as a boundary-spanning institution that facilitates coordination, conflict mediation, and cultural security. The proposed CMSGM advances governance theory by shifting collaboration from a policy implementation mechanism to an institutional policy design. This study contributes to the literature on cultural governance by offering an integrative governance framework that strengthens legitimacy, collaborative capacity, and the long-term sustainability of living heritage, while providing practical guidance for public policy reform in Indonesia and other culturally diverse societies.

Keywords :

Intangible Cultural Heritage; Collaborative Governance; Multi-Stakeholder Partnership; Polycentric Governance; Collaborative Policing; Public Governance; Cultural Security; Public Value.

INTRODUCTION

The safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) has emerged as one of the most significant governance challenges in contemporary cultural policy. Over the past two decades, rapid globalization, digital transformation, urbanization, demographic change, commercialization, and the growing mobility of communities have fundamentally altered the social environments in which cultural traditions are created, transmitted, and sustained. Unlike tangible heritage, which can be preserved through physical conservation and legal protection, intangible cultural heritage exists only through continuous social practice, collective memory, and intergenerational knowledge transmission. Consequently, safeguarding living heritage extends far beyond preserving

cultural artefacts or documenting traditional practices; it requires maintaining the institutional, social, and cultural conditions that enable communities to continuously reproduce their cultural identity. This transformation has shifted the discourse on heritage safeguarding from a predominantly conservation-oriented agenda toward a broader public governance challenge that requires coordinated action across multiple sectors and institutions.

The adoption of the UNESCO 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage marked a significant turning point in this transformation by repositioning communities as the primary custodians of living heritage rather than passive beneficiaries of state intervention. The Convention introduced a community-centred safeguarding paradigm, emphasizing that cultural sustainability depends on the active participation of heritage bearers throughout policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and intergenerational transmission. This principle fundamentally challenged the conventional state-centred model of cultural management, in which governments exercised exclusive authority over heritage preservation through administrative regulation and bureaucratic control. Instead, safeguarding has increasingly been understood as a collaborative process in which governments facilitate, rather than monopolize, the governance of cultural resources.

Reflecting this paradigm shift, recent scholarship has increasingly examined safeguarding through the lens of governance rather than conservation. Research has expanded beyond issues of inventorying, documentation, and heritage nomination to explore collaborative governance, stakeholder participation, institutional resilience, community empowerment, digital transformation, and public value creation. These studies consistently demonstrate that sustainable safeguarding depends not solely on regulatory capacity but also on the ability of public institutions to establish collaborative arrangements that mobilize diverse forms of knowledge, authority, and resources.

Collaborative governance enhances policy legitimacy through deliberative decision-making, while multi-stakeholder partnerships strengthen implementation capacity by integrating governments, communities, academia, civil society organizations, cultural practitioners, media, and the private sector into collective action. Similarly, polycentric governance provides a

complementary perspective by explaining how multiple centres of authority can coordinate adaptively to manage complex public resources whose sustainability depends upon distributed knowledge and shared responsibility.

Despite these important theoretical developments, the literature remains fragmented in several respects. *First*, collaborative governance research continues to conceptualize collaboration primarily as an implementation mechanism characterized by dialogue, trust-building, facilitative leadership, and stakeholder engagement. Although these dimensions are indispensable for successful collaboration, considerably less attention has been devoted to collaboration as an institutional architecture embedded within public policy design. Consequently, existing studies provide limited explanation of how authority, accountability, resource allocation, and decision-making responsibilities should be institutionally organized to sustain collaboration beyond individual programmes or political administrations.

Second, studies on multi-stakeholder partnerships have developed extensively within environmental governance, climate adaptation, public health, and sustainable development, yet their application to intangible cultural heritage remains relatively underdeveloped. Existing research predominantly examines tangible heritage management or tourism-oriented heritage development, whereas the distinctive characteristics of living heritage—its dependence on community recognition, social practice, cultural transmission, and collective ownership—require fundamentally different governance arrangements. As a result, current partnership models insufficiently explain how multiple stakeholders can collaboratively sustain heritage whose existence depends upon dynamic social interaction rather than physical conservation.

Third, although community participation constitutes the normative foundation of the UNESCO Convention, empirical research continues to reveal a persistent implementation gap. In many contexts, participation remains largely consultative, while governments retain dominant authority over agenda setting, resource allocation, and policy evaluation. Communities are therefore frequently positioned as recipients of cultural policy rather than as genuine co-producers of public value. This institutional imbalance limits adaptive learning, weakens

collaborative accountability, and constrains the long-term sustainability of safeguarding initiatives.

These conceptual limitations are particularly evident in Indonesia, one of the world's most culturally diverse countries and home to hundreds of recognized elements of intangible cultural heritage. While national policy has made considerable progress in documentation, inventorying, legal recognition, and UNESCO nominations, governance arrangements remain predominantly administrative. Existing studies on collaborative governance have focused primarily on tourism development, the creative economy, regional innovation, and community empowerment, with relatively limited attention devoted to safeguarding intangible cultural heritage as a distinct field of public governance. Consequently, the institutional mechanisms required to integrate governments, cultural communities, academia, civil society organizations, media, the private sector, and public institutions into a coherent governance system remain insufficiently theorized.

Building upon these observations, this study argues that the principal challenge facing contemporary ICH safeguarding is no longer whether collaboration is necessary, but rather how collaborative governance can be institutionalized as a durable public policy architecture. Addressing this challenge requires moving beyond viewing collaboration as a managerial process toward understanding it as a governance institution that structures authority, accountability, collective learning, resource sharing, and public value creation across multiple actors. Such a perspective is particularly important for living heritage because cultural sustainability depends upon maintaining relationships among institutions, communities, and social networks rather than preserving cultural expressions in isolation.

Accordingly, this study develops a Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model (CMSGM) by integrating the complementary insights of Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, Polycentric Governance, and Collaborative Policing into a unified governance framework for safeguarding intangible cultural heritage. The proposed model conceptualizes government as a metagovernor responsible for orchestrating collaborative institutions, communities as co-producers of public value, and law enforcement agencies as boundary-spanning institutions that facilitate

coordination, conflict mediation, and cultural security within collaborative governance networks. By integrating these perspectives, the study extends the theoretical boundaries of cultural governance beyond existing approaches that emphasize administrative coordination or community participation in isolation.

This study makes three principal contributions to the international literature. Theoretically, it advances collaborative governance scholarship by repositioning collaboration from an implementation mechanism to an institutional policy design capable of sustaining long-term collective action. Conceptually, it develops an integrative governance framework that connects Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, Polycentric Governance, and Collaborative Policing within the context of living heritage. Practically, it offers an adaptive policy model that can assist governments and cultural institutions in strengthening community-centred safeguarding while enhancing the legitimacy, resilience, and sustainability of intangible cultural heritage governance in Indonesia and other culturally diverse societies.

State of the Art

Since the beginning of the 2020s, scholarship on the safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) has undergone a notable conceptual transformation.¹ While research during the early implementation of the UNESCO 2003 Convention primarily focused on legal protection, inventorying, documentation, and inscription procedures, recent studies increasingly frame ICH safeguarding as a complex governance challenge rather than a technical conservation exercise. This shift reflects a growing recognition that the sustainability of living heritage depends not only on formal legal recognition but also on the institutional capacity to facilitate collaboration, collective action, and adaptive governance among diverse societal actors.² Consequently, the central

¹ Stephen P. Osborne, ed., *The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance* (London: Routledge, 2010).

² Torfing et al., *Interactive Governance: Advancing the Paradigm* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

question in contemporary ICH research has evolved from what should be safeguarded to how safeguarding should be governed.³

A major development within this evolving literature is the emergence of community-centred governance as the normative foundation of sustainable safeguarding.⁴ Building upon the principles of the UNESCO 2003 Convention, contemporary research consistently recognizes communities not merely as beneficiaries of cultural policy but as knowledge holders, rights bearers, and co-producers of cultural sustainability.⁵

Empirical studies demonstrate that meaningful community participation throughout policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation significantly enhances policy legitimacy, local ownership, and the long-term transmission of cultural practices.⁶ Nevertheless, comparative evidence also reveals a persistent implementation gap. In many countries, community participation remains largely consultative, while strategic decision-making continues to be dominated by government institutions. Consequently, the transition from state-centred administration to genuinely community-centred governance remains incomplete.⁷

Parallel to this development, the literature has witnessed a broader transition from heritage conservation to heritage governance.⁸ Rather than treating safeguarding as a technical matter of preservation, recent scholarship conceptualizes it as a governance process involving the distribution of authority, stakeholder coordination, accountability, resource mobilization, and institutional learning.⁹ This perspective reflects the broader shift in public administration

³ Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, *Theories of Democratic Network Governance* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

⁴ UNESCO, *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* (Paris: UNESCO, 2003).

⁵ Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa, eds., *Intangible Heritage*, (London: Routledge, 2009).

⁶ Janet Blake, "Further Reflections on Community Involvement in the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage," *International Journal of Cultural Property* 28, no. 2 (2021): 171–190.

⁷ Blake, "Further Reflections on Community Involvement," 174.

⁸ Chiara Bortolotto, ed., *Il Patrimonio Culturale Immateriale: Le Sfide della Convenzione UNESCO 2003* (Rome: Carocci Editore, 2015).

⁹ Osborne, *The New Public Governance?*, 15.

from hierarchical government toward networked governance, recognizing that the complexity of cultural policy exceeds the capacity of any single institution.¹⁰ Consequently, collaborative arrangements involving governments, communities, academia, civil society organizations, the private sector, and international institutions have become increasingly prominent as mechanisms for enhancing policy legitimacy, institutional resilience, and public value creation.¹¹

Within this governance paradigm, multi-stakeholder partnerships have emerged as one of the most influential institutional approaches.¹² Recent studies demonstrate that collaborative partnerships broaden stakeholder representation, integrate complementary knowledge and resources, and strengthen adaptive policy implementation. However, existing research remains unevenly distributed across policy domains.

While partnership models have been extensively developed in environmental governance, sustainable development, and the management of tangible heritage, their application to intangible cultural heritage remains comparatively limited. As Žuvela argues, current governance models insufficiently capture the distinctive characteristics of living heritage, whose sustainability depends upon continuous social practice, community recognition, and intergenerational transmission rather than the conservation of physical assets.¹³ Consequently, the theoretical relationship between collaborative governance and the institutional dynamics of living heritage remains insufficiently developed.¹⁴

Another rapidly expanding research frontier concerns the role of digital transformation in safeguarding ICH.¹⁵ Advances in artificial intelligence, digital

¹⁰ Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18, no. 4 (2008): 543–571.

¹¹ Ansell and Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," 546.

¹² Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi, and Stephen Balogh, "An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 22, no. 1 (2012): 1–29.

¹³ Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh, "An Integrative Framework," 12.

¹⁴ Ansell and Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," 550.

¹⁵ Emerson and Nabatchi, *Collaborative Governance Regimes*, 48.

archives, virtual reality, and collaborative digital platforms have substantially expanded opportunities for documenting, disseminating, and promoting cultural expressions.¹⁶ However, recent systematic reviews caution that technology-driven safeguarding strategies may unintentionally produce digital fossilization, whereby cultural expressions become extensively documented yet gradually lose their social function as living practices.¹⁷ These findings suggest that technological innovation alone cannot ensure cultural sustainability. Instead, digital tools should be embedded within participatory governance arrangements that strengthen community agency, facilitate knowledge transmission, and reinforce collaborative safeguarding rather than replace it.¹⁸

These developments have further stimulated growing interest in stakeholder governance and Collaborative Governance Regimes (CGRs).¹⁹ Contemporary governance research increasingly emphasizes that safeguarding outcomes are shaped not only by institutional structures but also by collaborative capacity, stakeholder trust, facilitative leadership, collective learning, and the ability to mobilize resources across organizational boundaries. Within this perspective, collaboration is understood as more than an administrative coordination mechanism; it represents an institutional process through which diverse actors jointly generate public value by sharing authority, responsibilities, and knowledge. Such an understanding is particularly relevant for intangible cultural heritage, whose sustainability depends fundamentally on long-term

¹⁶ John M. Bryson, Barbara C. Crosby, and Melissa M. Stone, "Designing and Implementing Cross-Sector Collaborations: Needed and Challenging," *Public Administration Review* 75, no. 5 (2015): 647–663.

¹⁷ Emerson and Nabatchi, *Collaborative Governance Regimes*, 55.

¹⁸ Elinor Ostrom, "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," *American Economic Review* 100, no. 3 (2010): 641–672; Ostrom, "Beyond Markets and States," 643.; Ana Žuvela, Marta Šveb Dragija, and Daniela Angelina Jelinčić, "Partnerships in Heritage Governance and Management: Review Study of Public–Civil, Public–Private and Public–Private–Community Partnerships," **Heritage** 6, no. 10 (2023): 6862–6880.

¹⁹ Ostrom, "Beyond Markets and States," 652; Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990); Wesley G. Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago*, 88.

cooperation among actors with diverse interests, capacities, and cultural responsibilities.

The Indonesian literature reflects many of these international developments but remains comparatively fragmented.²⁰ Existing studies have successfully demonstrated the value of collaborative governance within the contexts of cultural tourism, the creative economy, regional development, MSME empowerment, and pentahelix collaboration.²¹ Nevertheless, culture is generally positioned as an instrument for economic development rather than as the primary object of governance.²² Consequently, limited scholarly attention has been devoted to developing an integrated governance framework specifically designed for safeguarding intangible cultural heritage through sustained multi-stakeholder collaboration.

Overall, the contemporary state of the art reveals three interconnected trajectories that are reshaping international scholarship on ICH safeguarding. First, the governance paradigm has progressively shifted from state-centred protection toward community-centred governance. Second, hierarchical administrative approaches are increasingly being replaced by collaborative and multi-stakeholder governance arrangements capable of managing the institutional complexity of living heritage.

Third, although recent studies have begun to integrate digital innovation, stakeholder participation, and sustainability, these dimensions remain theoretically fragmented. A comprehensive governance framework that systematically integrates Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, and the distinctive institutional characteristics of intangible cultural heritage has yet to be fully developed. This unresolved theoretical gap provides the foundation for the present study.²³

²⁰ Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, 45.

²¹ Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago*, 92.

²² Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, 50.

²³ For the metagovernor framework, see Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, *Theories of Democratic Network Governance* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

Research Gap

Although the literature on Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships (MSPs), and the safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) has expanded considerably over the past decade, important theoretical and conceptual limitations remain.²⁴ Existing scholarship has generated valuable insights into stakeholder participation, collaborative processes, community empowerment, and institutional coordination. Nevertheless, these streams of research have largely evolved in parallel rather than converging into an integrated governance framework capable of explaining how collaboration should be institutionally designed to sustain living heritage over the long term. Consequently, the principal challenge confronting contemporary scholarship is no longer whether collaboration is necessary, but how collaborative institutions should be constructed to generate sustainable public value in the governance of intangible cultural heritage.

The first limitation concerns the dominant conceptualization of Collaborative Governance itself. Most studies continue to treat collaboration primarily as an implementation mechanism characterized by dialogue, trust-building, facilitative leadership, and stakeholder engagement.²⁵ While these process-oriented dimensions have substantially enriched the collaborative governance literature, they provide only a partial explanation of governance effectiveness. Considerably less attention has been devoted to collaboration as an institutional policy design that regulates authority distribution, accountability arrangements, resource mobilization, collective decision-making, and adaptive learning across multiple actors.²⁶ As a result, existing research offers limited theoretical guidance regarding how collaborative governance can be institutionalized as a durable governance architecture rather than remaining dependent upon individual programmes, projects, or political leadership.²⁷

²⁴ Emerson and Nabatchi, *Collaborative Governance Regimes*, 110.

²⁵ Harriet Deacon, Riëks Smeets, and Federico Lenzerini, *Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage* (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2020).

²⁶ Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, "Designing and Implementing Cross-Sector Collaborations," 660.

²⁷ Osborne, *The New Public Governance?*, 22.

A second limitation arises from the development of Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships. Although MSPs have become an established governance approach in climate policy, sustainable development, environmental management, and public health, their application to intangible cultural heritage remains comparatively underdeveloped.²⁸ Existing partnership models have predominantly been designed for policy domains concerned with tangible assets or measurable development outcomes.²⁹ By contrast, intangible cultural heritage constitutes a living cultural resource whose sustainability depends upon continuous social interaction, community recognition, and intergenerational knowledge transmission.³⁰ These distinctive characteristics require governance arrangements capable of coordinating multiple actors while simultaneously preserving cultural authenticity, social legitimacy, and community ownership. Current partnership theories provide only limited explanation of how such institutional arrangements should be designed within the context of living heritage.

The third limitation concerns the fragmentation of the ICH safeguarding literature itself. Research has developed through several relatively independent streams, including legal protection, implementation of the UNESCO 2003 Convention, digital heritage, cultural tourism, community empowerment, and the creative economy.³¹ While each perspective contributes important insights, they rarely converge into a unified governance framework capable of explaining how institutional design, collaborative dynamics, stakeholder interaction, and public value creation operate collectively within safeguarding policies.³² In particular, the theoretical integration of Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, Polycentric Governance, and Collaborative Policing remains largely unexplored, despite their complementary potential for explaining the institutional complexity of safeguarding living heritage.

²⁸ Osborne, *The New Public Governance?*, 25.

²⁹ Sørensen and Torfing, *Theories of Democratic Network Governance*, 142.

³⁰ Blake, "Further Reflections on Community Involvement," 182.

³¹ Osborne, *The New Public Governance?*, 30.

³² Ostrom, "Beyond Markets and States," 660.

These theoretical limitations become particularly evident within the Indonesian context. Existing research has made important contributions to understanding cultural advancement, heritage inventorying, creative economy development, and collaborative governance across sectors such as tourism, environmental management, and community empowerment.³³ However, relatively little attention has been devoted to developing an institutional governance model specifically designed for safeguarding intangible cultural heritage through sustained multi-stakeholder collaboration.³⁴ Consequently, the governance architecture required to coordinate governments, cultural communities, academia, civil society organizations, media, the private sector, and public institutions responsible for maintaining cultural security remains insufficiently theorized.

Taken together, these limitations reveal a broader theoretical deficiency. Contemporary scholarship has made substantial progress in explaining how collaboration functions, yet considerably less progress has been achieved in explaining how collaboration should be institutionally designed. In other words, the frontier of research has shifted from understanding collaboration as a managerial process toward conceptualizing collaboration as a governance institution capable of structuring authority, accountability, resource sharing, collective learning, and public value creation within complex cultural policy environments.³⁵

Addressing this theoretical gap, the present study develops the Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model (CMSGM) as an integrated governance framework for safeguarding intangible cultural heritage. The model synthesizes four complementary theoretical perspectives—Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, Polycentric Governance, and Collaborative Policing—into a coherent institutional architecture.³⁶ Unlike

³³ Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, 102.; also see Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago*, 115.

³⁴ Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, "Designing and Implementing Cross-Sector Collaborations," 662.

³⁵ Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, "Designing and Implementing Cross-Sector Collaborations," 662.

³⁶ Sørensen and Torfing, *Theories of Democratic Network Governance*, 150.

previous approaches that primarily emphasize collaborative processes, the CMSGM conceptualizes collaboration as a governance institution that regulates stakeholder relationships, coordinates distributed authority, facilitates adaptive learning, and strengthens the long-term sustainability of living heritage.³⁷ Within this framework, government assumes the role of a metagovernor responsible for orchestrating collaborative institutions, while communities become co-producers of public value, actively participating in the creation, transmission, and safeguarding of cultural heritage.

Building upon this conceptual foundation, the study addresses the following overarching research question: *How can an institutional model of collaborative multi-stakeholder governance be designed to strengthen the long-term safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage in Indonesia?*

To answer this question, the study examines the institutional limitations of existing safeguarding policies, analyses the governance dynamics among multiple stakeholders, and develops an integrative governance framework that combines the principles of Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, Polycentric Governance, and Collaborative Policing.

The study contributes to the literature in three important ways. First, it extends Collaborative Governance theory by repositioning collaboration from an implementation mechanism to an institutional policy design. Second, it advances cultural governance scholarship through the integration of four complementary theoretical perspectives into a unified framework for safeguarding living heritage. Third, it provides an adaptive governance model capable of informing public policy reforms aimed at strengthening community-centred safeguarding and enhancing the legitimacy, resilience, and sustainability of intangible cultural heritage governance in Indonesia and other culturally diverse societies.

³⁷ UNESCO, Basic Texts of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (Paris: UNESCO, 2024).

Theoretical Foundations of the Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model

The governance of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) has undergone a profound conceptual transformation during the past two decades.³⁸ Traditionally, safeguarding was predominantly understood as an administrative function of the state, emphasizing legal protection, inventorying, documentation, and conservation measures designed to preserve cultural expressions from disappearance. This perspective reflected a broader state-centred paradigm in which governments possessed primary authority over cultural policy, while communities were largely regarded as beneficiaries of state intervention.³⁹

Although this model contributed substantially to the institutional recognition of cultural heritage, its effectiveness has become increasingly constrained by the dynamic nature of living heritage. Unlike tangible cultural assets, intangible cultural heritage exists only insofar as it continues to be practiced, interpreted, transmitted, and recreated within communities. Consequently, safeguarding living heritage cannot be achieved solely through regulatory intervention or administrative control; it depends fundamentally upon sustaining the social relationships that enable cultural knowledge to remain alive across generations.

This conceptual transformation is closely associated with the broader evolution of public administration from government to governance.⁴⁰ Classical public administration assumed that governments possessed sufficient authority, resources, and legitimacy to address public problems through hierarchical coordination and bureaucratic control. However, increasing societal complexity has challenged this assumption. Contemporary public problems—including climate change, public health, environmental sustainability, digital governance, and cultural preservation—transcend organizational and jurisdictional boundaries, making unilateral government intervention increasingly insufficient.

³⁸ Stephen P. Osborne, ed., *The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance* (London: Routledge, 2010).

³⁹ Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 54.

⁴⁰ Blake, "Further Reflections on Community Involvement," 178

Rhodes conceptualizes this transformation as the emergence of self-organizing governance networks, while Osborne's New Public Governance perspective argues that public value is increasingly generated through collaborative interactions among multiple actors rather than through state action alone. Within this paradigm, governments no longer function exclusively as policy makers and service providers; instead, they facilitate, coordinate, and orchestrate relationships among diverse organizations that collectively contribute to public outcomes.

This governance perspective is particularly relevant for safeguarding intangible cultural heritage because living heritage represents one of the most complex forms of public resources. Unlike infrastructure or natural resources, cultural practices cannot simply be produced through government expenditure nor preserved through legal regulation alone. Their continuity depends upon community participation, collective memory, social legitimacy, and intergenerational transmission. Consequently, threats to intangible cultural heritage arise less from the absence of legislation than from the gradual erosion of the social ecosystems that sustain cultural practices. Urbanization, migration, commercialization, demographic transformation, and digital disruption may weaken cultural transmission despite the existence of comprehensive legal frameworks. Therefore, safeguarding ICH should be understood fundamentally as the governance of social relationships rather than the management of cultural objects.

The UNESCO 2003 Convention reflects this conceptual transition by redefining communities as the principal custodians of living heritage. Rather than positioning governments as exclusive guardians of culture, the Convention emphasizes community participation, free and informed consent, and shared responsibility in safeguarding processes. Nevertheless, while UNESCO successfully established the normative principle of community-centred safeguarding, it provides relatively limited guidance regarding the institutional arrangements through which governments, communities, academia, civil society organizations, cultural institutions, media, and the private sector should coordinate their respective responsibilities. Consequently, the principal theoretical challenge is no longer whether collaboration is desirable, but how

collaborative governance should be institutionally designed to sustain living heritage over time.

Collaborative Governance provides the initial theoretical foundation for addressing this challenge. Ansell and Gash conceptualize collaborative governance as a collective decision-making process in which public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders through formal, consensus-oriented deliberation. Their model identifies face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment, shared understanding, and intermediate outcomes as the principal determinants of successful collaboration. The significance of this framework lies in its departure from hierarchical public administration toward participatory decision-making, recognizing that complex public problems require collective solutions rather than unilateral governmental action.

Despite its substantial contribution, Collaborative Governance remains primarily concerned with explaining how collaboration emerges rather than how collaborative institutions should be designed. The framework concentrates on interactional dynamics—dialogue, trust, facilitative leadership, and consensus-building—but pays comparatively less attention to institutional architecture, authority distribution, accountability mechanisms, and governance configurations that sustain collaboration over extended periods. Consequently, Collaborative Governance effectively explains collaborative processes but provides a less comprehensive explanation of the governance structures required to manage highly complex, multi-level policy environments such as intangible cultural heritage safeguarding.

The Collaborative Governance Regime (CGR) developed by Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh substantially extends this perspective. Rather than viewing collaboration as a discrete decision-making process, CGR conceptualizes collaboration as an adaptive governance system emerging from the interaction of principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action. This framework recognizes that sustainable collaboration depends upon institutional learning, collaborative leadership, shared resources, and adaptive capacity rather than interpersonal trust alone. Within the context of safeguarding ICH, the CGR perspective is particularly valuable because it explains how collaborative arrangements can evolve into enduring governance systems capable of responding to changing cultural, political, and social environments.

However, even the CGR framework does not fully explain one of the defining characteristics of cultural governance: the diversity of stakeholders participating in safeguarding living heritage. Governments, indigenous communities, cultural practitioners, universities, museums, civil society organizations, media, tourism industries, creative enterprises, and international organizations possess fundamentally different forms of authority, expertise, legitimacy, and interests. Understanding collaboration therefore requires not only explaining collaborative processes but also analysing the institutional relationships among heterogeneous actors.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study adopts a qualitative case study design to examine how collaborative governance is institutionalized in the safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) and to develop the proposed Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model (CMSGM).⁴¹ A qualitative approach is particularly appropriate because the research seeks to explain complex governance processes, stakeholder interactions, institutional dynamics, and trust-building mechanisms that cannot be adequately captured through quantitative methods.⁴² Rather than measuring causal relationships, the study aims to understand how collaboration is constructed, negotiated, and sustained within the real-world context of cultural heritage governance.

The empirical setting is the "Kebaya Goes to UNESCO" initiative, selected as a critical case because it represents one of Indonesia's most prominent examples of collaborative safeguarding involving government agencies, cultural communities, academia, civil society organizations, media, and international actors.⁴³ The case provides an appropriate context for examining

⁴¹ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods*, 6th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2018).

⁴² Sharan B. Merriam and Elizabeth J. Tisdell, *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation*, 4th ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2016). Please see too John W. Creswell and Cheryl N. Poth, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2018).

⁴³ Yin, *Case Study Research and Applications*, 45.

how multiple stakeholders coordinate their roles in advancing the safeguarding of living heritage while simultaneously revealing the institutional challenges associated with collaborative governance.

Data were collected through methodological triangulation between May 2024 and March 2025.⁴⁴ Five Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with key stakeholders directly involved in the kebaya advocacy process to UNESCO in order to reconstruct the governance process and validate institutional relationships. Informants were initially selected through purposive sampling based on their expertise, organizational roles, and direct involvement in the safeguarding initiative. Subsequent snowball sampling expanded participant recruitment to include local practitioners and community representatives across the three research locations of "Kebaya Goes to UNESCO", resulting in a total of 145 informants. Interviews continued until theoretical saturation was achieved, indicating that additional data no longer generated new conceptual insights.

Primary data were obtained through semi-structured interviews, guided by dimensions of organizational trust—ability, benevolence, and integrity—to explore collaborative relationships among stakeholders. Interviews were complemented by passive participant observation, allowing the researchers to compare participants' accounts with actual governance practices observed during safeguarding activities. Documentary evidence, including government regulations, institutional reports, organizational documents, policy papers, UNESCO-related materials, and advocacy records, was analysed to reconstruct the institutional development of the safeguarding initiative and to corroborate evidence obtained from interviews and observations.

Data analysis followed the interactive analytical framework proposed by Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña, involving three iterative stages: data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Interview transcripts, field notes, and documentary materials were first coded through an inductive–deductive process that combined theory-informed coding with

⁴⁴ Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldaña, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2020).

emergent empirical categories. The analysis focused on identifying patterns related to collaborative governance, stakeholder roles, institutional coordination, authority distribution, trust formation, community participation, collaborative policing, protective nudges, and public value creation.

Themes were continuously compared across multiple data sources to identify recurring governance mechanisms and to develop the conceptual propositions underlying the CMSGM. Throughout the analytical process, empirical findings were interpreted iteratively alongside Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnership, Polycentric Governance, and Collaborative Policing theories, allowing conceptual refinement through constant comparison between empirical evidence and theoretical constructs.

To ensure methodological rigor, the study adopted the trustworthiness framework proposed by Lincoln and Guba, encompassing credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.⁴⁵ Credibility was strengthened through data-source triangulation, methodological triangulation, prolonged engagement with participants, and member checking with key informants. Transferability was supported through rich contextual descriptions of the research setting and institutional environment. Dependability and confirmability were enhanced by maintaining a comprehensive audit trail documenting methodological decisions, coding procedures, and analytical interpretations, complemented by peer debriefing to examine analytical consistency and minimize researcher bias. Collectively, these procedures strengthen the reliability, transparency, and trustworthiness of the study while enhancing the credibility of the proposed Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

From Cultural Preservation to Collaborative Governance: Reframing Intangible Cultural Heritage Safeguarding

The empirical findings demonstrate that safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) in Indonesia has undergone a profound transformation from a

⁴⁵ See the classic criteria for qualitative rigorousness in Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, *Naturalistic Inquiry* (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1985).

predominantly preservation-oriented activity into a complex public governance challenge.⁴⁶ Although legal recognition, cultural inventorying, and UNESCO inscription remain important components of safeguarding policy, they are insufficient to ensure the long-term sustainability of living heritage. Rather, the continuity of cultural practices depends on the capacity of multiple institutions to coordinate their authority, mobilize complementary resources, and sustain community participation through collaborative governance.⁴⁷

This finding reflects a broader conceptual shift in cultural policy. Instead of treating heritage as an object protected through administrative regulation, safeguarding increasingly concerns the governance of social relationships that enable cultural knowledge, identity, and practices to be continuously reproduced across generations.⁴⁸ Consequently, the principal policy challenge is no longer preserving cultural expressions themselves, but designing governance institutions capable of sustaining the social ecosystems within which those expressions remain meaningful.⁴⁹

The findings therefore extend the community-centred safeguarding paradigm promoted by the UNESCO 2003 Convention. While UNESCO recognizes communities as the primary custodians of living heritage,⁵⁰ empirical evidence indicates that normative recognition alone does not automatically translate into effective governance.⁵¹ Across the research sites, community participation frequently remained consultative, whereas agenda setting, resource allocation, and strategic decision-making continued to be dominated by

⁴⁶ Stephen P. Osborne, ed., *The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance* (London: Routledge, 2010).

⁴⁷ Jacob Torfing et al., *Interactive Governance: Advancing the Paradigm* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁴⁸ Kirk Emerson and Tina Nabatchi, *Collaborative Governance Regimes* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015).

⁴⁹ UNESCO, *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* (Paris: UNESCO, 2003).

⁵⁰ Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa, eds., *Intangible Heritage* (London: Routledge, 2009).

⁵¹ Janet Blake, "Further Reflections on Community Involvement in the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage," *International Journal of Cultural Property* 28, no. 2 (2021): 171–190.

government institutions.⁵² This institutional imbalance limits community ownership and weakens the adaptive capacity required for long-term safeguarding.

Accordingly, this study argues that community-centred safeguarding should be understood not simply as expanding participation but as institutionalizing communities as co-producers of public value. Such a shift fundamentally changes the relationship between government and society, replacing hierarchical policy implementation with collaborative governance based on shared authority, mutual accountability, and collective responsibility.

Beyond Collaborative Governance: From Collaborative Process to Institutional Design

A second major finding concerns the theoretical limits of existing Collaborative Governance scholarship. The empirical evidence confirms the importance of dialogue, trust-building, facilitative leadership, and shared commitment in fostering collaboration among stakeholders. These findings are broadly consistent with the collaborative governance model proposed by Ansell and Gash⁵³[8] and further elaborated within the Collaborative Governance Regime (CGR) framework.

However, the findings also demonstrate that collaborative processes alone are insufficient to sustain safeguarding initiatives over time. Successful collaboration depends equally upon institutional arrangements that regulate authority distribution, clarify stakeholder responsibilities, facilitate cross-sector coordination, establish accountability mechanisms, and enable adaptive learning across organizational boundaries.

This observation suggests an important theoretical refinement. Existing collaborative governance scholarship primarily explains how collaboration emerges, whereas the present study addresses how collaboration can be

⁵² Blake, "Further Reflections on Community Involvement," 174.

⁵³ Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18, no. 4 (2008): 543–71, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032>.

institutionalized. In the context of living heritage, collaboration should therefore be understood not merely as a deliberative process but as an institutional architecture embedded within public policy. Such an architecture enables collaborative relationships to endure beyond individual projects, organizational leadership, or political cycles.

Consequently, the study advances Collaborative Governance theory by repositioning collaboration from an implementation mechanism toward an institutional design principle capable of supporting long-term governance.

Polycentric Governance and the Institutional Ecology of Living Heritage

The findings further reveal that safeguarding ICH operates through a polycentric governance system involving multiple centres of authority rather than a single coordinating institution.⁵⁴ Government agencies establish regulatory frameworks and policy direction; local governments coordinate implementation; cultural communities maintain the authenticity of cultural practices; universities contribute scientific knowledge; civil society organizations facilitate community engagement; media organizations strengthen public awareness; and private-sector actors support economic sustainability.

Rather than creating institutional fragmentation, this distribution of authority enhances governance effectiveness by allowing different actors to contribute according to their comparative advantages. The empirical evidence therefore supports the application of Polycentric Governance beyond natural resource management, demonstrating that intangible cultural heritage functions as a common cultural resource whose sustainability depends upon adaptive coordination among multiple autonomous institutions.

This finding broadens Ostrom's theoretical perspective by illustrating that the governance of cultural commons requires not only shared rules but also collaborative learning, institutional trust, and continuous coordination among organizations operating across different policy domains.

⁵⁴ Elinor Ostrom, "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," *American Economic Review* 100, no. 3 (2010): 641–672, <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.641>.

Collaborative Policing as a Boundary-Spanning Institution

One of the most significant findings concerns the strategic role of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) within the collaborative governance system.⁵⁵ Contrary to conventional perspectives that primarily associate policing with law enforcement and public order, the findings indicate that Polri performs an important boundary-spanning function connecting governmental institutions, cultural communities, civil society organizations, educational institutions, media, and local stakeholders.⁵⁶

Within this governance arrangement, policing extends beyond crime prevention to include facilitation, mediation, conflict resolution, public education, and institutional coordination. The concept of cultural security emerging from the findings therefore shifts attention from protecting cultural assets against legal threats toward protecting the social conditions that enable cultural practices to survive, evolve, and be transmitted across generations.

This represents an important theoretical contribution because collaborative policing has traditionally been examined within public safety and crime prevention.⁵⁷ The present study expands its analytical scope by demonstrating that collaborative policing also constitutes an essential institutional mechanism within cultural governance, strengthening both social cohesion and the sustainability of living heritage.

Developing the Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model

The integration of these findings leads to the development of the Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model (CMSGM). The empirical analysis demonstrates that no existing governance framework independently provides a sufficiently comprehensive explanation of ICH safeguarding. Collaborative Governance explains deliberative interaction and collaborative

⁵⁵ Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, 45.

⁵⁶ Wesley G. Skogan, *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁵⁷ Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, 50.

processes but provides limited attention to institutional architecture. Multi-Stakeholder Partnership theory explains stakeholder diversity and cross-sector collaboration but offers less guidance regarding distributed authority and adaptive governance. Polycentric Governance explains institutional decentralization and shared decision-making but pays comparatively limited attention to collaborative processes and public value creation. Collaborative Policing contributes an understanding of facilitative institutions and cultural security but has rarely been incorporated into cultural governance research.

The CMSGM synthesizes these complementary perspectives into a unified governance framework. Within the model, government functions as a metagovernor, responsible for orchestrating collaborative institutions rather than exercising hierarchical control. Communities become co-producers of public value, actively participating in policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and cultural transmission. Meanwhile, Polri performs the role of a boundary-spanning institution, facilitating coordination, mediating conflicts, strengthening public trust, and maintaining the collaborative environment necessary for sustaining living heritage.

Accordingly, safeguarding intangible cultural heritage should no longer be understood as the responsibility of a single public institution. Instead, it represents a continuous process of collaborative governance through which multiple stakeholders jointly create, maintain, and reproduce cultural value.

Theoretical and Policy Implications

The findings contribute to governance scholarship in three important respects. First, they extend Collaborative Governance theory by repositioning collaboration from an implementation process to an institutional policy design. Second, they develop an integrative framework that synthesizes Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, Polycentric Governance, and Collaborative Policing into a coherent explanation of living heritage governance. Third, they broaden the theoretical scope of collaborative policing by conceptualizing law enforcement agencies as boundary-spanning institutions that facilitate public value creation beyond conventional security functions.

From a policy perspective, the findings indicate that strengthening ICH safeguarding requires more than regulatory refinement or expanded cultural

inventories.⁵⁸ Sustainable safeguarding depends upon institutionalizing collaborative governance through facilitative leadership, shared accountability, adaptive learning, and enduring multi-stakeholder partnerships.⁵⁹ Governments should therefore prioritize the development of governance arrangements that empower communities as co-producers of public value while strengthening coordination across governmental, societal, and cultural institutions. Such an approach offers a more resilient foundation for safeguarding living heritage in Indonesia and provides a transferable governance framework for other culturally diverse societies confronting similar institutional challenges.

CONCLUSION

The safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) in Indonesia has shifted from a normative cultural preservation agenda to a complex public governance issue. The state is no longer the sole actor, necessitating a collaborative institutional design reform. Although international conventions mandate the principle of community-centred safeguarding, an operational gap remains in the field because local community participation often falls into government-led patterns. Therefore, public policy must institutionalize the community's role as co-producers of public value, ensuring their active involvement from the planning stage through to evaluation.

This research has successfully formulated the Collaborative Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model (CMSGM) as a public policy innovation. This model integrates the theories of Collaborative Governance, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, and Polycentric Governance to adaptively distribute authority in managing ICH as a common cultural resource. The Indonesian National Police (Polri) can play a strategic role as an institutional boundary spanner through a collaborative policing approach. This approach broadens the policing function from conventional law enforcement into a public value facilitator that maintains cultural security and ensures the continuity of traditional social spaces.

⁵⁸ Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, "Designing and Implementing Cross-Sector Collaborations," 660.

⁵⁹ Osborne, *The New Public Governance?*, 22.

Central and local governments must immediately institutionalize the multi-stakeholder collaboration model into formal cultural policy regulations, rather than merely utilizing it as a temporary program instrument. The government should assume the role of a metagovernor, focusing on formulating the rules of the game and providing coordination facilities. Furthermore, Polri needs to develop tactical guidelines regarding collaborative policing functions in the cultural sector. Furthermore, Polri is advised to optimize its role as a mediator and public educator to support awareness-based cultural safeguarding.

On the other hand, Indigenous communities, academia, the private sector, and the media need to enhance their collaborative capacities. This will enable them to participate proportionally in data processing, social verification, and creative economy development without undermining the authenticity of cultural values. Since this research focuses on the case study of the "Kebaya Goes to UNESCO" movement, future researchers are encouraged to test the adaptability of the MSGM on other types of ICH in Indonesia that possess different socio-geographical characteristics.

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Whole-of-Government and Whole-of-Society Approaches in Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: A Study on the Implementation of the RAN PE 2021–2025

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Abstract : *The emergence of violent extremism as a prominent non-traditional security threat has driven a fundamental shift in security governance, transitioning from state-centric, coercive approaches toward preventive and collaborative models. In Indonesia, this transformation is institutionalized through the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE) 2021–2025, which operationalizes Whole-of-Government (WoG) and Whole-of-Society (WoS) approaches. Employing a constructivist perspective, this study examines how global norms of Human Security and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) are diffused and localized into Indonesia’s domestic security practices through state–civil society interactions. The study finds that while the*



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RAN PE marks a significant evolution from a predominantly law enforcement-oriented model toward a preventive, community-based governance architecture, implementation remains shaped by enduring state-centric security logics. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) act as key norm entrepreneurs, strengthening social cohesion, peace education, and community resilience while translating global norms into locally contextualized practices. Consequently, the RAN PE represents both a strategic policy shift and a structural negotiation between state and non-state actors over contemporary security governance. This paper contributes to the P/CVE literature by illustrating how the interplay between WoG and WoS frameworks mediates norm localization, underscoring the critical role of institutionalized state-civil society collaboration for sustainable, preventive security governance.

Keywords: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), Human Security, Norm Localization, Whole-of-Society (WoS), RAN PE (National Action Plan)

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War era, the concept of security in International Relations (IR) studies was predominantly defined by a traditional, state-centric security perspective. Within this framework, security was primarily conceptualized as the capacity of a state to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national stability against external military threats through defensive strategies and armed capabilities.¹ Security threats were largely understood through the prism of inter-state conflicts and geopolitical rivalries dictated by the bipolar structure of the international system. Consequently, security scholarship focused overwhelmingly on national defense and conventional military capabilities, leaving individual security and societal vulnerabilities largely unaddressed within the broader international security agenda.²

¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. ke-2 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 102.

² Azrul Azlan Abd Rahman, "The Concept of National Security in the Period of Cold War and Post-Cold War," *Journal of Law and Sustainable Development* 11, no. 5 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.55908/sdgs.v11i5.766>; Indah Amaritasari, "Keamanan Nasional dalam Konsep dan Standar Internasional," *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 1, no. 2 (2015): 155.

The end of the Cold War fundamentally transformed the landscape of global security threats. Although the risk of major inter-state wars declined, this shift did not automatically yield a more secure international environment. Instead, non-traditional security threats—characterized by their complex, cross-border, and multifaceted nature, such as terrorism, violent extremism, transnational organized crime, and social instability—came to dominate contemporary security dynamics.³ Unlike conventional military perils, these non-traditional threats target not only the state as a political entity but also directly undermine individual well-being and community resilience. This structural shift exposed the limitations of traditional state-centric frameworks in explaining contemporary, multidimensional security dynamics. Accordingly, it catalyzed an epistemological shift toward a broader conceptualization of security—one that transcends state protection to encompass the safeguarding of individuals from fear, violence, marginalization, and systemic social precarity.⁴

This evolving threat environment fostered the development of the *Human Security* paradigm, which repositions individuals as the referent object of security. Broadly introduced in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 *Human Development Report*, Human Security articulates two core dimensions: *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*.⁵ Departing from traditional state-centric frameworks, Human Security prioritizes protecting individuals and communities from an array of economic, social, political, and physical threats. This paradigm shift broadened security discourse from a rigid state-centric orientation toward a people-centered, multidimensional approach. In the realm of counter-terrorism and violent extremism, Human Security provides a theoretical and operational basis for preventive strategies rooted in community

³ Indah Amaritasari, “Keamanan Nasional dalam Konsep dan Standar Internasional,” *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 1, no. 2 (2015): 155.

⁴ Anak Agung Ayu Intan Parameswari dan Ni Wayan Rainy Priadarsini S., “Upaya Strategis Pemerintah Mengatasi Masuknya Teroris Melalui Pelabuhan Gilimanuk Bali,” *Jurnal Kajian Bali (Journal of Bali Studies)* 13, no. 2 (2023): 625, <https://doi.org/10.24843/jkb.2023.v13.i02.p12>.

⁵ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22.

resilience, social inclusion, and local protection, offering a vital alternative to purely coercive and repressive measures.⁶

The September 11 attacks in the United States marked a pivotal turning point in the evolution of global counter-terrorism governance. In the aftermath, state actors heavily reinforced state-centric, security-driven counter-terrorism apparatuses through military intervention, strict law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and heightened surveillance mechanisms. While these measures neutralized specific terrorist networks, a growing body of scholarship highlights that coercive, state-centric strategies fail to address the underlying socio-economic, political, and ideological drivers of violent extremism.⁷

Furthermore, an overreliance on repressive measures risks exacerbating marginalization, eroding public trust in state institutions, and inadvertently driving further radicalization. Recognizing these structural limitations, scholarly and policy discourses have increasingly advocated for preventive frameworks that emphasize community resilience, social inclusion, and multi-stakeholder collaboration.

This shift toward prevention catalyzed the conceptual formulation of Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), an approach that prioritizes non-coercive, community-based interventions. Unlike conventional counter-terrorism, which focuses primarily on reactive security enforcement, PVE treats social, economic, political, and cultural drivers as integral components of prevention strategies.⁸ As PVE governance has evolved, it has increasingly operationalized multi-actor collaboration through *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) and *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) frameworks—bringing together state institutions, Civil Society Organizations

⁶ Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001): 90, <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753191141>; Francesco Ragazzi, “Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation: Securitising Social Policy?” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 10, no. 2 (2017): 168, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1236875>.

⁷ Naureen Chowdhury Fink dan Ellie B. Hearne, *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2008), 12.; Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 479–94, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.491009>.

⁸ United Nations, “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.”

(CSOs), local communities, and non-state actors.⁹ Consequently, preventing violent extremism is no longer conceived solely as an exclusive mandate of the state, but as a collaborative, participatory, and preventive security governance architecture.¹⁰

In recent years, the evolving landscape of violent extremism in Indonesia has demonstrated increasingly complex and multidimensional threat patterns.¹¹ The rise of digital radicalization, online propaganda dissemination, and the growing involvement of women and children within extremist networks underscore that these threats can no longer be adequately addressed through traditional security lenses.

In response to these shifting dynamics, the Indonesian government transformed its counter-terrorism strategy from a predominantly repressive mechanism toward a more preventive and collaborative governance model. This strategic realignment was formally institutionalized through Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE) 2021–2025.

By operationalizing WoG and WoS frameworks, the RAN PE integrates inter-ministerial coordination with active participation from CSOs and non-state actors. Within this implementation architecture, CSOs serve not merely as project executors but as strategic partners of the state, enhancing community resilience through grass-roots prevention initiatives.

The implementation of the RAN PE represents a broader transformation in Indonesia's security practices—shifting from law enforcement-heavy counter-terrorism toward a more preventive, participatory security governance model. However, this evolution cannot be fully understood merely as an administrative policy shift or an institutional re-alignment. A constructivist perspective offers valuable analytical leverage by explaining how

⁹ UNDP, “Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity.”

¹⁰ OSCE, *Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism*.

¹¹ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), *The Crackdown on Islamist “Radicals” in Indonesia*, IPAC Report No. 71 (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2021); Jamhari dan Testriono, “The Roots of Indonesia’s Resilience Against Violent Extremism,” *Studia Islamika* 28, no. 3 (2021): 517–45, <https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v28i3.23956>.”

shared norms, ideas, and actor interactions actively shape and redefine security practices. In the context of the RAN PE, transnational Human Security and PVE norms are not passively imported; rather, they undergo a continuous process of domestic adaptation and localization tailored to Indonesia's socio-political context. Thus, CSO engagement in the RAN PE framework not only expands non-state participation in security governance but also directly facilitates the localization of global Human Security and PVE norms into domestic security practices.

Existing scholarship on counter-terrorism in Indonesia generally falls into three main analytical streams: first, studies focusing on state security apparatuses, legal enforcement, and state-led deradicalization programs; second, policy-oriented analyses assessing the institutional coordination and implementation of the RAN PE; and third, empirical studies highlighting CSO contributions to community-level prevention initiatives. While insightful, these three strands remain largely compartmentalized. Consequently, existing literature has yet to adequately explain how global Human Security and PVE norms are localized into domestic security governance through the dynamic interaction between state institutions and CSOs within the RAN PE architecture.

Addressing this conceptual and empirical gap, this article adopts a constructivist framework to analyze the implementation of the RAN PE as a process of global norm diffusion and localization within Indonesian security governance. In doing so, this study not only uncovers the structural transformation of counter-terrorism from a law enforcement-driven model toward preventive and collaborative governance, but also demonstrates how the interplay between WoG, WoS, and CSO networks contributes to the operational localization of Human Security and PVE norms. Specifically, it highlights the creation of resilient local social networks, inter-cultural dialogue, and social integration initiatives that mitigate vulnerabilities to radicalization. These empirical and theoretical insights seek to enrich broader academic debates on security governance and P/CVE implementation, particularly within the context of the Global South.

Research Gap

While existing literature has extensively examined law enforcement measures, radicalization pathways, and civil society roles in isolation, a distinct scholarly gap remains regarding how the structural interplay between WoG and WoS frameworks in the implementation of the RAN PE 2021–2025 serves as an **institutional mechanism for localizing global Human Security and PVE norms**. This study addresses this gap by offering a constructivist analysis of the collaborative dynamics between the BNPT and CSOs (such as the Wahid Foundation and WGWC) in transforming Indonesia's national security governance.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a qualitative approach through document analysis to investigate the implementation of Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE) 2021–2025 as a transformative practice of security governance in Indonesia. The unit of analysis is the implementation of the RAN PE, conceptualized as the institutionalization of *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) and *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) approaches in preventing violent extremism.¹² A constructivist perspective is utilized to analyze how global Human Security and PVE norms undergo processes of diffusion, adaptation, and localization within Indonesia's domestic security practices.

Data were gathered through a rigorous document analysis of relevant academic literature and policy documents pertaining to the implementation of the RAN PE in Indonesia. The data corpus comprises primary policy documents—including Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021, RAN PE implementation documents, operational guidelines for the RAN PE and Regional Action Plans (RAD PE), official reports from the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), and publications by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in P/CVE initiatives across Indonesia. The analysis is further supported by peer-reviewed journal articles, research reports, policy briefs, and

¹² Glenn A. Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 27–40, <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>.

international organization documents examining Human Security, PVE, constructivism, WoG, WoS, and norm localization. These documents were purposively selected as they represent the underlying policy framework, program implementation, and actor perspectives involved in the RAN PE, thereby enabling a detailed tracing of how Human Security and PVE norms are translated into policy, operationalized by diverse actors, and adapted within the Indonesian context.

Document analysis was conducted using thematic coding to identify core themes related to Human Security, PVE, WoG, WoS, CSOs, and the mechanics of norm diffusion and localization. The analytical focus was directed toward tracing how global Human Security and PVE norms were translated into national policy, adapted into institutional design, and implemented through collaborative interactions between the state and CSOs during the 2021–2025 period. From a constructivist viewpoint, the localization process is identified through the formal adoption of global norms into national regulations, shifts in actor roles, the strengthening of collaborative mechanisms, and the practical translation of these norms into domestic security routines. Consequently, documents are treated not merely as passive information sources, but as constitutive representations of evolving norms, ideas, and security practices embedded within Indonesia's socio-political context.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Research on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) within national security governance has undergone rapid theoretical and empirical evolution.¹³ To establish an analytical framework aligned with the Discussion section, this Literature Review synthesizes the scholarly domain into three core conceptual pillars: (1) the paradigm shift from state-centric security to human security, (2) constructivist perspectives and the mechanism of norm

¹³ Mohd Mizan Aslam, "The Critical Role of Civil Society Organizations (CSO) in Combating Terrorism," in *Civil Society Organizations Against Terrorism: Case Studies from Asia*, ed. Rohan Gunaratna dan Mohd Mizan Aslam (London: Routledge, 2021), 63–78, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003150145-3>.

localization, and (3) the institutionalization of Whole-of-Government (WoG) and Whole-of-Society (WoS) approaches.¹⁴

The Paradigm Shift from State-Centric Security to Human Security

In classical International Security Studies, the conceptualization of security was overwhelmingly dominated by realists' state-centric frameworks.¹⁵ This tradition posited territorial sovereignty and military capability as the principal bulwarks against interstate threats.¹⁶ However, post-Cold War security dynamics precipitated a fundamental redefinition of security threats toward increasingly complex, non-traditional risks, where non-state actors and extremist ideologies directly target domestic societal resilience and individual safety.¹⁷ Contemporary security governance consequently demands a strategic equilibrium between managing traditional and non-traditional threats.¹⁸

In response to the analytical limitations of traditional paradigms, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) introduced the concept of Human Security, effectively shifting the referent object of security from state sovereignty (*national security*) to human individuals (*people-centered*) via two primary pillars: *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*.¹⁹ A substantial body of literature demonstrates that overly repressive and hard counterterrorism approaches often fail to address underlying structural drivers—such as social marginalization, intolerance, and systemic injustice—and risk compounding radicalization while

¹⁴ Indah Amaritasari, "Upaya Lokalisasi Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme oleh BNPT," *Abdi Bhara* 3, no. 1 (2024): 20–27, <https://doi.org/10.31599/av1vdx31>.

¹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–39, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>

¹⁶ Carola Patricia Cucat Vilchez, "The Concept of National Security in the Period of Cold War and Post-Cold War," *Journal of Law and Sustainable Development* 11, no. 5 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.55908/sdgs.v11i5.766>

¹⁷ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. ke-2 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 102.

¹⁸ Arfan Mahmood, Muhammad Tahir, dan Maryam Arshad Tarar, "Security in the Transforming World: Balancing Traditional and Non-Traditional Threats," *Social Science Review Archives* 3, no. 3 (2025): 2646–51, <https://doi.org/10.70670/sra.v3i3.1589>

¹⁹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22.

eroding public trust in state authority.²⁰ Consequently, Human Security serves as an essential normative foundation for Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) strategies, prioritizing early prevention, social cohesion, and the empowerment of vulnerable communities.²¹

Constructivism, Diffusion, and the Localization of PVE Norms

The adoption of Human Security and PVE norms by sovereign states cannot be adequately explained through utilitarian, rational-choice calculations alone. Constructivist theory posits that the international structure is fundamentally constituted by ideas, identities, and intersubjective understandings.²² Ideational power plays a pivotal role in reinterpreting security concepts in International Relations, wherein global norms shape how states define threats and formulate socially legitimate policy responses.²³

Nevertheless, global norms are not passively absorbed into domestic structures. Drawing on Amitav Acharya's theory of *norm localization*, local actors function as *norm entrepreneurs* who actively adapt, adjust, and reinterpret international norms to align with local cultural values, religious traditions, and existing legal frameworks (*cognitive prior*).²⁴ In international and regional P/CVE studies, transnational counterterrorism arenas consistently involve complex

²⁰ R. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Francesco Ragazzi, "Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation: Securitising Social Policy?" *Critical Social Policy* 37, no. 2 (2017): 163–79, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018316683472>.

²¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity* (New York: UNDP, 2016).

²² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 110; Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–48, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100008133>

²³ Nawid Aria, "The Power of Ideas: A Constructivist Reinterpretation of Security in International Relations," *Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities* 2, no. 3 (2025): 18–36, <https://doi.org/10.62810/jssh.v2i3.120>

²⁴ Acharya, Amitav. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582024>.

processes of norm assemblage.²⁵ In the Indonesian context, state institutions such as the BNPT and national stakeholders localize extremist prevention norms by harmonizing them with local wisdom, the state ideology of *Pancasila*, and religious moderation.²⁶

Institutionalizing Whole-of-Government (WoG) and Whole-of-Society (WoS) Approaches

The evolution of contemporary security governance necessitates multi-stakeholder collaboration mechanisms (collaborative frameworks). The Whole-of-Government (WoG) approach fosters horizontal and vertical coordination across ministries and agencies to eliminate sectoral silos in addressing multidimensional security challenges.²⁷ Concurrently, the Whole-of-Society (WoS) framework expands participation beyond state apparatuses to include Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), religious institutions, academia, media, and the private sector.²⁸

Empirical studies on P/CVE practices in Indonesia highlight that CSO engagement is not merely auxiliary, but vital. Indonesia's operationalization of the WoS approach is reflected in CSOs' unique capacity to engage grassroots communities with greater operational flexibility and social legitimacy than formal security forces.²⁹ Islamic mass organizations and former violent extremist offenders (*ex-offenders*) play crucial roles in interactive dialogue, counter-narrative

²⁵ Baldaro, Edoardo, and Silvia D'Amato. 2024. "Transnational Counterterrorism Assemblages: The Case of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Mali." *Territory, Politics, Governance* 12 (4): 519–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2023.2268651>

²⁶ Indah Amaritasari, "Upaya Lokalisasi Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme oleh BNPT," *Abdi Bhara* 3, no. 1 (2024): 20–27, <https://doi.org/10.31599/av1vdx31>.

²⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism* (Vienna: OSCE, 2020).

²⁸ Cameron Sumpter dan Yuslikha K. Wardhani, *Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia's National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism* (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.37805/pn2022.2.sea>.

²⁹ Chaula Rininta Anindya, *An Indonesian Way of P/CVE and Interpreting the Whole-of-Society Approach: Lessons from Civil Society Organisations* (London: Routledge, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003518655-7>

disruption, and social reintegration.³⁰ Furthermore, Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (RAN PE) successfully institutionalized WoG and WoS synergies.³¹ Nevertheless, this integration remains marked by ongoing negotiations between state-centric security logic—focused on formal authority—and Human Security paradigms that emphasize human rights and civic inclusiveness.³²

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Paradigm Shift in Security Governance

The development of policies aimed at preventing violent extremism in Indonesia demonstrates a fundamental paradigm shift in security governance. Prior to the enactment of Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE), state responses to terrorism were heavily dominated by a state-centric approach that relied on law enforcement, security operations, and intelligence capabilities as primary instruments. While this coercive approach proved effective in degrading the operational capacity of terrorist networks, it remained ill-equipped to systematically address the multi-dimensional root causes of violent extremism—such as social exclusion, intolerance, inequality,

³⁰ Wachid Ridwan, “The Dynamics of Islamic Mass Organisations in Preventing Violent Extremism,” in *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia: Islam, Gender and Civil Society*, Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, dan Yenny Wahid, ed., (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4>. Muhammad Wildan, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: The Role of Former Terrorists and Civil Society Organisations,” in *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia: Islam, Gender and Civil Society*, ed. Greg Barton, Matteo Vergani, dan Yenny Wahid (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 150–79.; <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4>

³¹ International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), *Menampak Dampak, Meneruskan Kebijakan: Laporan Penelitian Capaian dan Keberlanjutan Kebijakan Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme 2020–2024 (RAN PE)* (Jakarta: INFID, 2023).

³² Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes, *The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies: Undermining Human Rights, Instrumentalising Civil Society* (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2018), 30.

identity politics, and the rapid dissemination of extremist ideology across digital spaces.³³

This reorientation is clearly reflected in the substantive framework of the RAN PE, which expands counter-terrorism strategy beyond reactive security enforcement toward comprehensive prevention involving both state and non-state actors. The RAN PE integrates prevention, preparedness, protection, rehabilitation, and multi-stakeholder partnerships as core components of national security policy. Beyond strengthening inter-ministerial and regional institutional coordination through a *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) approach, the RAN PE explicitly opens structural avenues for participation by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), educational institutions, religious organizations, mass media, academia, and the private sector via a *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) mechanism.³⁴ Consequently, security is no longer conceptualized as the exclusive domain of state security apparatuses, but as a collective responsibility requiring cross-sectoral collaboration to foster community resilience.

This shift signifies the institutionalization of global PVE norms into Indonesia's national policy landscape. Aligning with the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the PVE approach emphasizes addressing conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism through education, community empowerment, social cohesion, protection of vulnerable groups, and enhanced participation of women and youth.³⁵ Nevertheless, the implementation of the RAN PE reveals that Indonesia did not passively adopt these transnational norms. Instead, PVE norms have been continuously negotiated and adapted into domestic multi-stakeholder governance contexts that had already been evolving within Indonesian administrative practices.³⁶

³³ Jones, ISIS in Indonesia; Mietzner and Muhtadi, "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation"; United Nations, "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism."

³⁴ Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, Laporan RAN PE 2023.

³⁵ United Nations, "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism."

³⁶ Wulandari, "Analysis of The Indonesian Government Initiative of The National Action Plan on Counter Violent Extremism That Lead to Terrorism"; Indah Amaritasari, "Upaya Lokalisasi Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme oleh BNPT," Abdi Bhara 3, no. 1 (2024): 22, <https://doi.org/10.31599/av1vdx31>.

From a constructivist perspective, this transformation demonstrates that security governance shifts are driven not only by evolving threat landscapes, but also by how state actors reframe threats and re-define appropriate strategic responses. International norms regarding Human Security and PVE provide a new normative foundation regarding the importance of preventive measures, yet their operational meaning and implementation are actively reshaped through interactions between international organizations, the state, and domestic non-state actors.³⁷ Put differently, the implementation of the RAN PE does not represent a direct, unmediated adoption of global norms, but rather a process of localization that yields a security governance framework tailored to Indonesia's political, institutional, and socio-cultural context.

Simultaneously, this transformation highlights an ongoing process of negotiation between state and non-state actors in policy implementation. On one hand, the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) retains its primary authority as the lead agency coordinating RAN PE implementation through inter-ministerial mechanisms. On the other hand, the practical efficacy of preventive measures relies heavily on CSOs, which possess social legitimacy, direct community access, and the operational capacity to translate PVE agendas into locally resonant programs.

For instance, BNPT formed the Task Force of Religious Leaders and Scholars (Ulama) to deliver educational outreach, public lectures, and national integration dialogues aimed at countering radical narratives that incite violence or religious intolerance. Thus, the implementation of the RAN PE illustrates that the paradigm shift in Indonesian security governance does not supplant state security imperatives; rather, it integrates them with Human Security principles through a more collaborative governance architecture. Analyzing this negotiative process provides the foundation for understanding how global PVE norms

³⁷ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change"; Newman, "Human Security and Constructivism"; Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58.

subsequently undergo diffusion and localization through the operationalization of the RAN PE.³⁸

However, although the RAN PE expands non-state participation through a Whole-of-Society approach, its policy implementation has not entirely discarded the state-centric character of Indonesia's security governance. Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 continues to designate BNPT as the central lead agency responsible for coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating the execution of the RAN PE, thereby framing CSO engagement within state-established institutional boundaries.³⁹

Furthermore, the 2023 and 2024 RAN PE Implementation Reports demonstrate that multi-stakeholder collaboration operates through structured mechanisms such as the Joint Secretariat, inter-agency coordination forums, the National Partnership Forum, and thematic working groups.⁴⁰ Therefore, the evolution of security governance within the RAN PE framework is most accurately understood as a continuous negotiation between state security logic and Human Security paradigms, rather than a total replacement of one paradigm by another.

Diffusion and Localization of PVE Norms

The implementation of the RAN PE demonstrates that the PVE framework in Indonesia is the result of an active interaction between international normative developments and domestic policy needs. Following the adoption of the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in 2015, global approaches to violent extremism shifted from predominantly repressive responses toward more preventive strategies. This paradigm emphasizes community empowerment, education, the enhancement of social cohesion, protection of vulnerable groups, and structured collaboration between government and civil society as core components of long-term prevention.⁴¹

³⁸ Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Sumpster and Wardhani, *Hopes and Hurdles for Indonesia's National Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism*.

³⁹ *Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021*.

⁴⁰ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

⁴¹ United Nations, "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism."

This strategic direction was subsequently reflected in Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021, which establishes prevention as a primary pillar of counter-violent extremism policy in Indonesia.⁴²

However, the operationalization of the RAN PE indicates that Indonesia did not adopt PVE norms in an unmediated or passive manner. Various provisions within the RAN PE reveal that global norms have been carefully adapted to fit Indonesia's administrative system, legal framework, and socio-cultural realities. Rather than relying solely on abstract global PVE agendas, the implemented approach actively integrates foundational national values—such as *Pancasila*, religious moderation (*moderasi beragama*), tolerance, and community resilience. Consequently, while international norms provided an essential baseline reference during policy design, the actual content and implementation mechanisms were decisively shaped by domestic imperatives.⁴³

Evidence of this norm localization is further driven by non-state actors. Within the RAN PE implementation framework, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) act not merely as project implementers, but as key translators of international norms into local contexts. For example, the Wahid Foundation (WF) developed grassroots programs that bridge PVE agendas with tolerance building, peace education, and local socio-economic empowerment. Similarly, AMAN Indonesia together with the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC) successfully advocated for the integration of gender perspectives and the protection of vulnerable groups into local prevention initiatives. The contributions of both organizations demonstrate that PVE practice in Indonesia has evolved through a highly contextualized approach rather than a simple replication of international templates.⁴⁴

From a constructivist lens, this empirical evidence illustrates that norm diffusion does not terminate upon formal policy adoption. Transnational norms undergo continuous negotiation, reinterpretation, and structural adaptation to

⁴² Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021.

⁴³ Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58; Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021.

⁴⁴ Dja'Far and Nisa, Wahid Foundation dan Advokasi Kebijakan Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan di Indonesia; Kholifah and Masudi, WGWC: Membumikan Gender Dalam Kerja Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan.

secure political and social legitimacy within the domestic arena. In Indonesia's case, while the state retains central authority through the BNPT as the coordinating lead agency, the practical efficacy of these policies relies heavily on the government's ability to foster genuine collaboration with CSOs and local actors. This dynamic demonstrates a textbook process of norm localization as conceptualized by Acharya —where domestic actors do not passively absorb external norms, but actively reconstruct them to align with local institutional structures, prevailing social values, and national security needs.⁴⁵

Implementation of the RAN PE as the Institutionalization of WoG and WoS Approaches

The implementation of the RAN PE illustrates that the process of PVE norm localization in Indonesia extends beyond the formulation of national policies to encompass the creation of formal institutional mechanisms that sustain its execution. Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 establishes the RAN PE as a national coordination framework involving ministries and state agencies, regional governments, CSOs, academia, mass media, and development partners in counter-violent extremism efforts. Through this structural blueprint, preventive approaches are systematically integrated into national security governance, ensuring that violent extremism is no longer treated solely as the domain of law enforcement and security institutions.⁴⁶

Within this governance arrangement, the BNPT retains its central position as the lead agency. Beyond drafting national policy, BNPT is tasked with coordinating the overall implementation of the RAN PE, facilitating inter-ministerial cooperation, conducting monitoring and evaluation, and compiling national implementation reports. This setup indicates that the *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) approach does not weaken state authority; rather, it reinforces the state's coordination capacity, enabling previously siloed prevention programs to be executed in a more integrated and coherent manner.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58; Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

⁴⁶ Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021.

⁴⁷ Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

The operationalization of WoG is clearly demonstrated through the active involvement of line ministries and state agencies in accordance with their respective mandates. The 2023 and 2024 RAN PE Implementation Reports highlight a significant strengthening of inter-agency coordination through joint action plans, unified reporting mechanisms, the establishment of the Joint Secretariat (*Sekretariat Bersama*), and institutional support for drafting Regional Action Plans on P/CVE (RAD PE). These institutional mechanisms demonstrate that PVE has evolved into a cross-sectoral policy agenda spanning education, social welfare, religious affairs, women empowerment, public communication, and local governance.⁴⁸

Simultaneously, the execution of the RAN PE formalizes the *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) paradigm. Implementation reports reveal that CSOs, faith-based organizations, higher education institutions, media outlets, local communities, and development partners actively engage in diverse initiatives—including peace education, community resilience programs, digital literacy, women and youth empowerment, and local government capacity building. This broad engagement expands the operational foundation of policy execution, grounding PVE governance not merely in state capacity, but also in the social legitimacy and community-level proximity of non-state actors.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the expansion of civil society participation has not dismantled the state-centric core of Indonesian security governance. The entire implementation process remains bound within the institutional parameters set by BNPT as the lead agency. While CSOs are provided structural space to contribute through strategic partnerships, policy priorities, coordination protocols, and reporting lines strictly adhere to the RAN PE institutional hierarchy. Consequently, state–civil society dynamics within this framework are

⁴⁸ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*.

⁴⁹ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

best understood as a negotiated partnership rather than a delegation or transfer of sovereign authority to non-state actors.⁵⁰

From a constructivist standpoint, this dynamic proves that norm localization alters not only substantive policy text but also the institutional logic of security governance. The state retains ultimate authority in directing policy implementation, while non-state actors are afforded functional space to contribute based on their comparative advantages and social proximity to communities. Thus, the implementation of the RAN PE represents a hybrid governance model that combines the state's central coordinative authority with societal participation as an integrated strategy for preventing violent extremism.⁵¹

From a critical perspective, however, constructivism may offer an overly optimistic account of norm localization in security policy. Although the state retains formal authority over RAN PE execution, such state dominance can potentially constrain meaningful civil society participation. In certain contexts, states may prioritize maintaining complete control over security agendas at the expense of grassroots contributions, thereby increasing vulnerabilities among marginalized communities. Therefore, evaluating the dynamic balance between state authority and genuine public participation remains essential for developing inclusive security policies.

WF and AMAN Indonesia as Norm Entrepreneurs

The implementation of the Whole-of-Society (WoS) paradigm within the RAN PE framework significantly expands the operational space for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in preventing violent extremism. However, the contribution of CSOs is not confined merely to executing grass-roots programs. As highlighted in the 2023 and 2024 RAN PE Implementation Reports, CSOs actively contribute to policy formulation, institutional capacity building, multi-stakeholder network expansion, and the dissemination of best practices at both national and sub-national levels.⁵² This demonstrates that CSOs serve as pivotal

⁵⁰ Perpres No. 7 Tahun 2021; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, Laporan RAN PE 2024.

⁵¹ Acharya, *How Ideas Spread*, vol. 58; Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

⁵² Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–
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agents translating the strategic objectives of the RAN PE into community-level security practices.

From a constructivist lens, this agency can be conceptualized through the framework of *norm entrepreneurs*. As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, norm entrepreneurs do not merely introduce new normative ideas; they actively cultivate social acceptance through sustained advocacy, persuasion, and institutional embeddedness.⁵³ In Indonesia, this dynamic does not occur via direct or unmediated adoption of international templates. Instead, PVE norms are continuously translated and adapted to align with prevailing domestic socio-cultural values and institutional architectures, illustrating Acharya's concept of norm localization.⁵⁴ This theoretical dynamic is clearly evidenced in the programmatic work developed by the Wahid Foundation (WF) and the AMAN Indonesia during the implementation of the RAN PE.

The Wahid Foundation (WF) has contributed significantly by formulating a prevention framework that links PVE objectives with tolerance building, peace education, and community resilience. Initiatives such as *Desa Damai* (Peace Villages) and *Sekolah Damai* (Peace Schools) bypass heavy-handed, repressive security logic, positioning local communities as primary actors in cultivating resilience against extremist ideologies. Beyond grass-roots programming, WF actively participates in institutional capacity building, multi-stakeholder dialogues, and policy feedback mechanisms within state-led coordination forums. This approach demonstrates how global PVE norms are operationalized into practices closely aligned with domestic societal needs, rather than serving as passive replications of international models.⁵⁵

75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582024>; also see Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

⁵³ Martha Finnemore dan Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789>.

⁵⁴ Amitav Acharya. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582024>.

⁵⁵ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

The AMAN Indonesia and the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC) displays a distinct pattern of norm localization. WGWC systematically integrates gender perspectives into PVE implementation, framing women not merely as passive victims requiring protection, but as active agents in strengthening family and community resilience against radicalization. Through targeted training, capacity enhancement, policy advocacy, and the development of women-led peace networks, the AMAN Indonesia and WGWC broadens the scope of counter-extremism governance beyond traditional state security concerns to encompass the protection of vulnerable groups, social empowerment of women and youth, and the reinforcement of social cohesion. This strategy illustrates how global PVE norms are re-articulated to address localized gender dynamics and social realities⁵⁶.

The collective work of both organizations highlights that norm localization depends not solely on state policy design, but on the capacity of local non-state actors to contextualize transnational norms for domestic audiences. While WF prioritizes tolerance education, peace-building, and community resilience, and the AMAN Indonesia advances a gender-responsive, empowerment-focused framework. Despite their distinct focus areas, both entities follow a shared structural pattern: translating global PVE norms into contextualized, inclusive, and socially accepted practices. Thus, CSOs operate not merely as secondary implementation partners for the state, but as key actors shaping the substantive meaning and practical execution of PVE in Indonesia.

This reality supports Acharya's (2004) argument that the successful diffusion of international norms is fundamentally driven by localized adaptation led by domestic actors. Under the RAN PE framework, the state provides the structural policy architecture and institutional coordination mechanisms via Whole-of-Government (WoG) channels, while CSOs like WF and AMAN Indonesia enrich policy execution through programmatic innovation, advocacy, and community empowerment within the Whole-of-Society (WoS) paradigm. Consequently, the implementation of the RAN PE demonstrates that the

⁵⁶ Dja'Far and Nisa, *Wahid Foundation dan Advokasi Kebijakan Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan di Indonesia*; Wahid Foundation, "Intoleransi Masih Tinggi, Wahid Foundation Gandeng Media Dan Kesbangpol Jateng Gerakkan Sekolah Damai"; Wahid Foundation, "RAN PE"; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.
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ongoing transformation of security governance in Indonesia is not merely a top-down product of state policy reform, but a negotiated outcome of state–CSO interactions in building a contextually grounded, preventive security architecture.⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that the implementation of the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (RAN PE) 2021–2025 represents not only a strategic policy shift in Indonesian counter-terrorism, but also a broader structural transformation of security governance toward a collaborative model. This reorientation is operationalized through the *Whole-of-Government* (WoG) approach—which strengthens inter-ministerial and inter-agency coordination under the leadership of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT)—and the *Whole-of-Society* (WoS) framework, which structurally incorporates Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), academia, faith-based organizations, mass media, and local communities into P/CVE efforts. Consequently, the RAN PE architecture signifies that violent extremism prevention is no longer conceptualized purely as a law enforcement issue, but as a shared imperative that integrates security, social cohesion, and development dimensions.

Furthermore, this research illustrates that the operationalization of the RAN PE constitutes a process of active norm localization rather than a passive adoption of global policy templates. Transnational norms surrounding Human Security and PVE have been translated into the Indonesian context through

⁵⁷ Zuhri et al., *Civil Society and Gender Mainstreaming: Case Study of the Working Group on Women and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (WGWC) Program*; True and Eddyono, “Preventing Violent Extremism – What Has Gender Got to Do With It?”; True and Eddyono, *PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: GENDER PERSPECTIVES AND WOMEN’S ROLES*; Kholifah and Masudi, *WGWC: Membumikan Gender Dalam Kerja Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan*; Venny et al., *Perempuan Perdamaian: Adopsi Resolusi 1325 Di Indonesia*; Mustaspa and Affianty, “Agensi Perempuan Dalam Implementasi Resolusi PBB 1325 Tentang WPS Pada RAD Pencegahan Ekstremisme Di Banten (2021-2023)”; Kholifah and Masudi, *WGWC: Membumikan Gender Dalam Kerja Pencegahan Ekstremisme Kekerasan*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2023*; Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Laporan RAN PE 2024*.

deliberate adaptation to national values, administrative structures, and localized community needs. Within this dynamic, the state maintains its central coordinative role via BNPT, while non-state actors—specifically organizations such as the Wahid Foundation (WF) and the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC)—operate as *norm entrepreneurs* who re-articulate global principles into locally resonant programming. These findings confirm that norm localization unfolds through continuous interaction and negotiation between state and non-state actors, rather than through unmediated top-down absorption of international standards.

Theoretically, this paper contributes to constructivist scholarship, particularly refining Amitav Acharya's (2004) framework on *norm localization*. The findings demonstrate that the ultimate trajectory of norm diffusion depends not merely on formal state policy adoption, but on the agency of domestic actors to interpret, negotiate, and operationalize those norms within specific domestic contexts. Accordingly, this study underscores that CSOs function not simply as peripheral project implementers, but as pivotal actors shaping the substantive meaning, legitimacy, and daily practices of security governance within the Global South.

From a policy standpoint, sustaining the momentum of the RAN PE beyond its initial 2025 mandate requires institutionalizing both WoG and WoS mechanisms. BNPT must continue to reinforce its coordinative capacity, refine monitoring and evaluation protocols, and ensure the deep integration of RAN PE targets into the national and sub-national budgeting and strategic planning cycles of line ministries and regional governments. Concurrently, CSO engagement should be fostered as an equal and sustainable partnership rather than a short-term sub-contracting arrangement. Strengthening institutional capacity, establishing systematic consultation channels, and providing robust support for community-driven innovations will be vital to ensuring that preventive security governance flourishes—without compromising the independence of civil society or reducing social actors to mere instruments of state security agendas.

Finally, this study acknowledges limitations inherent in its qualitative document-analysis methodology and its primary focus on national-level policy frameworks. Future research could expand upon these insights through

comparative empirical studies analyzing the localized implementation of Regional Action Plans (RAD PE) across diverse provinces, field-based ethnographic research investigating state–CSO partnership dynamics on the ground, or longitudinal assessments evaluating the forthcoming iteration of the RAN PE (2025–2029) to measure the long-term sustainability of norm localization and the practical efficacy of WoG and WoS approaches.

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Indonesian Police Reform: Balancing Independence and Accountability

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Abstract : *The placement of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) within the constitutional structure—directly under the President or under a ministry—remains a contested issue in Indonesia’s security-sector reform amid a persistent deficit in public trust and human rights protection. This article analyses the direction of police reform and weighs the constitutional consequences of both placement options. Employing a juridical-normative method with statutory, conceptual, case, and comparative approaches, this study examines primary and secondary legal materials, including Constitutional Court Decision No. 19/PUU-XXIII/2025. The study finds that the dichotomy of ‘under the President versus under a ministry’ is a false binary: the quality of democratic policing depends not on the structural locus but on the design of institutional safeguards: namely, guaranteed*



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operational independence of investigation, legally empowered external oversight, and transparency. Comparative evidence from the United Kingdom, Japan, and France shows that police placed under a ministry can remain professional and democratic when such safeguards exist. The article recommends retaining Polri under the President while reconstructing the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) from an advisory body into an oversight body with binding ethical-investigative authority through amendment of Law No. 2 of 2002.

Keywords : *police reform; accountability; independence; democratic civilian control; democratic policing*

INTRODUCTION

Police reform is one of the most important agendas in the post-1998 reform democratization. The separation of the National Police from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) began through Presidential Instruction No. 2 of 1999, confirmed by MPR Decrees No. VI/MPR/2000 and VII/MPR/2000, and instituted through Law No. 2 of 2002 concerning the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia. Through this series, Polri is expected to evolve into a professional, neutral, and service-oriented civilian institution. However, more than two decades later, the polemic regarding the position and direction of the National Police reform is still relevant to debate.¹

As a state apparatus, the National Police is tasked with maintaining security and order, enforcing the law, and also providing protection and public service. In practice, the reality in the field is often inversely proportional to these normative expectations, thereby eroding public trust, which serves as the bedrock of institutional legitimacy.²

¹Munif Ashri, "The Impact of ICCPR Accession on the Prevention of Extrajudicial Killings in Indonesian Perspective," *Veritas et Justitia* 11, no. 1 (2025): 50–81.

²Isna Putri Yustina, "Juridical Review of the Code of Ethics of the Indonesian Police in Law Enforcement in Indonesia" (Dissertation, Sultan Agung Islamic University Semarang, 2024).

The results of the Indonesian Political Indicators survey show that public trust in the National Police is at a high level but has been consistently eroded, namely 80% (2021), 77.3% (2022), 76.4% (2023), and 75.3% in early 2024. This erosion is volatile and susceptible to events, and is exacerbated by divergences between survey agencies: the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) in early 2025 placed the National Police as the law enforcement agency with the lowest trust compared to the Attorney General's Office and the KPK.³

Table 1.
Level of Public Trust in the National Police according to Indonesian Political Indicators (2021–2024)

Year (Wave)	Highly Trusted (%)	Moderately Trusted (%)	Total (%)
2021 (Nov)	16	64	80,0
2022 (May)	11,8	65,5	77,3
2023 (Jun)	10,8	65,6	76,4
2024 (Jan)	12,0	63,0	75,3

Source: Indonesian Political Indicators, national survey 2021–2024 (processed by the author). Total = the sum of “highly trusted” and “moderately trusted” responses”.

At least four factors explain the pressure on public trust: abuse of authority and violence by officials, illegal levies that are structural in nature, involvement of individuals in criminal acts, and major scandals such as the *obstruction of justice case* in the case of Brigadier J in 2022.⁴

³Data on the trend of the Indonesian Political Indicators 2021–2025 as compiled from the release of the institution's survey; compare the Indonesian Survey Institute, the Survey of the Level of Public Trust in Law Enforcement Institutions (Jakarta: LSI, February 2025).

⁴Kompas, "The Obstruction of Justice Case of Brigadier J's Murder Shakes Police Reform," August 2022 edition.

The 2023 Kompolnas report places complaints of maladministration and abuse of authority ranked as the second highest category, emphasizing that problems are systemic, not just individual.⁵

The problem has become increasingly salient/highly topical due to the rolling out of the draft revision of Law Number 2 of 2002 (Police Bill) since 2024 which has been criticized as having the potential to expand authority without strengthening accountability safeguards, while on the other hand the Constitutional Court Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025 emphasizes that the position of the National Police remains under the President and cannot be reduced to a ministerial level.⁶

Departing from this context, this article answers two research questions. *First*, what is the direction of the reform of the National Police in responding to the crisis of public trust related to the abuse of authority and human rights violations? *Second*, what are the constitutional consequences of placing the National Police under the President compared to under a ministry, as well as the ideal supervisory design for both options?"

This article contributes theoretically by shifting the focus of the debate from the structural locus ("under whom") to the design of institutional safeguards ("with what safeguards"), using the framework of democratic policing and democratic civilian control. Empirically, this article integrates the latest survey data, legislative developments (Police Bill), jurisprudence (Constitutional Court Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025), and police institutional practices in a number of democratic countries as the basis for *the recommendation of the ius constituendum*.

⁵Kompolnas, Annual Report on Public Complaints against the National Police (Jakarta: Kompolnas, 2023).

⁶The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025, regarding the position of the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia as a state tool under the President.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Recent Literature

The study of the reform of the National Police in the last five years is divided into several focuses. In the empirical-diagnostic realm, Hasani, Halili, and Yosarie mapped 130 institutional problems through a survey of 167 experts and found a gap in accountability in Law Number 2 of 2002 (61.7% of expert assessments were unfavorable), accompanied by a comparison of France and the Netherlands.⁷ Adhikara, Putranto, and Gurion examine the search for legitimacy in contemporary policing,⁸ while Hatmawan examines public compliance in the midst of the tense police-community relationship.⁹

In the normative-institutional realm, Amostian, Yusriyadi, and Silviana highlight the weak authority of the National Police Commission as a point vulnerable to accountability,¹⁰ while the previous author evaluated the Presisi program as a trust-building strategy.¹¹

The international literature enriches the perspective of supervision. Hope points out that civilian oversight is the main approach to "policing the police" in a democratic society, complete with its typologies and challenges;¹² Rosenthal

⁷Ismail Hasani, Halili, and Ikhsan Yosarie, "Police Transformation within Constitutional Democracy Design: Evidence from Indonesia," *Journal of Civics: Media of Citizenship Studies* 23, no. 1 (2026): 331–346.

⁸R. Adhikara, P. Y. Putranto, dan A. B. Gurion, "In Pursuit for Legitimacy: An Overview of Contemporary Policing in Indonesia," *Eduvest: Journal of Universal Studies* 4, no. 2 (2024): 687–702.

⁹Ilham Dwi Hatmawan, "Public Compliance towards Indonesian National Police (POLRI) Authority in the Midst of a Strained Public–Police Relationship," *Jurnal Kriminologi Indonesia* 1, no. 1 (2025): Artikel 6.

¹⁰Amostian, Yusriyadi, and Ana Silviana, "Reformasi Polri Melalui Penguatan Fungsi dan Kewenangan Komisi Kepolisian Nasional dalam Melakukan Pengawasan Eksternal terhadap Polri," *Jurnal Pembangunan Hukum Indonesia* 5, no. 3 (2023): 510–522.

¹¹Edi Saputra Hasibuan, "Reformasi Polri: Menilik Keberhasilan Program Presisi Polri," *Krtha Bhayangkara* 17, no. 3 (2023): 515–524.

¹²Kempe Ronald Hope Sr., "Civilian Oversight for Democratic Policing and Its Challenges: Overcoming Obstacles for Improved Police Accountability and Better Security in Africa and Beyond," *Journal of Applied Security Research* 16, no. 4 (2021): 422–447.

maps the perspectives of the directors of civilian oversight agencies,¹³ and Adams experimentally examines the police leadership's support for democratic oversight regimes.¹⁴

Gap Analysis

The existing literature generally stops at the diagnosis of dysfunction, performance evaluation, or strengthening of one supervisory institution. Relatively no study has specifically examined the structural dichotomy of the placement of the National Police—under the President or ministries—by clashing it with the theory of democratic policing and democratic civilian control as well as on the design of the police supervisory body in the comparative jurisdiction, especially in the context of the 2024 National Police Bill and the Constitutional Court Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025. This is the void that this article aims to fill.

Main Theory

First, democratic policing (David H. Bayley): democratic policing is subject to democratically elected laws and authorities, prioritizing citizen safety, transparency, and respect for human rights; its democratic quality is not measured by who it is structurally accountable, but by its accountability to the law and the public.¹⁵

Second, democratic civilian control (Samuel P. Huntington): *objective civilian control* maximizes professionalism by maintaining the professional autonomy of the

¹³Robert A. Rosenthal, “Perspectives of Directors of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement Agencies,” *Policing: An International Journal* 41, no. 4 (2018): 435–447.

¹⁴Brian Adams et al., “Police Reform from the Top Down: Experimental Evidence on Police Executive Support for Civilian Oversight,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22620>.

¹⁵David H. Bayley, *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 2001), 13–14.

apparatus from political intervention, as opposed to *subjective civilian control* which subordinates the apparatus to political factions.¹⁶

Third, accountability (Guillermo O'Donnell): horizontal accountability—oversight by another state's agency that has the authority to question and sanction—is key; weak horizontal accountability occurs when supervisors do not have coercive powers.¹⁷ Fourth, *the state of law* as a normative frame that demands the neutrality of the apparatus, the rule of law, and equality before the law.¹⁸

Conceptual Framework


As illustrated in Figure 1, this research framework progresses systematically from problem identification to policy recommendations. It begins with the crisis of public trust and human rights protection, which gives rise to a structural dichotomy regarding police governance. This dilemma is then critically examined through three analytical lenses, shifting the conceptual focus toward institutional safeguard design. Ultimately, this logical progression yields concrete recommendations for structural restructuring (*see the figure at next page, [ed]*).

¹⁶Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80–85.

¹⁷Guillermo O'Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 3 (1998): 112–126.

¹⁸Jimly Asshiddiqie, *Indonesian Constitution and Constitutionalism* (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2022), 189.

Figure 1. Research Conceptual Framework



Source: Author's construction (2026).

RESEARCH METHODS

This research is a juridical-normative (doctrinal) law research that places norms, principles, and doctrines as the object of study. This type was chosen because the focus of the analysis is the constitutional position of the National Police and the harmonization of its arrangements, not field behavior testing; Therefore, the research does not use primary data (interviews/questionnaires), but rather a study of documents on legal materials and secondary data.¹⁹

¹⁹Ariman Sitompul, *Metode Penelitian Hukum Normatif: Strategi Praktis Penulisan Skripsi, Tesis, dan Disertasi* (Medan: t.p., 2022), 30–40.

Four integrated approaches are used: the statute *approach* to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the MPR Decree No. VI and VII/MPR/2000, and Law No. 2 of 2002; the *conceptual approach* to democratic policing, democratic civilian control, and accountability; the *case approach* on the Constitutional Court's Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025 and legal events that triggered a crisis of trust (Ferdy Sambo case, the Kanjuruhan tragedy); and a *comparative approach* to the institutional model of policing in the United Kingdom, Japan, and France.

Primary legal materials include the above regulations and rulings; Secondary legal materials include the Komnas HAM Report (2023), Kompolnas report, survey data on Political Indicators, LSI, and Kompas R&D (2021–2025), books, and articles from reputable journals; tertiary material in the form of a legal dictionary. The collection technique is carried out through literature study. Analysis is prescriptive-qualitative, interpreting and connecting norms with theories to produce arguments *ius constituendum*.

The validity of legal materials is maintained in two ways: verification of primary sources in official repositories (regulatory databases, Directory of Supreme Court and Constitutional Court Decisions, and official reports of state institutions), and triangulation of secondary data between sources—in particular comparing cross-agency survey figures to avoid unverified claims.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Key Findings: Crisis of Trust, Accountability, and Human Rights

Measured by democratic policing standards, the transformation of the National Police has not been fully realized. The biggest problem is accountability: normatively there is internal (Propam) and external (Kompolnas, DPR) supervision, but its effectiveness is weak because Kompolnas only serves as a advisory body without binding investigative authority, while the President's control is political and does not reach violations of operational ethics.²⁰ The

²⁰Satjipto Rahardjo, *Polisi dan Masyarakat dalam Negara Demokrasi*, (Bandung: Alumni, 2022), 156.

accountability deficit, thus, stems from the absence of coercive authority on the supervisor, not from the absence of its institution.

The structural vulnerability of internal oversight was starkly demonstrated in the Ferdy Sambo case, where the abuse of authority within the Internal Affairs Division (Propam) led to systematic obstruction of justice. Concurrently, institutional failures such as the Kanjuruhan stadium tragedy further exposed the critical deficit in operational accountability and human rights protection, directly triggering the sharp decline in public trust.

The weakness of independence worsened the situation; in various political moments, the National Police was often perceived as not neutral, even though in a state of law the apparatus must be free from political intervention.²¹ The stigma of law enforcement being 'sharp downwards, blunt upwards' exposes the stark contradiction between the ideal of equality before the law and actual discriminatory practices.²²

In the human rights dimension, the 2023 Komnas HAM Report recorded the police as the party with the most complaints (around 37% of complaints), and this trend persists—in 2024 Komnas HAM again recorded the police as the institution with the most complaints.²³

Theoretical Analysis

With the framework of William N. Dunn's policy evaluation—effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, leveling, responsiveness, and precision—the National Police Grand Strategy 2005–2025 (Trust Building, Partnership Building, Strive for Excellence) can be assessed.²⁴ The final stage that should

²¹Muladi, *Demokrasi, HAM, dan Reformasi Kepolisian*, (Jakarta: Prenadamedia, 2023), 211.

²²Todung Mulya Lubis, *Hukum dan Politik di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2022), 94.

²³Komnas HAM RI, Annual Report 2023: The Situation of Human Rights in Indonesia (Jakarta: Komnas HAM RI, 2023), 48; compare Komnas HAM 2024 complaint data which puts the police at the top.

²⁴William N. Dunn, *Public Policy Analysis: An Integrated Approach*, 5th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2012), 254–256.

have resulted in superiority and trust has not been fully effective: trust has been consistently eroded to 75.3% in early 2024 and highly volatile to events—from the 2022 shock to the sharp decline after the August 2025 riots—signaling a low responsiveness to accountability demands.²⁵

Discussion: Structural Design in the Perspective of Democratic Civic Control and Comparison

The placement of the National Police directly under the President gives high independence but poses accountability problems because supervision is not equal to its authority;²⁶ Conversely, placing the police under a ministry strengthens accountability through the minister's political accountability to Parliament, but opens up the risk of politicization.²⁷

Table 2.

Comparison of the Constitutional Consequences of Police Placement

Aspects	Under President	Under the Ministry
Independence	Higher; the potential for greater neutrality.	More vulnerable to the political interests of the ministry.

Source: processed by the author (2026).

The claim that the placement of the police force under the ministry inherently weakens the institution is comparatively untenable. In the UK, the

²⁵Edi Saputra Hasibuan and Kurniawan Tri Wibowo, *Politik Hukum Kepolisian: Pembentukan Peraturan Kepolisian* (Yogyakarta: Jejak Pustaka, 2025), 113.

²⁶Bivitri Susanti, *Reformasi Sektor Keamanan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Epistema Institute, 2023), 81.

²⁷Todung Mulya Lubis, *Hukum dan Politik di Indonesia*, 99.

police are within the purview of the *Home Office*, but the operational independence of the chief of police is guaranteed by the doctrine of *operational independence*, with local accountability through the *Police and Crime Commissioners*.²⁸ In Japan, the *National Police Agency* is overseen by the *National Public Safety Commission* which maintains neutrality from partisan political control; in France, the *Police Nationale* is under the Ministry of the Interior but investigations are subject to the supervision of judicial authorities.²⁹

Some established democracies even place the police under ministries but balance them with oversight bodies with full investigative authority, such as the *Independent Police Conduct Authority* (New Zealand/Australia) and the *Civilian Review and Complaints Commission* (Canada). This kind of civilian supervision, as emphasized in the literature, is the main approach to maintaining accountability—an aspect that is precisely absent from the National Police Commission.³⁰

Analyzed with Huntington's theory, the two options pursue the same goal through different paths; therefore the dichotomy of "under the President or the ministry" is a false opposition—the determining variable is not the structural box, but the quality of its safety design. These findings are in line with a recent study that places the accountability gap in Law No. 2 of 2002 as the root of the problem.³¹

Juridically, this choice obtained constitutional affirmation. The Constitutional Court's Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025 states that the position of the National Police cannot be reduced to a ministerial level and remains under the President as the holder of government power, in line with

²⁸David H. Bayley, *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 60–64.

²⁹Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Guidebook on Democratic Policing* (Vienna: OSCE, 2008), 18–20.

³⁰Kempe Ronald Hope Sr., "Civilian Oversight for Democratic Policing," 422–447; please see too Robert A. Rosenthal, "Perspectives of Directors of Civilian Oversight," 435–447.

³¹Hasani, Halili, dan Yosarie, "Police Transformation within Constitutional Democracy Design," 331–346.

Article 30 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000.³²

Implications: National Security and Policy

For national security, maintaining the National Police under the President maintains a clear line of command and reduces political fragmentation between ministries, but it is only valid if it is accompanied by strengthening horizontal accountability. For policy, the key implication is the need to reconstruct the design of external oversight – not simply move the structural locus – in order for the crisis of trust to be substantially addressed.

CONCLUSION

First, The direction of the National Police's reform in responding to the crisis of trust cannot be solved through structural changes alone. The accountability deficit stems from the lack of coercive authority on supervisors, weak independence from political intervention, inconsistencies in law enforcement, and lack of guaranteed human rights protection—four prerequisites for democratic policing.

Second, the dichotomy of placement "under the President or ministries" is a misguided opposition; The structural locus is not a determinant of the democratic quality of the police, but rather the design of its security. In the context of Indonesia, and strengthened by the Constitutional Court Decision Number 19/PUU-XXIII/2025, the most relevant option is to maintain the National Police under the President accompanied by strengthening horizontal accountability with legal force.

Policy implications: it is recommended to amend Law No. 2 of 2002 to reconstruct the National Police Commission from a advisory body to a supervisory institution with the authority to conduct binding ethical investigations, accompanied by periodic reporting to the public, as well as optimizing the role of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia over *the*

³²Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 19/PUU-XXIII/2025.

undue delay in handling cases. Future research agendas include a study of the independence of the National Police's budget and the readiness of the bureaucratic culture if external supervision is tightened, as well as a more in-depth comparative study on the legal basis of police supervisory bodies in various jurisdictions.

Research Limitations

This research has a number of limitations. *First*, in terms of data, the research is juridical-normative and only examines legal materials and secondary data, without primary field data (interviews or questionnaires), so it does not measure stakeholder perceptions directly.

Second, in terms of approach, legal comparisons are carried out at the level of institutional design and have not explored all the positive legal bases of each jurisdiction in depth.

Third, public trust rates vary between survey institutions with different methodologies, so the interpretation of trends needs to be cautious. This limitation also opens up opportunities for further research that is empirical and comparative-juridical in more detail.

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